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Preface: Change the Game
Pledge-and-review was invented for the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by Japan in 1991, and it hasn’t 
changed much since. It’s what happened in Kyoto, although they tried hard 
to avoid the fate of each country simply pledging to do whatever it wanted 
followed by unenforced reviews. It’s what happened under the Copenha-
gen Accord and the Cancún Agreements. And it’s what happened again in 
Paris.
At least under Kyoto there was a bit of structure. Countries picked com-
mitment levels relative to 1990. But within the European Union (EU), these 
ranged from a 30% cut to a 40% increase. There was virtually no structure 
in Paris; countries pledged almost anything. Now they will review it. And 
then there may be more pledges and more reviews.
Elinor Ostrom, a political scientist, won the 2009 Nobel Prize in eco-
nomics for her lifelong studies of common-pool dilemmas—one of which 
is climate change. And her work is part of an enormous literature describ-
ing hundreds of real-world systems, thousands of laboratory experiments, 
and a great deal of theory. Yet after 25 years of failure, climate negotia-
tions stick with an approach that ignores what we know about human 
cooperation.
To save the commons, the users of the commons must cooperate. That 
requires trust, and trust requires a reciprocal agreement—we will if you will, 
and you will if we will. For a group, especially a group of 10 or 100 coun-
tries, finding a reciprocal agreement requires simplification to a common 
commitment. Finding that commitment, and finding how to strengthen 
and stabilize it—that’s the job undertaken by this book. But before you 
delve into that, we would like to show you a sort of magic trick.
xii Preface
Negotiation design matters. We will now take a group of 10 completely selfish 
individuals and show you how they cut each other’s throats in one game. 
Then, changing one rule—so they make common commitments instead 
of individual commitments—you will see those very same people, their 
temperaments unchanged, cooperate like angels.
You and nine other cut-throat individuals (representing countries) play a 
game. Each player has $10, of which each must simultaneously pledge some 
part to the common pot. A referee makes sure they honor their pledges 
but uses two different rules, one per game, for what it means to “honor a 
pledge.” Every dollar (for CO2 abatement) placed in the pot will be doubled 
(by natural climate benefits) and distributed evenly to all players. So any 
dollar placed in the pot will be doubled to $2, and 20 cents will be returned 
to each player.
First, in the “individual commitment” game, all pledges are independent 
of those of others. So the referee makes sure each contributes exactly what 
he or she pledges. This is the classic public-goods game, and the rational 
strategy for the narrowly self-interested player is to contribute nothing 
because this makes a player better off no matter what the others do. The 
result is the famous tragedy of the commons. Cooperation does not occur, 
except perhaps on the part of a few committed altruists, who correctly note 
that if only everyone cooperated, everyone would be better off.
Second, consider the “common commitment” game, in which the rule is 
that the referee interprets a pledge of $x to mean a player will contribute 
up to $x, but only as much as the lowest pledge. As before, this involves 
enforcement, but enforcement is weaker in the sense that, unlike before, 
the referee will not enforce contributions greater than the lowest pledge. 
This is a reciprocal agreement. It says, “I will if you will.” But it does not say 
what anyone must do. Any outcome from “all contribute $0” to “all con-
tribute $10” is possible, each is free to pledge from $0 to $10, and no one is 
forced to contribute more than his or her pledge. As before, after enforcing 
these common-commitment pledges (under the new rule), the money is 
doubled and distributed evenly.
This changes everything. Pledging $0 will mean simply keeping your $10, 
whereas pledging $10 could result in ending up with anything between $10 
(if the lowest pledge is $0) and $20 (if the lowest pledge is $10), depending 
on what others pledge. So, even though you are completely selfish, because 
you cannot lose and could gain by pledging $10, that’s what you would do. 
Change the Game xiii
So, assuming that all play in their narrow self-interest, all pledge $10, and 
the group’s $100 is doubled and divided evenly, and all end up with the 
maximum amount of $20.
Because the common commitment protects against free-riding, self-
ish behavior has been changed from “contribute nothing” to “contrib-
ute everything,” and the outcome is changed from no cooperation to full 
cooperation. With the common commitment, all know that “We are in 
this together.” This demonstrates a key point. We will get better outcomes 
from the same players if we design better rules, even if those players do not 
increase their political will or ambition at all.
Of course, there is still a long way to go before we turn these ideas into 
a viable climate treaty, but there’s something refreshing about seeing that 
human behavior can be changed without increasing enforcement power, 
changing human nature, or increasing ambition or political will. The ref-
eree fully enforced pledges in both games, and players were just as greedy 
in the second game as in the first. That the design of the negotiations can 
dramatically change human behavior allows a more optimistic interpreta-
tion of the climate predicament. It says, we are not as uncooperative as we 
have appeared to be for the last 25 years. The problem was just that we were 
trapped in the wrong game.
A focus on cooperation. This book is about climate cooperation—what it 
means, why it’s needed, and how to attain it. The first three introductory 
chapters set the stage. They explain that, although COP21 in Paris formu-
lated an ambitious global climate goal, this is only progress if the collec-
tive goal will be translated into a reciprocal, common climate commitment 
(MacKay et al., chapter 2). Indeed, Paris led to an unresolved gap between 
what is collectively needed and the intended national climate policies 
(Cooper et al., chapter 1). Narrow self-interest, responding to domestic pol-
lution concerns and technological miracles, will not be enough to solve the 
dilemma (Parry, chapter 3), and neither will altruistic ambition. Coopera-
tion is what is needed—and it is a feasible alternative to simply relying on 
narrow self-interest or altruistic ambition: If the game is changed to involve 
a reciprocal common commitment, national self-interests will be realigned 
with the public good. Ambition will follow automatically.
The second part of the book includes nine chapters that each provides 
different perspectives on the same theme: how the simple idea of a com-
mon commitment, illustrated by the previous example, can actually be 
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turned into a viable climate treaty. A key insight of all chapters is that nar-
row self-interest as well as Paris’ “pledge-and-review” approach will fail as 
long as it is based on individual commitments (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 
10). Rather, all contributors agree that the best candidate for a common 
commitment is carbon pricing. Global carbon pricing is a natural com-
parison standard for abatement efforts, facilitating reciprocity (Cramton 
et al., chapter 12) and enforcement (Nordhaus, chapter 7); it substantially 
simplifies negotiations by focusing on a single minimum price variable, as 
opposed to many different quantity targets (Weitzman, chapter 8); it is effi-
cient and flexible with respect to national climate policies (Stiglitz, chapter 
6); it can help to make other, idiosyncratic climate policies more effective 
(Edenhofer and Ockenfels, chapter 9); it substantially reduces countries’ 
risks and makes it easier to take into account “differentiated responsibili-
ties” (e.g., because all proceeds from global carbon pricing stay in the coun-
try) (Cramton et al., chapter 12; Laurent, chapter 11). Overall, there is a 
remarkable consensus among the different contributors to our book regard-
ing the most fundamental role of a reciprocal common price commitment 
for successful climate policy, although the contributors come from differ-
ent backgrounds, including game theory, cooperation science, economic 
design, political science, engineering, risk analysis, climate negotiations, 
climate policy, and climate economics. That said, there are, of course, still 
many controversies and details that need to be addressed along the way. 
Gollier and Tirole, for instance, put forward monitoring reasons for why 
they personally favor an international cap-and-trade agreement to imple-
ment a global carbon price, whereas all others prefer a minimum price 
agreement. Cooper (chapter 5), for instance, discusses the likely impossibil-
ity of negotiating a global cap-and-trade scheme because the global “caps” 
would be too high and because the allocation of permits to domestic agents 
would invite corruption. Cramton et al. (chapter 4) provide a survey of the 
merits of global carbon pricing for negotiating international cooperation.
We emphasize that, although global carbon pricing facilitates coopera-
tion and is an essential climate policy, it is of course not the only policy 
needed to effectively address climate change. Investments in green research 
are needed, too, and there is a role for some command-and-control style 
regulation, such as building standards. But the lack of a common commit-
ment on carbon pricing is the primary source of the problem, and so cor-
recting this is what this book is about.
Change the Game xv
A common commitment says, “We will do what is required for the com-
mon good as long as you do as well.” This type of reciprocity is almost uni-
versally what drives human cooperation. It is not new. It is ancient and has 
now been well documented by the various sciences that study human coop-
eration. It is universally used by governments when, for example, they fund 
highways or toxic waste cleanup. It is more difficult to achieve without the 
strong arm of a government. Explaining how that is done is the point of 
Ostrom’s and many others’ research on cooperation, and the conclusion is: 
“trust and reciprocity.” Explaining how to apply this to the earth’s atmo-
sphere is the purpose of this book.
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Paris Formulated a Collective Goal, Yet Individual Contributions Do Not 
Add Up
COP21 in Paris reconfirmed the customary global climate goal: warming 
should stay “well below 2°C” and added that by 2050 the world should 
no longer produce net greenhouse gas emissions. The breadth of this inter-
national consensus represents important progress, but only if the collective 
goal will be translated into a common climate commitment. Paris partici-
pants tried and will continue to try hard to promote ambitious national cli-
mate policies, but so far the Paris approach neglects the free-rider problem. 
National ambition comes with trust in others’ cooperation, and trust comes 
with a common, reciprocal commitment. With its focus on collective goals 
rather than on common commitments, the Paris agreement could inhibit 
progress, if setting goals are seen as simply tantamount to success.
The Paris talks were based in part on the assumption that narrow self-
interest is enough for solving climate change. As Christina Figueres put 
it, “Frankly, none of them are doing it [agreeing to their pledges] to save 
the planet. Let us be very clear. They’re doing it for what I think is a much 
more powerful political driving force, which is for the benefit of their own 
economy.”1 As a consequence, COP21 elicited individual and largely inde-
pendent commitments.
However, climate change is a problem of the commons, and it likely 
remains one in the foreseeable future (see next section). If each country 
had its own climate, then self-interested countries would reach the climate 
* Ockenfels thanks the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support 
through the Research Unit “Design & Behavior” (FOR 1371).
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goal—much like self-interested countries provide education, transportation 
infrastructure, parks, and other public goods. But with a shared climate, 
a CO2-abating country receives only a small fraction of the benefits, yet 
incurs the full costs of its abatement. The self-interested response is to free-
ride. This is particularly true in a globalized economy, where the costs of 
energy substantially affect economic competitiveness. Self-interested coun-
tries would let others do what is in the common interest.
Not all countries selfishly ignore the benefits of national climate poli-
cies to others. But even those that do not are unlikely to fully internalize 
the external benefits, in particular when they see that their cooperation 
gets exploited. This is why countries can sincerely agree with an ambitious 
collective goal and at the same time only commit to mostly self-interested 
individual abatement strategies, which do not add up to the collective 
goal. Indeed, for example, many African countries are heavily invest-
ing in oil extraction or allowing international oil companies to explore 
within their territories, Australia is predicted to be the world’s largest 
coal exporter by 2020, China’s emission level will increase until around 
2030 (the ongoing process of reducing China’s CO2 emission growth 
seems to simply reflect what China intended to do anyway—to reduce 
deaths from local air pollution), India submitted no intention to peak or 
decrease CO2 emissions and their coal production is predicted to double 
in the next decade, and the United States is focusing on shale gas, which 
reduces domestic emissions but leads to rising coal exports. Countries 
rationally prefer to let others make the costly efforts needed to reach the 
collective goal.
As a result, even if all Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (INDCs) fully materialize, total emissions and emissions per year 
will increase until 2030. According to the last IPCC report, a 2°C goal 
would yield a carbon budget of 630–1180 GtCO2 (90–310 GtCO2 with a 
1.5°C goal) until 2100, yet the INDCs, if fully and unconditionally imple-
mented, would already yield emissions that sum up to approximately 815 
GtCO2 until 2030. Reaching the collective goal after 2030 would then 
require drastic and rapid emission reductions, including possibly the need 
for massive negative emissions, making free-riding an even more attrac-
tive option. Moreover, the large amounts of already built and currently 
planned coal-fired capacities seem inconsistent with many of the INDCs 
in Paris’ agreement; they alone are predicted to eat up 450 GtCO2 of the 
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remaining budget (Edenhofer et al., 2016; Steckel et al., 2015). There is 
an insurmountable gap between what is collectively needed and national 
climate policies.
Ratcheting Up or Ratcheting Down?
The lack of ambition in Paris, when it comes to individual commitments 
as opposed to the collective goal, explains why negotiators established 
a review process. The hope is that, as the lack of individual coopera-
tion becomes more apparent and the technology for reducing emissions 
becomes cheaper, ambition will “ratchet up.” But this hope relies on wish-
ful thinking, not on what we know about cooperation, and not on guaran-
tees concerning technology.
Cooperation. The strong attraction of the free-riding strategy, when there is 
no common commitment, is a consistent theme across theory, field, and 
experiment that has been extensively studied not only in static but also in 
dynamic environments. For instance, in a typical laboratory experiment, 
players contribute to the public good in the first round, which produces 
a collective benefit that is distributed evenly to all. This allows players 
to review the collective contribution. The contribute-and-review process 
is then repeated several times. The most common outcome by far is that 
some ambition is shown in the first round, but less is shown in subsequent 
rounds because parties observe others acting in their narrow self-interest, 
and nobody likes being taken advantage of. That is, the initial ambition, if 
any, tends to vanish, and behavior tends to move toward the selfish equilib-
rium (Ledyard, 1995). The failed Kyoto process provides another example 
of the attraction of the selfish equilibrium.
Independent climate action and positive leadership that induces others 
to follow is often thought to be a source for the desired ratcheting up effect. 
Unfortunately, the effect of independent action is often just the opposite: 
Without a common commitment, one country’s abatement can increase 
the emissions in other countries (carbon leakage), increase aggregate world 
emissions, and reduce the chance of effective subsequent climate negotia-
tions (Hoel, 1991; Sinn, 2008). However, laboratory studies find that uni-
lateral commitment can also enhance cooperation; the effect is typically 
small, in particular with heterogeneous agents (Levati, Sutter, and van der 
Heijden, 2007).
4 Richard N. Cooper et al.
Finally, theory suggests and the field work by Elinor Ostrom and 
numerous experiments confirm that comparability and reliable monitor-
ing of efforts are needed for cooperation to be stable (Bereby-Meyer, 2012; 
Ostrom, 1990). Yet in the context of the intended review process after Paris, 
individual pledges and efforts are hardly comparable and differently moni-
tored, reported, and verified.
For all these reasons, it seems likely that the review process, as long as it 
is based on individual commitments only, will fail to significantly increase 
ambition. Indeed, it will likely lead to a ratcheting down of cooperation.
Technology. Before Paris, there was general agreement that simply buying the 
cheapest energy with no thought for global consequences was the source 
of the climate problem. But the Paris agreement seems partly driven by the 
reverse assumption: that the cost of clean energy sources will fall so fast that 
fossil fuel use will become uneconomic—a bold assumption given that as 
demand for fossil fuels declines, so too do fossil fuel prices (e.g., Covert et 
al., 2016). Under this scenario, countries would be induced to give up all 
fossil fuel use by 2050 simply because clean energy is the cheapest alterna-
tive. Although this optimistic scenario may be technically possible, this 
seems a risky bet, especially given the rather short time horizon before the 
carbon budget is eaten up and the plans in many countries to massively 
expand coal-based power plants that run for decades. It would not be wise 
to depend on it.
This Book: A Reciprocal, Common Commitment Is Needed
The failure of Paris to address the free-rider problem is the motivation 
for this book. We will argue, from different perspectives, that to promote 
cooperation and discipline free-riders, a collective goal must be translated 
into a reciprocal, common commitment: an agreement to abide by rules 
that specify ambitious behavior, provided others abide by the same rules 
(MacKay et al., 2015). This holds for practically all cooperation problems, 
from dish washing in shared apartments to international trade and disar-
mament, to laboratory evidence (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2009). The commonality 
of the commitment creates a shared understanding of what can be expected 
from each other, so that the reciprocity principle, which can include various 
forms of enforcement, can be implemented to promote cooperation and 
mutual trust that one’s cooperation will not be exploited.
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The best candidate for a common commitment in international climate 
policy is carbon pricing. Indeed, carbon pricing is recommended by the 
vast majority of economists and many policymakers as the preferred cli-
mate policy instrument. A carbon price directly, efficiently, and transpar-
ently addresses the central problem of overusing the limited storage space 
in the atmosphere as a free dumping ground for greenhouse gases. This 
has been known for a long time. The main contribution of this book is to 
present analyses and arguments which show that a common commitment 
to carbon pricing is also useful to promote international cooperation (see 
also Cramton et al., 2017).
We hope to convince you with this book that, now that Paris has reached 
a consensus about the collective goal, there is a chance—maybe the last 
chance—to bring together what is needed to overcome self-interest and 




Bereby-Meyer, Y. 2012. Reciprocity and uncertainty. Behavioral and Brain Sciences  
1 (0): 18–19.
Covert, T., M. Greenstone, and C. R. Knittel. 2016. Will we ever stop using fossil 
fuels? Journal of Economic Perspectives 30 (1): 117–138.
Cramton, P., A. Ockenfels, and J. Tirole. 2017. Policy Brief—Translating the collec-
tive climate goal into a common commitment. Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy. In press.
Edenhofer, O., J. C. Steckel, M. Jakob, and C. Bertram. 2016. Reading the writing on 
the wall: Coal and the Paris agreement. Mimeo.
Hoel, M. 1991. Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions 
taken by one country. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20:55–70.
Kosfeld, M., A. Okada, and A. Riedl. 2009. Institution formation in public goods 
games. American Economic Review 99 (4): 1335–1355.
Ledyard, J. 1995. Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In The Handbook 
of Experimental Economics, ed. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, 111–194. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
6 Richard N. Cooper et al.
Levati, V., M. Sutter, and E. van der Heijden. 2007. Leading by example in a public 
goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51 (5): 793–818.
MacKay, D., P. Cramton, A. Ockenfels, and S. Stoft. 2015. Price carbon—I will if you 
will. Nature 526:315–316.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sinn, H.-W. 2008. Public policies against global warming: A supply side approach. 
International Tax and Public Finance 15:360–394.
Steckel, J. C., O. Edenhofer, and M. Jakob. 2015. Drivers for the renaissance of coal. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112 (29): 
E3775–E3781.
2 Price Carbon—I Will If You Will*
David JC MacKay, Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft
Negotiations at the United Nations (UN) climate summit in Paris in Decem-
ber 2015 adopted a “pledge-and-review” approach to cutting global carbon 
emissions. Countries promised to reduce their emissions by amounts that 
will be revised later. The narrative is that this will “enable an upward spiral 
of ambition over time” (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform, 
2014). History and the science of cooperation predict that quite the oppo-
site will happen.
Climate change is a serious challenge because the atmosphere gives a 
free ride to countries that emit. If some nations sit back and rely on others’ 
efforts, the incentives for anyone to act are weakened. Review of the first 
phase of the Kyoto Protocol at the 2012 UN climate meeting in Doha, for 
instance, resulted in Japan, Russia, Canada, and New Zealand leaving the 
agreement, frustrating those who kept their promises.
Success requires a common commitment not a patchwork of individual 
ones. Negotiations need to be designed to realign self-interests and promote 
cooperation. A common commitment can assure participants that others 
will match their efforts and not free-ride. A strategy of “I will if you will” 
stabilizes higher levels of cooperation. It is the most robust pattern of coop-
eration seen in laboratory and field studies of situations open to free-riding 
(Kraft-Todd et al., 2015).
A global carbon price—so far excluded from consideration in inter-
national negotiations—would be the ideal basis for a common commit-
ment in our view. A price is easy to agree and handle, relatively fair, less 
vulnerable to gaming than global cap-and-trade systems, and consistent 
* First published in Nature, 526, 315–316 (October 15, 2015), doi:10.1038/526315a, 
by Nature Publishing Group.
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with climate policies already in place, such as fossil-fuel taxes and emis-
sions cap-and-trade.
Only a common commitment can lead to a strong treaty. Forty years of 
empirical and theoretical literature on cooperation confirms that individ-
ual commitments do not deliver strong collective action. Cooperators find 
that defectors take advantage of them. Ambition declines when others are 
revealed to be free-riding (Ledyard, 1995). Dishes often stack up in the sinks 
of shared apartments. But in the Alps, villagers have successfully managed 
shared land for hundreds of years with a common commitment governing 
grasslands (Ostrom, 1990).
Common Commitment
Imagine that you and nine other self-interested players (representing coun-
tries) take part in a game. Each player has $10, some or all of which the 
players may simultaneously pledge to a common pot. A referee makes sure 
that they honor their pledges. Every dollar (for carbon dioxide abatement) 
placed in the pot will be doubled (by climate benefits) and distributed 
evenly to all players. So putting $1 in the pot will return 20 cents to each 
player.
Consider two variants of the game. First, in the “individual commit-
ment” version, pledges are made independently. This is the classic public-
goods game, in which the rational selfish strategy is to contribute nothing 
because this makes a player better off no matter what the others do. The 
result is the famous tragedy of the commons. Cooperation does not occur, 
even though everyone would gain from it.
Second, in the “common commitment” version, players condition their 
contributions on others’ pledges: a referee ensures that all contribute the 
amount of the lowest pledge. After enforcing this common commitment, 
the money is doubled and distributed evenly, exactly as before.
This changes everything. Pledging $0 will mean simply keeping your 
$10, whereas pledging $10 could result in ending up with anything between 
$10 and $20 depending on what others pledge. If you cannot lose and 
could gain by pledging $10, then that is what you would do, even if you are 
completely selfish. Because all parties would pledge $10, the group’s $100 is 
doubled, and all players end up with the maximum amount of $20.
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Selfish behavior has been changed from “contribute nothing” to 
“contribute everything” because the common commitment protects against 
free-riding.
In 1997, the Kyoto negotiators initially tried to agree on a common 
commitment, expressed as a formula for national emissions caps, but 
they failed. In the end, each nation was simply asked to submit their 
final numbers for insertion into the draft annex (Depledge, 2000). The 
result was a patchwork of weak and unstable commitments. Similarly, in 
response to the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, China pledged emissions equal 
to those considered “business as usual” before the accord, and India pledged 
even less.
Enforcement is widely thought to be the missing ingredient in the Kyoto 
Protocol and crucial for the success of the Paris agreement. This is only 
half right—both enforcement and a common commitment are required. 
For example, if drivers chose their own speed limits, there would be no 
use enforcing them because everyone would drive at their desired speed. 
Instead, because it limits others as well, people agree to a common speed 
limit that is lower than almost everyone’s individual limit. In other words, 
with individual commitments, there is nothing meaningful to enforce, 
whereas enforcement strengthens a common commitment.
What could all countries commit to? National limits on the quantity of 
emissions will not work. Kyoto negotiators suggested at least 10 formulae to 
determine the reductions that each nation should make but could not agree 
on. When attention turned to reducing emissions by some percentage rela-
tive to 1990 levels, individual commitments ranged from an 8% decrease 
to a 10% increase. The United States and developing countries made no 
commitments at all.
Percentage pledges failed because countries differ; for instance, some 
economies declined after 1990, whereas some grew. Developing countries 
fear caps that curb their growth. Instead they see it as fair to allocate emis-
sion permits on an equal per capita basis. Because permit sales would result 
in huge wealth transfers to poor countries, rich countries find such propos-
als unacceptable (Stiglitz, 2006).
There is no longer any serious discussion of a common commitment to 
reduce the quantity of carbon emissions.
10 David JC MacKay, Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft
Global Carbon Price
We, and others, propose an alternative: a global carbon-price commit-
ment (Cramton et al., 2015). Each country would commit to place charges 
on carbon emissions from fossil-fuel use (e.g., by taxes or cap-and-trade 
schemes) sufficient to match an agreed-on global price, which could be set 
by voting—by a super-majority rule that would produce a coalition of the 
willing.
A uniform carbon price is widely accepted as the most cost-effective 
way to curb emissions. Carbon pricing is flexible, allowing fossil taxes, cap-
and-trade, hybrid schemes, and other national policies to be used (unlike a 
global carbon tax). All that is required of a country is that its average carbon 
price—cost per unit of greenhouse gas emitted—be at least as high as the 
agreed-on global carbon price.
Unlike global cap-and-trade, carbon pricing allows countries to keep all 
carbon revenues, eliminating the risk of needing to buy expensive cred-
its from a rival country. Taxes need not rise if a nation performs a green 
tax shift—reducing taxes on good things such as employment by charging 
for pollution. Shifting taxes from good things to bad things could mean 
there is no net social cost to pricing carbon, even before counting climate 
benefits (Bovenberg, 1999).
A global price does not automatically result in acceptable burden 
sharing. A “Green Climate Fund” will be needed to transfer funds from 
rich to poor countries. To minimize disputes, the objective of climate-fund 
transfers should be to maximize the global price of carbon. This can be 
implemented in a way that encourages rich countries to be generous and 
poor countries to vote for a higher global carbon price (Cramton and Stoft, 
2012), for example, by making all climate-fund payments proportional to 
the agreed-on carbon price.
After decades of failure, a fresh approach is needed—one that is guided 
by the science of cooperation. A common price commitment would har-
ness self-interest by aligning it with the common good. Nothing could be 
more fundamental.
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3 Reflections on the International Coordination  
of Carbon Pricing
Ian W. H. Parry*
Introduction
This chapter makes two basic points about international coordination of 
carbon pricing.
The first is that just because climate externalities cause a global free-
rider problem (i.e., the reluctance of one country to move ahead unilat-
erally with carbon pricing because it bears the costs while all countries 
benefit from a more stable global climate system), this does not mean 
we have to solve that problem to make a good start on reducing climate 
externalities. In fact, a significant amount of carbon pricing is in many 
countries’ own national interests (before even counting the global climate 
benefits) because the domestic environmental benefits (most important, 
public health benefits from reduced local air pollution), and perhaps also 
the domestic fiscal benefits, easily outweigh the climate mitigation costs. 
So countries can move ahead on their own with carbon pricing and make 
themselves better off—they do not need to wait for large emitters to act in 
a coordinated way. This is an important message that policymakers need 
to communicate to legislators, the general public, and stakeholders as they 
start to move forward on their mitigation pledges for the 2015 Paris Agree-
ment on climate change.
The second point is that, as countries seek to build on domestic pric-
ing initiatives through international coordination, they should consider 
the possibility of international carbon price floor arrangements (in prefer-
ence to linked trading systems). These arrangements provide some protec-
tion against free-rider issues and losses in competitiveness, while allowing 
* I am grateful to Steven Stoft for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
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individual countries the flexibility to set prices higher than the floor, which 
makes sense if they have relatively high domestic environmental benefits 
or high fiscal needs, or if higher prices are more politically acceptable in 
that country than in other countries. Some operationalizing issues need 
to be worked out (e.g., accounting for broader changes in energy taxes and 
subsidies and country-level needs for special provisions in carbon pricing 
programs), but the practicalities should be manageable.
The following two sections elaborate on the above points.
Is Carbon Pricing in Countries’ Own Interests?
The main focus of this section is on the domestic environmental benefits of 
carbon pricing1 as the evidence on their magnitude is more solid than for 
the fiscal benefits (i.e., the economic efficiency benefits from substituting 
carbon taxes for distortionary taxes on labor, consumption, and capital).
Domestic Environmental Considerations
Leaving aside the global climate benefits, carbon pricing can generate sub-
stantial domestic environmental benefits, most important the reduction in 
premature deaths from exposure to local air pollution as carbon pricing 
reduces the use of coal and other polluting fuels and (less important) the 
reduction in traffic congestion, accidents, and road damage externalities, 
to the extent that carbon pricing reduces vehicle use and these externalities 
are not reflected in road fuel excises.2
Clearly, there are much more efficient instruments than carbon pricing 
for addressing these domestic environmental externalities. For example, 
the most efficient way to reduce local air pollution is to impose a Pigouvian 
tax, either through directly charging emissions or (which may be admin-
istratively easier for some countries) an upfront tax on fuel use combined 
with rebates for entities demonstrating emissions capture during the com-
bustion process. And (for given road infrastructure) traffic congestion is 
most efficiently addressed through congestion fees on busy roads, rising 
and falling progressively over the course of the rush hour.
It is also clear, however, that it will take a long time before these ideal 
charging systems are widely implemented across large carbon emitting 
countries. With the odd exception (e.g., Chile), countries have yet to 
introduce a comprehensive set of charges on the major air pollutants with 
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charges aligned to estimates of air pollution costs3 (technology mandates 
and other regulations are common, but they do not fully internalize the 
externality). Certainly no country comes anywhere near close to having 
a set of finely tuned congestion fees, varying with marginal external costs 
across time of day, on all links in the road network with non-free-flowing 
traffic.
For the interim, therefore, it is entirely appropriate to account for the 
unpriced domestic environmental benefits when assessing the welfare 
effects of near-term carbon pricing schemes. Not doing do violates long-
established principles of welfare measurement,4 implying that the welfare 
impacts of new charges in fuel markets hinge critically on preexisting dis-
tortions in those markets, whether they be from prior fuels taxes, externali-
ties, or other sources.
Methodology for Measuring Domestic Environmental Benefits The conceptual 
framework for assessing the domestic efficiency benefits (or costs) of car-
bon pricing is basically straightforward. Consider figure 3.1, which shows 
the demand and supply5 for a fuel product such as coal or gasoline. In the 
absence of any noncarbon externalities, preexisting fuel taxes or subsidies, 
or other distortions, the welfare cost of a new carbon charge in this market 
is the usual darker-shaded triangle—the “Harberger triangle”—with base 
equal to the reduction in fuel use induced by the carbon charge and height 
equal to the carbon charge, that is, the fuel’s CO2 emissions factor times the 
charge on CO2 emissions.
If there are noninternalized, noncarbon externalities associated with use 
of the fuel, however, like local air pollution damages, then it is possible for 
the carbon charge to generate a net welfare gain, indicated by the lighter-
shaded trapezoid in figure 3.1, equal to the (noninternalized) domestic 
environmental benefits—damages per unit of fuel use times the reduction 
in fuel use—less the Harberger triangle. The prospects for an overall welfare 
gain in the fuel market are clearly greater (1) the greater the size of the 
noncarbon externality, relative to the carbon charge; and (2) the less any 
internalization of the externality through preexisting fuel taxes.
In fact, if the fuel is subsidized rather than taxed—as has (at least up 
until recently) been the case for petroleum products and natural gas in 
a number of Middle East and North African countries6—and if a carbon 
charge were superimposed on top of unreformed subsidies, then the 
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prospects for a welfare gain are further enhanced. However, although coal 
and natural gas are generally not subject to substantial excises, road fuels 
in most countries are, and in cases (e.g., some European countries) where 
they may exceed estimates of noncarbon environmental costs, carbon 
charges will induce welfare losses in road fuel markets despite domestic 
environmental benefits.
Of course many countries are using domestic (usually regulatory) mea-
sures to reduce air emission rates, but this does not eliminate the domes-
tic efficiency gains from carbon pricing. This point is illustrated in figure 
3.2, where a regulation, such as requirements for technologies on new coal 
plants to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, shifts up the industry average 
supply curve (inclusive of technology operation costs) for coal generation 
and shifts down the industry average environmental damages per unit of 
coal use, but not to zero. For example, plants operating these technologies 
still emit some sulfur dioxide, the technologies may not always be switched 



















Welfare Effect of a Carbon Charge in a Fuel Market
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air emissions, such as nitrogen oxides and direct fine particulates. The car-
bon charge still has the potential to induce a net welfare gain (indicated 
by the shaded trapezoid), albeit a smaller one than in the absence of other 
regulations.
The (second-best) nationally efficient carbon price—that is, the price 
warranted by domestic environmental benefits (before counting global cli-
mate benefits)—is obtained by differentiating the sum of welfare gains (or 
welfare losses) in the markets for coal, natural gas, and petroleum prod-
ucts with respect to the carbon price. Not surprisingly, the efficient tax (see 
Parry, Veung, and Heine, 2014) is higher (1) the greater the magnitude of 
non-CO2 externalities net of any prior fuel taxes, and (2) the greater the 
share of CO2 reductions that come from fuels with relatively high noninter-
nalized environmental damages.
Parry, Veung, and Heine (2014) estimated nationally efficient carbon 
prices for large emitters for 2010 using fuel consumption data (from the 
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sources), CO2 emissions factors for fuels,7 fuel price elasticities from the 
empirical literature,8 and estimates of domestic environmental costs by fuel 
product and by country from an IMF database developed by Parry, Heine, 
Lis, and Li (2014)9—the appendix to this chapter provides more details on 
the measurement of these environmental costs.
Ideally, estimates of nationally efficient carbon prices would be projected 
forward (say to 2030, a typical year for meeting countries’ emissions pledges 
for Paris), accounting for future changes in the fossil fuel mix, changes in 
fuel prices (which affect the proportionate change in fuel prices from car-
bon pricing), tightening domestic environmental regulations, rising valua-
tions of air pollution mortality risks with growth in per capita income, and 
so on. Nonetheless, the estimates discussed below are still useful in provid-
ing some broad sense of the size of domestic environmental benefits and 
the extent of variation across countries.
Results Figure 3.3 shows estimates of nationally efficient carbon prices for 
the top 20 emitting countries in 2010. These estimates indicate the price 
levels up to which incremental increases in prices are in countries’ own 
interests because the extra domestic environmental benefits outweigh the 
extra mitigation costs—only beyond these prices do incremental abate-
ment costs start to rise above domestic environmental benefits (the point 
at which, in theory, the free-rider problem should start to kick in).
Although the precise numbers in the figure should not be taken too lit-
erally, the two key points are first that the nationally efficient CO2 prices 
can be substantial and second that the efficient prices differ greatly across 
countries.
Averaging over the top 20, the nationally efficient price is $57 per ton 
of CO2, which is a large number—about 60% higher than the social cost of 
carbon in 2010 according to US Inter-Agency Working Group (2013).
For China, the nationally efficient CO2 price is $63 per ton, which essen-
tially reflects the domestic air pollution benefits from reducing coal use—
these benefits are relatively high given that China is densely populated 
with a lot of exposure to coal plant emissions.10 Although air pollution 
deaths per unit of coal combustion are dramatically lower in the United 
States (about one-twelfth of that for China), the nationally efficient CO2 
price is still $36 per ton, in part because the valuation of health risks is 
assumed to be about four times higher for the United States than for China, 
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and a more significant portion of the CO2 reductions come from reductions 
in road fuels, which are substantially undertaxed from a domestic perspec-
tive in the United States.
In contrast, the nationally efficient CO2 price is more moderate in Aus-
tralia at $12 per ton, in part reflecting the much more limited exposure to 
air pollution (due to low population density and the coastal location of 
power plants, where much of the emissions disperse harmlessly over the 
oceans). The nationally efficient CO2 price is negative for Brazil, where 
there is little coal use, and a significant portion of the CO2 reduction comes 
from reduced gasoline use, which is already overtaxed from a domestic per-
spective. Also striking are Saudi Arabia and Iran, where domestic subsidies 
for petroleum and natural gas were large in 2010, implying large efficiency 


























Nationally Efficient CO2 Prices, 2010. Note: Top 20 averages across countries weight-
ing by their emissions shares. 
Source: Parry, Veung, and Heine (2014).
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gains in the (unlikely) event that carbon pricing were imposed on top of 
unreformed subsidies (although both countries have since been scaling 
back these subsidies).
Fiscal Considerations
Besides environmental impacts, carbon pricing also raises substantial 
amounts of revenue, for example, the carbon prices shown in figure 3.3 
would have raised estimated revenues averaging 1.9% of GDP across the 
top 20 emitters in 2010 (Parry, Veung, and Heine, 2014). This raises the 
issue of whether—leaving aside environmental benefits—raising these rev-
enues from carbon pricing imposes lower costs on the economy than rais-
ing them through broader fiscal instruments. If so, fiscal considerations 
constitute another reason that carbon pricing is in countries’ own domes-
tic interests.
The combined effect of broader fiscal instruments, including personal 
income taxes, payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, and general consump-
tion taxes, is to distort the economy in two main ways. First, they reduce 
the overall level of economic activity by reducing real factor returns, thereby 
deterring work effort and investments in human and physical capital. Sec-
ond, they distort the composition of economic activity by shifting activity to 
the informal sector and promoting excessive spending on tax favored goods 
(e.g., housing, untaxed fringe benefits). In measuring the efficiency costs of 
broader taxes, it is standard to capture (in a reduced form way) both types 
of distortion by estimating the responsiveness of the tax base to higher tax 
rates (e.g., Saez et al., 2012).
Carbon taxes interact with these broader distortions from the fiscal 
system in two ways. First, using the revenues from carbon pricing to cut 
the rates of broader taxes produces efficiency gains—termed the “revenue-
recycling effect”—and a key theme of the literature is that these efficiency 
gains are relatively large, so forgoing them (e.g., through using revenues 
for low value spending or giving away free allowances in trading systems) 
greatly increases the overall costs of carbon pricing for the economy (e.g., 
Parry, Williams, and Goulder, 1999). Second, by increasing energy prices 
and thereby reducing overall economic activity, carbon taxes tend to 
compound some of the distortions created by broader taxes—the “tax-
interaction effect.”
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Up to a point, the revenue-recycling effect tends to dominate the tax-
interaction effect, implying a negative cost from carbon tax shifts. This 
is because cutting broader taxes alleviates distortions both in the overall 
level of economic activity and its composition, whereas (loosely speaking) 
higher energy prices compound distortions to the level of economic activ-
ity but not its composition. The prospects for negative costs are greater 
when the composition effect accounts for a substantial portion of the over-
all efficiency costs of broader taxes, which can apply to countries with large 
informal sectors (many developing countries) or with large preferences in 
the tax code (e.g., the United States).11 However, accurately quantifying the 
efficiency gains from carbon tax shifts, and at what carbon price the incre-
mental efficiency impact changes from positive to negative, is hampered 
by a lack of systematic empirical work across countries on the absolute effi-
ciency costs of broader taxes and the relative contribution of the level and 
composition effects. Nevertheless, some rough calculations in Parry, Veung, 
and Heine (2014) suggest that the efficiency gain could, for some countries, 
be as large as the efficiency benefits from addressing domestic environmen-
tal benefits.
The Bottom Line
The bottom line from the above discussion is that many countries can start 
the process of fulfilling their emissions mitigation pledges for the Paris 
Agreement through unilateral carbon pricing that addresses local (envi-
ronmental and fiscal) needs while also contributing to relieving a global 
problem—it is not necessary to wait for other countries to act on carbon 
pricing.
Viewed another way, once an international agreement to enhance and 
strengthen domestic initiatives has been implemented, it might be a little 
less challenging to enforce it than previously thought because countries 
make themselves worse off by reneging on the agreement. The costs of 
reneging to the general public might be highly visible, for example, in the 
form of more severe air pollution in emerging market economies, where 
urban residents see and deal with the health effects of polluted air on a 
daily basis and air pollution statistics are routinely reported, or in the form 
of higher direct and indirect taxes that might be needed to compensate for 
scaling back a large revenue stream from carbon pricing.
But what form should such an international agreement take?
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The Rationale for, and Design of, Carbon Price Floor Arrangements
Rationale
Underpricing from an international perspective is familiar from situations 
where countries compete for mobile tax bases, in which context some pro-
gress has been made through tax agreements, for example, in the European 
Union for value added taxes and excises on alcohol, tobacco, and energy 
products. A key lesson here is that it seems easier for countries to agree on 
tax floors than tax rates, not surprisingly given, for example, heterogeneity 
among countries in the public health benefits from these taxes (depending 
on the prevalence of smoking, alcohol abuse, etc.), their fiscal needs, and 
the political acceptability of higher taxes.
The carbon pricing analog would be a coordinated CO2 price floor 
among a coalition of willing countries, which could be pursued alongside 
the Paris process. This arrangement would provide some degree of protec-
tion for industries competing with imports from other countries that are 
party to the agreement and some protection against free-riding and cross-
border fuel smuggling. Yet individual countries could set prices exceeding 
the floor, which is efficient if they have relatively high domestic environ-
mental benefits or fiscal needs. More generally, the political acceptability 
of carbon pricing differs considerably across countries, and those countries 
willing and able to set higher prices should not be held back. In contrast, 
linked emissions trading systems (in their pure form) impose a uniform 
price across participating countries, and policies (e.g., the UK carbon tax 
floor) to raise the overall domestic carbon price in one country will only 
reduce allowance prices without any effect on system-wide emissions, 
which are fixed by the regional cap.
Design Practicalities
A carbon price floor agreement could initially be negotiated among a lim-
ited number of willing (preferably large emitting) countries and progres-
sively expanded over time with additional participants.12 The arrangement 
could accommodate both countries with carbon taxes and with trading sys-
tems, although in the latter case the systems would need to have explicit 
mechanisms that permanently withdraw allowances from the system to 
prevent the price falling below a target level.13
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One challenge is how to account for idiosyncratic, special provisions 
among countries with carbon pricing programs, such as exemptions 
or reduced rates for influential or vulnerable sectors. Another is how to 
account for changes in existing energy taxes or subsidies that can enhance 
or offset the emissions impact of a direct price on carbon.
In principle, both challenges could be addressed through monitoring 
“effective carbon prices,” which convert direct carbon pricing programs 
and existing taxes/subsidies on fossil fuel products, electricity, and possibly 
other products (e.g., vehicles) into an aggregate carbon price. This involves 
converting all carbon pricing schemes and broader energy taxes/subsidies 
into an economy-wide average carbon price equivalent. For a carbon price 
scheme with incomplete coverage, the price needs to be weighted by the 
fraction of emissions reductions that would come from the covered sector 
under economy-wide pricing.14 For broader taxes/subsidies on energy prod-
ucts, these should be converted to carbon price equivalents by dividing the 
tax/subsidy rate by CO2 emissions per unit of the product and then weight-
ing by the share of reductions that would come from that product under 
economy-wide carbon pricing.15
Figure 3.4 shows some calculations of effective carbon prices across 
selected countries for 2010. The calculations are highly simplified—just 
accounting for taxes/subsidies on fossil fuel products16—and somewhat 
outdated (e.g., Mexico and Indonesia have since scaled back fuel subsidies), 
but the main point here is that effective carbon prices differ substantially 
across countries. For example, effective CO2 prices are relatively high (more 
than $40 per ton) in France, where road fuels account for a relatively high 
share of nationwide emissions and there are already high road fuel excises, 
but effective carbon prices are below $10 per ton in most other cases. Given 
such wide dispersion, achieving convergence in effective carbon prices is 
likely impractical. But nor is it desirable, as fuel taxes may in part be address-
ing domestic environmental and fiscal needs rather than CO2 emissions.
Instead, an agreement might focus on raising effective carbon prices in 
each country by a target amount (e.g., $20 per ton in 2020 and $70 per ton 
by 2030) relative to the effective price in that country in a (previous) base-
line year. Effective carbon prices would need to be independently assessed 
and consistently measured across countries, although the practicalities 
should be manageable once countries have agreed to analytical conven-
tions (e.g., over fuel price responsiveness assumptions).
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Conclusion
This chapter pushes back on two notions about global carbon policy implied 
by economic models that do not account for noninternalized, noncarbon 
externalities in fossil fuel markets and broader distortions to economic 
activity from the fiscal system.
The first is the rather pessimistic notion that acting unilaterally on car-
bon pricing inevitably makes an individual country worse off, and, as a 
consequence, meaningful progress on carbon pricing will not occur until a 
pricing agreement among large emitters with credible enforcement mecha-
nisms is in place. In contrast, this chapter argues that carbon pricing is in 
many countries’ own national interests when account is taken of nonin-
ternalized local externality benefits, which (up to a point) exceed domestic 
mitigation costs. Fiscal considerations reinforce this argument to the extent 
that the efficiency costs of raising revenues from carbon pricing are initially 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data compiled in Parry, Veung, and Heine 
(2014).
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lower than those for broader fiscal instruments (when the full range of dis-
tortions created by the latter are properly considered).
It is not inconceivable that policymakers can get these important but 
arcane-sounding points across to stakeholders with more accessible messages 
about estimated lives saved from breathing healthier air, improvements in 
their international urban air quality rankings, specific commitments to 
cut burdensome taxes or address underinvestment in hospitals, schools, 
and infrastructure, with the proceeds from carbon pricing, and so on. In 
this way, significant headway on carbon pricing at the local level might be 
made, whereas at the international level policymakers and organizations 
continue dialogue on the practicalities of coordinated regimes for eventu-
ally building on local pricing initiatives.
The second notion is that the long-term goal should be a uniform global 
carbon price. That has always looked impractical, given the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, and the reluctance (especially 
in current times of historically high fiscal pressures) of advanced countries 
to transfer large side payments to developing countries that might other-
wise be unwilling to impose the same carbon price. A key point from the 
current chapter is that a globally uniform carbon price is not economically 
efficient either, given the wide dispersion across countries in the magnitude 
of noncarbon externalities from fuel use and the dim prospects as far as the 
eye can see for perfectly internalizing them through other pricing policies, 
as well as differences in the efficient amount of carbon pricing from a fiscal 
perspective.
In short, there are both pragmatic and economic arguments for flex-
ible international regimes built around carbon price floor arrangements. 
Discussions about these regimes should be welcomed by delegates to the 
annual UN Framework Convention on Climate Change meetings because 
they would complement and strengthen the mitigation commitment pro-
cess already initiated by the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement.
Appendix: Procedures for Measuring Domestic Environmental 
Externalities
Air Pollution Damages from Coal Plants
Parry, Heine, Lis, and Li (2014) used four main steps to quantify the air 
pollution damage from coal plants.
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First, data on the geographical location of coal plants in different coun-
tries was mapped to granular data on the number of people living at differ-
ent distance classifications from each plant (up to 2,000 km away, given the 
potential long-range transport of emissions from tall smokestacks). These 
data are used to extrapolate “intake fractions”—the average portion of a 
particular pollutant that ends up being inhaled (as fine particulates) by 
exposed populations—for different pollutants, from a widely cited study 
for China, adjusting for population exposure in other countries relative to 
that in China. Although this approach does not account for differences in 
meteorological conditions (e.g., wind speeds) between other countries and 
China, which affects regional pollution formation, some cross-checks with 
air quality models in a limited number of cases suggest the bias from omit-
ting these factors is not necessarily large and does not follow a systematic 
pattern.
The second step is to obtain elevated mortality risks by country from 
additional pollution emissions by linking intake fractions to two pieces 
of information from the World Health Organization’s Global Burden of 
Disease project. One is baseline mortality rates in different regions for 
illnesses (heart, pulmonary and lung diseases, and strokes) whose preva-
lence is increased by exposure to pollution.17 The other is evidence on the 
relationship between pollution exposure and additional mortality risk, or 
“concentration-response” functions.18 One noteworthy issue here is that, 
although at lower pollution concentrations the concentration-response 
function is approximately linear, some (although not all) evidence suggests 
it may flatten out at especially severe concentration levels as people’s chan-
nels for absorbing pollution become saturated. Paradoxically, this would 
imply (given other factors) lower marginal environmental benefits for small 
pollution reductions in severely polluted regions—this possibility is not 
taken into account in the estimates presented here.
The third step is to monetize mortality risks. For this purpose, Parry, 
Heine, Lis, and Li (2014) use estimates of the value per premature mortal-
ity for the average OECD country ($3.7 million, updated to 2010) and the 
elasticity of mortality valuation with respect to income (0.8)—both based 
on the literature—to extrapolate mortality values for all countries.
The final step is to convert damages per ton of emissions into damages 
per unit of coal use using a country-level database of coal plant air emis-
sions factors compiled by the International Institute for Applied Systems 
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Analysis. The results presented earlier are based on those for a representa-
tive sample of plants with emissions control technologies and are therefore 
lower than the industry average emission rates (the latter including plants 
with no control technologies), a possible justification being that industry 
average emission rates will gradually converge to the former over time as 
older, dirtier plants are retired from the fleet.
Air Pollution from Other Sources
The same steps as discussed previously were used to assess environmental 
damages for natural gas used in power generation.
Local air emissions from ground-level sources—principally vehicles and 
residential heating—tend to stay locally concentrated (rather than being 
transported long distances), which simplifies assessment of their intake 
fractions. Parry, Heine, Lis, and Li (2014) obtain (from other studies) 
ground-level intake fractions for air emissions from more than 3,000 cit-
ies, extrapolate these to the country level, and then follow the three steps 
mentioned previously.
Other Motor Vehicle Externalities
In the absence of better data, Parry, Heine, Lis, and Li (2014) regress travel 
delays from a city-level database on various transportation indicators and 
then extrapolate delays to the national level using the regression coeffi-
cients and country-wide measures of those same indictors. Marginal delay 
(the delay one extra kilometer driven in one vehicle imposes on other road 
users) is assumed to be four times the average delay, loosely based on specifi-
cations commonly used by transportation engineers. The result is scaled by 
vehicle occupancy and monetized based on literature, suggesting the value 
of congested travel time is around 60% of the wage. These estimates likely 
understate marginal congestion costs; for example, cars impose greater 
delay to other road users when buses (which have high vehicle occupan-
cies) are a significant share of vehicles on the road.
Parry, Heine, Lis, and Li (2014) estimate accident externalities by 
country using data on people killed in traffic accidents and assumptions 
about the decomposition between internal and external risks, for exam-
ple, injury risks to occupants in single-vehicle collisions are assumed to 
be internal, whereas risks to pedestrians/cyclists and a portion of injuries 
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in multivehicle collisions are taken to be external. Other components of 
external costs (e.g., medical and property damages borne by third-parties, 
a portion of nonfatal injuries) are extrapolated from several country case 
studies. Road damage costs, which apply to heavy (diesel) vehicles, are 
obtained from data on road maintenance expenditures (where it is avail-
able and extrapolated from other countries where it is not) and assump-
tions about the portion of wear and tear due to vehicle traffic as opposed 
to other factors such as climate.
Mileage-related externalities (congestion, accidents, road damage, and 
local pollution where emissions regulations are expressed on a per mile 
basis) are scaled back by around 50% in computing Pigouvian taxes, given 
that only about half of the long run reduction in fuel use from higher road 
fuel taxes comes from reductions in vehicle mileage (the other half coming 
from long-run improvements in average fleet fuel economy, which essen-
tially have no effect on mileage-related externalities).
Notes
1. Other mitigation instruments—coal taxes, emission rate standards for power gen-
eration, clean fuel subsidies, and so on—may also have domestic environmental 
benefits. However, there is broad acceptance among analysts, governments, and 
businesses that carbon pricing is (by far) the most efficient instrument for reducing 
CO2 emissions (see http://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/carbon-pricing-panel). 
To maintain a tight focus, the discussion here is limited to carbon pricing.
2. The discussion in this subsection draws from Parry, Veung, and Heine (2014).
3. See Parry, Heine, Lis, and Li (2014).
4. For example, Harberger (1964).
5. The latter is drawn as perfectly elastic, which is generally reasonable with interna-
tionally integrated fuel markets. 
6. See Clements et al. (2013) and Coady et al. (2015).
7. These are well established and (per unit of energy for coal and natural gas and per 
liter for petroleum products) vary little across countries.
8. Parry, Veung, and Heine (2014) used price elasticities of -0.25 for coal and natural 
gas and -0.5 for road fuels for each country. Although elasticities are uncertain and 
will vary somewhat across countries, typically the estimates of nationally efficient 
carbon prices are only moderately sensitive to different assumptions. For example, if 
coal is more price-responsive, it will tend to raise the nationally efficient carbon 
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price through increasing the share of CO2 reductions coming from coal, which gen-
erally has relatively high domestic environmental costs.
9. The database is available at http://www.imf.org/environment.
10. As noted in the appendix, air pollution damages are conservatively estimated in 
the sense that emissions rates are based on those at representative plants with emis-
sion control technologies rather than the industry average (which is higher due to 
the inclusion of other plants without control technologies).
11. See, for example, Parry and Bento (2000) and Bento et al. (2012).
12. Starting out with a limited number of countries should improve prospects for an 
agreement. For example, the European Energy Tax Directive specifying minimum 
taxes for fuels outside of the EU emissions trading system was implemented just 
prior to the large expansion in the number of EU member states. Later attempts to 
reform the Directive have stalled due to the difficulty of reaching agreement among 
many member states with highly divergent priorities.
13. The agreement could be made even more flexible by allowing countries to fall 
short of the price floor in a particular year providing they purchase sufficient carbon 
credits from countries exceeding the floor price (see Cramton et al., chapter 12, this 
volume).
14. For example, if a carbon price is applied to the power and large industry sector 
and this sector accounts for 50% of CO2 emissions, but (due to relatively low cost 
mitigation opportunities) 75% of the CO2 reductions that would occur under 
economy-wide pricing, then the carbon price should be weighted by 0.75 rather 
than 0.5.
15. For example, if electricity generation accounts for 40% of economy-wide CO2 
emissions but reductions in electricity demand would account for only 10% of CO2 
reductions under economy-wide carbon pricing, then any tax on electricity use 
(which only reduces emissions through reducing electricity demand) should be 
weighted by 0.1 rather than 0.4.
16. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2015) for a 
more sophisticated treatment.
17. Mortality rates are relatively high in Eastern Europe, where there is high con-
sumption of alcohol and tobacco, and relatively low in African countries, where 
people are more prone to dying from other non-pollution-related diseases.
18. The key assumption here is that each 10 microgram/cubic meter increase in 
fine particulate concentrations increases all-cause mortality risks by 10%, which is 
similar to assumptions used in modeling by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency.
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4 Global Carbon Pricing
Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft*
Why Is Cooperation So Important?1
Narrow Self-Interest
Do we need cooperation? The 2°C goal, or even more ambitious goals, could 
be met purely due to national self-interests if technological progress is fast 
enough—if the price of nonfossil energy falls quickly enough relative to the 
price of fossil energy—and if countries would rationally address the domes-
tic damage being done by greenhouse gas emissions. It has been suggested 
that this will be the case, and so the only real problem is getting countries, 
such as the United States, to recognize and act in their self-interest (for 
a discussion of this view, see Cooper et al., chapter 1, this volume; for an 
example, see Green, 2015).
Of course, it would be convenient if technology is about to allow 
humankind to achieve its goals through pure self-interest. Such a technol-
ogy miracle would imply that no transfers from rich to poor will be needed 
(although they would still be laudable). Also, no additional round of nego-
tiations would be necessary to ratchet up agreements. The reason is that 
there is no need for agreements to get countries to do what is in their nar-
row self-interest. International education might be necessary, but we do 
not make international agreements to provide city parks or clean drinking 
water, public goods that present no international free-rider problem.
However, no one in Paris seemed to believe either of these conclu-
sions, which would follow from the assumption of a timely technology 
rescue. Indeed, no one has offered any proof of such a miracle. Actual 
* Ockenfels thanks the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support 
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developments, plans, and behaviors suggest that there is no relief in sight, 
but that we should rather expect the opposite: a continuing global “coal 
renaissance” together with increasing greenhouse gas emissions (Covert et 
al., 2016; Edenhofer and Ockenfels, chapter 9, this volume; Edenhofer et 
al., 2016).
There are more reasons that the world’s nations will need to coop-
eratively take individual costly actions to achieve the greater collective 
benefit that will result from meeting (or at least coming closer to) the Paris 
objectives. It is true that CO2 abatement policies to address local pollution 
can help mitigate global warming. But the damages from local pollution 
and global warming due to CO2 emissions are additive. That is, if a country 
suffers a local negative externality equivalent to $60/ton of CO2 and the 
negative climate externality is $50/ton, a carbon price of $60/ton is not 
optimal. Instead, only a carbon price of $110/ton would efficiently address 
both externalities. So, even if all countries abate to fully address domestic 
pollution, they would not sufficiently address climate change. This is inde-
pendent of technological progress—unless and until self-interest takes us to 
a corner solution where the negative climate externality vanishes.
In other words, narrow self-interest in local pollution issues will always 
provide too little mitigation incentive by the exact amount of the negative 
climate externality at every point in time. Also note that CO2 causes no local 
externalities whatsoever, so local incentives are helpful only to the extent 
that CO2 continues to correlate with other pollutants such as particulates 
and SO2. This means that technology may gravitate toward solutions, such 
as scrubbers and natural-gas substitution, which target the local pollutants 
and have a limited or even at times a negative impact on CO2 mitigation. 
Furthermore, history indicates that local pollution has been significantly 
undermitigated, especially in the early stages of economic development. 
So even in the case where narrow self-interest should be sufficient, realism 
would suggest a cautious approach.
Besides climate, an additional international externality calls for coop-
eration on carbon abatement. In a global economy, unilateral abatement 
reduces a country’s competitiveness (and, by related mechanisms, often 
comes with carbon leakage effects), so that it is, in fact, not in a country’s 
self-interest to fully address local pollution. Regardless of how one looks at 
this: narrow self-interest is unlikely to solve the climate dilemma, although 
it can certainly provide climate benefits and help with kick-starting global 
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carbon pricing. In other words, self-interest can be part of the solution as 
well as the central problem.
Ambition and Aligned Self-Interest
Christiana Figueres called 2014 the Year of Climate Ambition. Ten thou-
sand UNFCCC web pages tell us that ambition is essential for a strong 
agreement. The UNFCCC newsroom informs us that developed countries 
are expected to lead the global drive to raise ambition. Ambition is what we 
want. But how do we get it if narrow self-interest is not enough?
Elinor Ostrom, a political scientist, won the 2009 Nobel Prize in eco-
nomics for a lifetime studying “common-pool resource dilemmas” (such as 
global warming). She worked in the field, analyzed a thousand field studies 
by others, did game-theory experiments, and developed her own theories. 
She never mentions ambition. Instead, in her report on climate policy to 
the World Bank (Ostrom, 2009), she says her research on collective action 
identifies a “necessary central core of trust and reciprocity.”
Indeed, reciprocity is what changes self-interest. I will do X for you if you 
do Y for me. It is not in your self-interest to hand $20 to your local clean-
ers. and it is not in their self-interest to clean your coat. But if you want 
your coat cleaned and they tell you that would cost $20, then you may well 
decide to change their self-interest and make them want to clean your coat. 
Or perhaps that’s too much money. So you may negotiate to see whether 
you can change their self-interest at a lower cost. You are good at changing 
the self-interest of others.
It’s trickier for a group to change its self-interests. That requires a special 
form of reciprocity, a common commitment. I will do X if all of you also do 
X. (Of course, X can be a rule that takes circumstances into account in the 
same way for all players.) It’s trickier still when there is no government to 
organize or enforce the common commitment. But we know it’s possible. 
Ostrom’s (2009) central point is that people can self-organize what she calls 
“self-governance” when there is no government to do it for them.2
All disciplines dealing with human cooperation find that the reciprocity 
of a common commitment—I will if you will—is the key principle underly-
ing collective human cooperation. Ostrom goes on to note that, “Trust and 
reciprocity are mutually reinforcing. A decrease in either can generate a 
downward cascade leading to little or no cooperation” (Poteete et al., 2010). 
In other words, insufficient reciprocity will not lead to an “upward spiral of 
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ambition,”3 as is hoped for with “pledge-and-review” (the approach exer-
cised in Paris). This is the crucial lesson for international climate policy 
after Paris: ambitious aspirations mean little, and trust cannot be legislated, 
but reciprocity can be designed into a treaty. If that design is effective, then 
trust will follow, and then ambition.
This chapter, and this book, is about how to design a climate treaty that 
builds on reciprocity.
The Paris approach omitted built-in reciprocity. So it leaves out Ostrom’s 
(2009) “necessary central core.” The consequence is that the “Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions” (INDCs) submitted in Paris are far 
from being ambitious enough to solve the climate dilemma, and there is 
no hope that, without a reciprocal, common commitment, pledge-and-
review will succeed (Cooper et al., chapter 1, this volume). This is one 
conclusion of every chapter in this book. Instead of ambition, the chap-
ters collected here focus on designs that, when put into practice, produce 
reciprocity.
What Ostrom (2009) and many others find in every successful coopera-
tive system are rules governing everyone’s contributions to, and use of, the 
common resource, as well as penalties for breaking those rules. These rules 
and penalties are the reciprocity mechanisms, and they build trust. Exhor-
tation to be ambitious is helpful but not enough. Common rules and sanc-
tions for breaking them are required in real-world settings.4
Free-Riding and Cooperation
The atmosphere is a common-pool resource, a type of public good, and so it 
is susceptible to overuse. It’s a global public good. But imagine for a moment 
that it was not. Imagine that the United States could only damage its own 
climate and the same for other countries. What would change? We would 
still need climate science. But there would be no reason for international 
negotiations. There would be no reason for any other country to be upset 
with US or Chinese emissions because they would not affect anyone else. 
Domestic pollution and domestic climate change could be addressed fully 
by narrowly self-interested countries.
So, the reason for international negotiations is the public-goods nature 
of the atmosphere. The essence of a common-pool resource is that everyone 
has access to the common pool, and hence all can overuse it to their own 
Global Carbon Pricing 35
benefit and to the detriment of others. This is the definition of free-riding. 
So the only reason that international negotiations over ambition levels are 
needed, or make sense, is because of free-riding.
Deniers of Free-Riding Sometimes we have noticed climate advocates deny-
ing the importance of free-riding. One reason given is that climate deniers 
make use of the free-riding argument. But your opponent’s use of a fact 
does not make the fact wrong.
Another reason for dismissing the importance of free-riders is a sim-
ple lack of understanding. One highly placed climate policy expert has 
argued that free-riding means doing little and expecting to “benefit suf-
ficiently from other countries’ mitigation.” The expert then pointed out 
that there is currently not much action from which to benefit. In other 
words, if there are few actions to free-ride on, then free riding can’t be a 
big problem.
This is backward. The main characteristic of the most severe free-rider 
problem is that when we all try to free-ride, there is no one left to give 
rides. In the most severe version of the free-rider problem, there is no 
free-riding!
But this confusion runs even deeper. The destruction of trust is the most 
pernicious aspect of free-riding. It causes those with no inclination to free-
ride to act just like free-riders. This is the insidious mechanism that causes 
the unraveling of cooperation. Here’s one way that could happen.
One Bad Apple Spoils the Bunch Consider 10 equal countries, nine of which 
do not want to free-ride but also don’t want to be taken advantage of. How-
ever, one nice but poor country (a “classic” free-rider) will not cooperate 
even if others do their part. Also suppose that:
• One country will tolerate no defecting (free-riding) countries
• One will tolerate one defector
• One will tolerate two defectors
• And so on down to the most tolerant country that will tolerate eight 
defectors.
What happens? Well, the classic free-rider country defects, so the zero-
tolerance country defects, so two have now defected, and the country that 
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will only tolerate one defector defects, and so on down to complete unrav-
elling. Although only 1 in 10 was a free-rider in the classic sense of wanting 
to do nothing, disaster ensued. Also notice that, in the end, no one had 
anyone to free-ride on, even though free-riding was what caused the whole 
problem.
This example has only one equilibrium—no cooperation. A common 
commitment by itself will not fix this version of the problem because 
the poor country would not be willing to sign any commitment that 
involves ambitious contributions by everyone. But a common commit-
ment that included a green climate-fund payment to the poor country 
could well work and achieve total cooperation. So reciprocity could over-
come free-riding.
In other examples, everyone will cooperate if enough others cooperate. 
But the world can still get stuck with no cooperation if there’s no trust 
to start with. But then all it takes is a common commitment to serve as 
a coordinating mechanism to shift everyone from no cooperation to full 
cooperation.
Not Being a Sucker Ostrom (2009) described another aspect of the prob-
lem in her climate report to the World Bank. “When participants fear 
they are being ‘suckers’ for taking costly actions while others free-ride, 
more substantial effort is devoted to finding deceptive ways of appear-
ing to reduce emissions while not doing so.” This is what pledge-and-
review will lead to. The free-rider problem is so essential that at the start 
of her classic book, Governing the Commons, she defines her “central 
question” as finding out “how a group … can organize and govern them-
selves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to 
free-ride.”
These are not theoretical judgments. For example, as Ostrom (2009) 
reported, in Törbel, Switzerland, the common-commitment rule is “no citi-
zen can send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the winter,” 
and this is still enforced by “substantial fines for any attempt by villagers to 
appropriate a larger share of grazing rights.” Those two reciprocity mech-
anisms prevent free-riding and generate trust. There are numerous other 
field studies like this.
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What the US Senate Understood During the Kyoto negotiations, developing 
countries said “you go first” to the others. The US Senate voted 95 to 0 to 
say, in effect, “No. You must come along with us. You can’t free-ride.” Even 
if this is not what the senators were thinking, there is a profoundly true 
message in that unprecedented vote. The message is, “Make a reciprocal 
deal we can trust.”
Some claim the senators’ expressions of concern were a cover for baser 
motives. But suppose that was true of all 95 senators. No one is more cal-
culating and no one listens to the electorate better than professional politi-
cians. When they calculate the same answer 95 to 0, you’d be a fool not to 
listen. This is what they understood:
Americans have a powerful and abiding fear that they will be taken advan-
tage of in the international arena. They don’t trust “foreigners.” So do not 
depend on their altruistic cooperation. They want a reciprocal deal they 
can trust.
That is the message of the Senate’s vote on Kyoto. That is not just what the 
senators said, that is what they were betting their careers on.
In 2015, the main argument in the United States against the Iran nuclear 
treaty is, “You can’t trust Iran” or any of our partners in the negotiations—
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Nothing has 
changed. But the United States is hardly alone in this. During the 2009 
Copenhagen climate negotiations, China became convinced and angry 
that the United States, Europe, and other developed countries were actively 
trying to turn the developing world against it.
Similar issues came up in Paris. Japan’s Paris pledge has been attacked by 
the Climate Action Network, a network of more than 950 nongovernmen-
tal organizations (http://www.climatenetwork.org/fossil-of-the-day). They 
claim that Japan is “using smoke and mirrors (shifting baselines) to fake 
ambition.” That’s a claim of free-riding. China’s pledge is for slightly less 
than what they found they needed to do to curb domestic pollution (http://
climateparis.org/china-emissions-pledge). When they announced it, they 
made no claim that it was motivated by concern for the climate. This may 
be free-riding or fear of it. But we are not blaming China; it’s just what one 
should expect from rational players who have no good reason to trust other 
players.
Those advocating national climate policies face climate-change deniers 
pointing out that other countries could free-ride on our efforts. In defense, 
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they tend to deny the free-rider problem and make up baseless theories, 
such as Al Gore’s notion that, “If we lead, China will follow.” In the long 
run, it will be far more constructive to solve the free-rider problem—the 
most central problem of cooperation—rather than deny there is a problem. 
Solving the free-rider problem is the heart of the solution proposed in this 
volume.
The Problem and the Solution
For 20 years, almost all climate negotiators have agreed on the need for 
strong climate-change mitigation. Even before Paris, there was a strong 
consensus that 2°C should be the goal. But this aspiration has not been 
translated into commitments and actions.
The Problem
The real problem is not the climate or the lack of climate-science knowl-
edge, and it’s not the lack of a common aspiration or goal—Paris achieved 
that. It’s not even the lack of blueprints for global action. The trouble is that 
negotiations end in acrimony or hollow victory statements. Paris was not 
different in that respect. So the problem is to find and fix the cause of these 
negotiation failures.
A better approach to negotiation is needed, and so we have made “how 
to negotiate” the focus of this book. This focus requires a distinction often 
overlooked. Two things matter most to the success of a negotiation: what 
outcome you aim for and how you go about getting there. Everyone knows 
this, but it is easier to focus on what you want than on how to structure the 
negotiations. So the “how” part is usually ignored and almost never ana-
lyzed systematically. In fact, the “how” part is so important that Weitzman 
(2014, chapter 8, this volume), Cramton and Stoft (2012a, 2012b), and 
Cramton et al. (chapter 12, this volume) argue it is decisive. But “what” and 
“how” are interrelated, and that just adds to the tendency for the “how” 
part to be forgotten.
Consider free-riding. As discussed in the previous section, an agreement 
that makes free-riding attractive will break down. As Ostrom (2007, p. 201) 
explains, it will “generate a downward cascade leading to little or no coop-
eration.” But she is not concerned with how to negotiate, so this is purely a 
consideration of what works. But if negotiators see that an agreement allows 
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free-riding, it is hard to negotiate a strong commitment within that frame-
work. So the potential to free-ride—the “what” part—affects the negotiation 
process—the “how” part.
This is not a general principle. A treaty that will work poorly may be easy 
to negotiate because it demands little, whereas one that would solve the 
problem brilliantly may be impossible to negotiate because of coordination 
problems—parties can’t agree on who should play which role.
Also, an agreement must cover three separate areas—abatement, burden 
sharing, and enforcement. It must get the “what” and “how” parts right in 
each area. But to avoid being too ambitious, we will only briefly speak to 
enforcement and leave that question mostly to Nordhaus (chapter 7, this 
volume). It is important to note, however, that enforcement is not a substi-
tute for a common commitment but rather a complement (see MacKay et 
al., 2015). This leaves the two closely related areas: abatement and burden 
sharing. The challenge is to find a treaty design that solves the free-rider 
problem for abatement and the fair burden-sharing problem, as well as to 
find a way to negotiate the two solutions that will lead to a strong treaty 
and not to a deadlock or weak commitments.
The Pledge-and-Review Non-Solution
Pledge-and-review was first proposed by Japan in a memo to the UNFCCC 
in 1991 and was much discussed starting in 1992. It was the model for the 
Paris Agreement. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
are the pledges, and these will be reviewed and, it is hoped, upgraded occa-
sionally. These are individual commitments, not common commitments, 
and so they do not address free-riding. But the situation is actually much 
worse than this statement implies.
The Kyoto Protocol was based on individual commitments, too, but all 
countries committed to some percentage (not a common percentage) of 
emission reduction below their 1990 emissions level. These commitments 
provided some hope of comparability. But the Paris pledge-and-review 
commitments are quite free-form even for developed countries and entirely 
free-form for developing countries. Hence, they are essentially impossible 
to compare.
Being both individual and noncomparable opens the door wide to free-
riding. Many countries will do their best to either lock in a free-ride or 
prevent others from free-riding on them. Either strategy results in weak 
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pledges. Hence, this approach will fail. For further discussion of actual 
outcomes in Paris, see Cooper (chapter 5, this volume) and the references 
cited therein. For a further general discussion of why individual commit-
ments will fail to solve the climate dilemma, see Cramton et al. (chapter 
12, this volume), Weitzman (chapter 8, this volume), and Gollier and Tirole 
(chapter 10, this volume).
Problems with Cap-and-Trade
Global cap-and-trade is likely the oldest of the three major approaches 
(global carbon pricing, pledge-and-review, global cap-and-trade), although 
the early (standard) versions were not global and worked quite differently. 
There are variations of global cap-and-trade, but for simplicity we will 
mostly adhere to the most up-to-date one, presented by Gollier and Tirole 
(chapter 10, this volume).
This approach first negotiates a global cap, Q, which is a quantity limit 
on emissions. However, no country is responsible for it, and at this stage, 
nothing has been decided about how to share responsibility for it. So what 
looks like simplicity has likely left us in a worse negotiating predicament 
than the one faced by the Kyoto negotiations. In Kyoto, countries just 
signed up for whatever abatement reduction they wanted. So naturally they 
reached agreement, just as they did in Paris with INDCs. However, that 
would not likely work under this global cap-and-trade approach because 
voluntary pledges probably would add up to more than the agreed Q. It is 
easy to be ambitious for the group when choosing Q, and again it is easy 
to allocate to your own country a lot of permits and explain that others 
should be taking fewer.
To solve this problem, it is necessary to agree on a formula for allocating 
any Q that the players select. Weitzman (chapter 8, this volume) explains 
why this is nearly impossible, and we examine the 20-year search for 
such formulas and find that little progress has been made. Moreover, 
because the formula is negotiated after Q is chosen, every country will 
evaluate the formula by computing its share of Q under the formula and 
judging the formula on that basis. This will make a successful negotiation 
even more difficult than choosing a formula first (as was tried unsuccess-
fully in Kyoto).
There are many reasons that agreeing on a formula is difficult. There is no 
agreeable focal point for a “fair” allocation of Q to all countries. Moreover, 
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with this mechanism, assuming that the global Q is actually credible, there 
is no built-in reciprocity that might help to discipline countries: the “I 
will do more if you do more” principle is not applicable because in the 
constant-sum-game that is being played when allocating a fixed Q to many 
countries, “I will actually do less if you do more.” The best strategy in this 
kind of game, even when players would in principle be willing to recipro-
cate others’ cooperation, is to be competitive (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). 
This makes it impossible to build trust. Of course, this in turn implies that 
no ambitious global Q can be made credible.
In addition, we will find that a strong global cap-and-trade would cause 
enormous trading risks. Concern over such risks will make negotiating a 
strong treaty even more difficult as poor countries seek large permit alloca-
tions for protection. In short, the chances of negotiating a global cap-and-
trade agreement appear to have been receding for 20 years, and if a strong 
agreement were ever implemented, it seems likely to unravel due to unfair 
realized outcomes of trading risks.
The Solution: A Global Carbon Price Commitment
A global carbon price commitment evolved from the idea of a global carbon 
tax and (to our knowledge) was first published by Cooper (2008) and then 
Stoft (2008). One key feature in these publications was the idea that coun-
tries could commit to a minimum price and then meet that commitment 
with either standard cap-and-trade or fossil-fuel taxes. Compared with a 
uniform global tax on carbon, this allows tremendous flexibility, which is 
clearly necessary for political reasons.
When fleshed out, the proposal can be seen to be quite similar to 
global cap-and-trade but with quantities replaced by prices, as is shown in 
table 4.1.
Table 4.1







Quantity cap, Q Qi = ? Emission credits Everything
Price, P Pi = P Pricing credits Cap, tax, or similar
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Notice that no rule for allocating global target Q to country i is provided. 
This missing part of the specification is one of the main criticisms of global 
cap-and-trade. Also notice that global cap-and-trade allows any national (or 
regional or local) abatement policy, and hence it does not require the pric-
ing of carbon emissions, whereas global pricing provides a great deal, but 
not complete, flexibility and does require carbon pricing.
Besides flexibility, there is a need for burden sharing. This would appear 
to be crucial for any effective global climate agreement. Hence, the defining 
features of global carbon pricing can be summarized as follows:
1. Negotiate green-climate-fund payments, Gi = some formula, for each 
country i.
2. Negotiate a global price-floor, P(t), to be flexibly met by each country.
The price path, P(t), is the “common responsibility” of all countries, 
whereas climate-fund payments, Gi, are their “differentiated responsibili-
ties” under the UNFCCC. It is essential that P be a common commitment 
to solve the free-rider problem with trust and reciprocity as described by 
Ostrom. However, P could be a flexible commitment, provided all countries 
are granted the same flexibility. For example, if a country’s price is too low 
in one year, then it could be allowed to buy pricing credits5 from another 
country that has overperformed. Also note that P(t) should be adjusted 
every five years or so as ambitions increase.
Price is defined flexibly within a country as total carbon revenues divided 
by total emissions. Carbon revenues include the market price of freely allo-
cated cap-and-trade permits because these credits price carbon just as effec-
tively as a tax. Because price is defined in terms of carbon revenue, tax rates 
on fossil fuels can vary from fuel to fuel and between customer classes.
It is important to negotiate the green climate fund first because the results 
determine what common price countries will accept. If the climate fund is 
meager, then poor countries will demand a low carbon price, whereas if it is 
too generous, rich countries will attempt to stymie the price negotiations. 
Consequently, we propose that the generosity of the green fund be deter-
mined with only one goal in mind—to maximize the global carbon price. 
To do this, it must satisfy both rich and poor reasonably well so that the 
second phase, price negotiations, will succeed. To arrive at such a fair com-
promise, we suggest that the generosity of the climate fund be decided by 
a group of countries that are midway between donors and recipients. These 
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countries will care most about the success of the climate policy and worry 
least about their climate fund payments, either into or from the fund.
Summary This completes the sketch of the solution—the path to a strong 
and negotiable climate treaty. First, a common climate-fund formula is 
negotiated, guided by the goal of achieving the strongest possible climate 
commitment. This means it must be seen as reasonably fair by rich and 
poor alike. Then a common price commitment is negotiated, which pre-
vents free-riding.6
A Simple Treaty to Change Self-Interest
When it is not kept in check, free-riding produces the tragedy of the com-
mons. The Kyoto negotiations hoped to keep it in check with a uniform 
requirement (X%) for emission reduction. The search for a commonly 
acceptable X failed, but the idea of a common X was based on good intu-
ition. So failure led to a nearly permanent loss of the intuition that a 
common commitment is needed. Global carbon pricing searches along a 
different path and finds the common commitment that eluded the Kyoto 
negotiators. This section explains the basic idea of that common commit-
ment and how it defeats free-riding.
Few doubt that self-interest is a powerful force, and few believe we can 
redirect it to solve the tragedy of the commons that now controls climate 
change. This pessimism is a bit surprising considering that Elinor Ostrom’s 
work (and the work of many others) focuses on explaining how communi-
ties, many of them poor, have been doing this for centuries. In this section, 
we sketch a simple climate treaty that demonstrates the basic principles of 
promoting cooperation. It begins with an independent-commitment game 
among 10 purely self-interested countries and argues that they would be 
trapped as expected by the tragedy of the commons. We then change one 
rule in the negotiation game and nothing else. The result is that, although 
the 10 selfish countries remain as selfish as ever, they cooperate perfectly. 
The new rule is a common price commitment.
A Simple Global Climate Model7
First, we need a simple model of the climate-policy world. Imagine that the 
world has 10 identical countries. If you weight countries by their size (so 
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the little ones don’t count much), the average-size country has about one-
tenth of the world’s population. This turns out to be a good first model to 
use to find out how countries might cooperate or free-ride on each other’s 
efforts.
Suppose that one ton of emissions does $50 of climate damage to the 
whole world but only $5 of damage to each country. So the world is bet-
ter off if it stops emissions worth less (in nonclimate benefits) than $50/
ton, and an individual country is better off stopping emissions worth less 
than $5/ton.
A carbon price of $50/ton will stop emissions that cause a net loss to the 
world, but a single selfish country will only want to price its carbon at $5/
ton in order to allow local projects worth $6/ton. These bring it a net ben-
efit of $1 but do $45 of damage to the rest of the world. Remember that the 
tax itself does not cost the country anything, it just shifts money around. 
(From here on we will often drop the per-ton units.)
Two Climate Treaties
Enforcement. Can these 10 countries negotiate a strong treaty? The answer is 
“yes, if there is enforcement.” So assume there will be enforcement but only 
of voluntary agreements. We won’t force anyone to comply with an agree-
ment they don’t like. Imagine that if one country reneges, this enforce-
ment will be carried out by the other nine countries (perhaps with trade 
sanctions). So if you voluntarily sign a deal to cut emissions by 20%, it will 
be enforced. But if you don’t like the treaty, you can just not sign it, and 
then nothing will be enforced. That’s pretty mild enforcement—saving face 
might even be a strong enough motive to accomplish this. For simplicity, 
we assume that all countries are selfish.
An Individual-Commitment Treaty In the spirit of the 2015 Paris conference, 
all countries could agree to the following Individualistic treaty:
Treaty: Each country will pledge to implement a carbon price of its choosing.
Of course, this will be enforced as discussed earlier. There would be long 
negotiations and discussions first, but nothing would be known for sure 
until the written pledges are opened simultaneously on the deadline.
Selfish countries would set a carbon price no lower than $5 because that 
would allow emissions that directly caused them more climate damage 
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than the non-climate benefit they would gain. But self-interest will hold 
them down to that level.
So individual pledges made simultaneously will lead to a complete lack 
of cooperation. It takes reciprocity to prevent this outcome—and that’s 
missing with the individualistic treaty.
Outcome: All countries would pledge $5; that is, no country would coop-
erate to address climate change—the same outcome as if there were no 
negotiations.
A Common-Commitment Treaty. Suppose instead that the 10 countries ask 
their treaty-design team to invent a treaty and a way to negotiate it. The 
team reports back: Every country should pledge their “conditional price” 
with the understanding that they will only implement that price if all 
others pledge that much. Otherwise they will implement the lowest con-
ditional price pledged by any country. With this treaty design, once the 
pledges are in, the lowest pledge becomes the common global price com-
mitment. This will be enforced for all countries because all have volun-
tarily agreed to that particular price—the lowest “conditional price” that 
was pledged. So, as before, any country can pledge $5 without any penalty, 
so it can fully defect.
Treaty: Every country agrees to price carbon at the lowest price pledged by 
any country.
With this treaty, all countries will pledge to price at $50, so that the 
global carbon price is at its optimum. First, we check that any other out-
come would make all countries worse off. Suppose the lowest price is 
lower, say $40. Then companies in all countries would emit carbon that 
only had a $41 benefit to them ($1 more than the tax they pay). But with 
identical countries, all would do this, and again with 10 countries each 
emitting 1 ton, the damage is $50 per country, but they only get $41 in 
local benefit from burning the fossil fuel. All the countries would lose. 
Similarly, if the lowest price is higher than $50, say $60, then this would 
stop them from all using a ton of fossil fuel that had a $59 local benefit. 
But such a project is good because, with 10 of these there is only $50 of 
climate damage per country, and they all gain a net benefit by $9 (a $59 
local benefit and $50 climate cost). So a $50 carbon price is as high as 
anyone would want.
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To see why everyone pledges $50, observe that one’s pledge can only be 
relevant for the outcome if one has submitted the lowest price among all 
players. So if your pledge was lowest and it was less than $50, then it would 
benefit everyone (including you) to raise it. If your pledge was lowest and 
above $50, then it would benefit everyone to lower it. Just in case your 
pledge is the controlling minimum pledge, you will want to pledge $50, 
which is optimal for all.
Outcome: All countries would pledge $50, and that would be the global 
price of carbon—all countries would fully cooperate to optimally address 
climate change.
Conclusion
In a simple world with identical, completely selfish countries, and with 
enforcement of voluntary commitments, we can change the negotiation 
game and thereby change selfish behavior—even though the intention 
remains selfish. This can be done by introducing a common commitment 
into the negotiations. This changes the outcome from no cooperation to 
full cooperation. Note that the results in this section are robust: They hold 
when players are completely selfish as well as under weaker assumptions 
about players’ motivations (e.g., even if most players are conditional coop-
erators and would be willing to match others’ average contributions, there 
would be a complete lack of cooperation with an individualistic treaty as 
long as at least one player is at least “to some extent” selfish) (see Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000, for a more formal treatment). Note, however, that 
both a common commitment and some enforcement are required. After 
discussing some practicalities and fairness, we will return and discuss how 
to make this simple story more realistic.
Does Global Cap-and-Trade Price Carbon?
For economists, the central goal of global cap-and-trade, as well as stan-
dard, local cap-and-trade, has been economic efficiency—its ability to get 
the job done much more cheaply than traditional command-and-control 
approaches. It does this by (supposedly) putting a “uniform price” on car-
bon emissions. Standard cap-and-trade actually does do this—by requiring 
emitters to have emission permits.
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But global cap-and-trade, which works like the Kyoto Protocol, will fail 
to achieve the central objective of cap-and-trade for the same reason that 
Kyoto did—emitters are not required to have permits for their emissions or 
to price carbon at all. Here we explain this essential flaw in global cap-and-
trade and how a global carbon price commitment would avoid this.
Why Price Carbon Emissions?
Until recently, emitting carbon (by which we mean emitting CO2 from 
fossil-fuel or certain other easy-to-track greenhouse gases) has generally 
been free. Disposing of carbon into the atmosphere, unlike taking your 
garbage to the dump, had a price of zero. But carbon emissions turned out 
to have a cost, which is increasing as the concentration of atmospheric 
carbon increases.
As with any good, when the price is too low, it is overused. However, 
burning carbon produces valuable services, and the damage from disposal 
may be only $30 or $40 per ton at present. Certainly, no one would suggest 
we immediately stop driving, heating, and using electricity. We must admit 
there is a tradeoff. Economics shows that if carbon is correctly priced and 
we are rational, we will make that tradeoff perfectly. The net benefit (value 
minus damage) will be maximized. The result won’t actually be perfect, but 
to a reasonable approximation, it will maximize net benefit—carbon ben-
efits minus climate damages.
Price Matters In 1972 and 1973, US CO2 emissions rose by 4.6% and 4.2%, 
respectively. In October 1973, the Arabs declared an oil embargo, and oil 
prices rose sharply. In 1974 and 1975, CO2 emissions declined by 3.5% and 
4.2%, respectively. As figure 4.1 shows, at the end of 12 years—which is 
when the Saudis stopped propping up oil prices and took back their market 
share, emissions were down not up. Doubters claim this was caused by the 
introduction of nuclear power, but if all those plants had emitted as much 
CO2 as coal plants, then emissions would have been only 9% higher and 
still would have been down not up from 1973 levels. In fact, even in this 
fictitious (no nuclear) scenario, they would have been down about 37% 
relative to a trend line based on GDP. Note also that the decline was not at 
all caused by a decline in GDP.
Prices work in an uncountable number of ways. For example, US refriger-
ators were made more efficient. But this was the direct result of work by the 
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brilliant particle physicist Art Rosenfeld, who explained, “I was prompted 
by the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil 
embargo to switch to improving energy end-use efficiency, particularly in 
buildings.” That was after he realized “why we in the United States used 
so much energy; oil and gas were as cheap as dirt or water, and so they 
were treated like dirt or water.” Art Rosenfeld’s brilliant work on energy 
efficiency was a direct result of higher carbon prices.
Of course prices also change individual consumer decisions, but it is 
important to remember their impact on politics, how cars are advertised, 
regulatory hearings, and the environmental movement. The impact is 
enormous, and most of it is long run so it is not immediately apparent.
Why Carbon Charges Are Cheap It is cheap to price carbon. For simplicity, 
think of a $100 billion per year carbon tax. How much does that cost the 
country? The tax itself costs nothing. The money collected is not lost to the 
country and can either be returned directly to its citizens or used in place 
of some other tax—as a “tax swap.” As long as revenues are not returned in 
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example, if a gasoline tax collects $500 per person on average, and every-
one is given a refund of $500 regardless of their gasoline usage, every dollar 
of tax saved by buying less gasoline will be kept, and the incentive to use 
less is unaffected.
A direct and complete refund is the best way to prove the carbon charge 
costs nothing. It is also fair because it is equivalent to saying each person 
has an equal right to the atmosphere, and those who use more should have 
to buy extra rights from those who use less and not just take the rights for 
free (usually from the poor). Nonetheless, a tax swap will likely be politi-
cally more popular, and a swap also demonstrates that the tax itself is free 
(but only in the short run).
There is, however, an indirect and nearly invisible cost to pricing carbon. 
No matter how it is done or what is done with the revenues, pricing carbon 
will cause reduced emissions—abatement, and abatement is costly. It will 
cost somewhere between nothing and the price of carbon because there is 
no use in paying more—it’s better to just pay the charge. So the standard 
formula for that cost is P × A/2, where P is the carbon price and A is the 
amount abated. If a $30 price reduces emissions from 1 billion tons to 0.8 
billion, then 0.8 billion × $30 = $24 billion will be collected in revenue. 
However, because abatement is only 0.2 billion, the cost of abatement will 
be only $30 × 0.2/2 = $3 billion, eight times less than the carbon revenues 
collected (and recycled).
So to summarize, the carbon charge itself costs nothing. It just causes 
money to change hands. In contrast, the induced abatement does have a 
cost. However, people will be quite creative in figuring out how to mini-
mize this cost and will consider far more possibilities than regulators pos-
sibly can. This is what makes carbon pricing much cheaper than regulatory 
subsidies (see Edenhofer and Ockenfels, chapter 9, this volume, for a similar 
argument regarding the German “Energiewende”).
A uniform global carbon price is certainly not a full solution to the cli-
mate problem, but it is by far the broadest, simplest, and most efficient 
(cheapest) partial solution. So it should be high, perhaps even highest, on 
the list of important policies to implement. This is the well-known, tradi-
tional economic argument for pricing carbon.
A New Reason to Price Carbon The point of this section is that global cap-
and-trade fails at its mission—pricing carbon emissions. But we don’t want 
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to give the impression that that is the only mission of global carbon pric-
ing. The broken climate negotiations suggest an arguably more important 
reason to price carbon. As we just saw, free-riding and the fear of it have 
prevented the world from taking meaningful action to limit climate dam-
age. To overcome this problem, we need a common commitment. As it 
turns out, global carbon pricing makes an ideal common commitment, and 
nothing else seems to work. So this is the new and probably most important 
reason to price carbon. We will return to this topic later.8
How Can We Price Carbon Emissions?
There are two well-known ways that governments can price carbon emis-
sions: cap-and-trade and taxing fossil fuel. Although both of these could be 
operated as a global policy, it would require complex international institu-
tions that presently seem quite improbable. Cap-and-trade would require 
that all emitters in all countries trade permits in one unified market. The 
European Union (EU) emissions trading scheme (ETS) is such a policy, but it 
only covers half of emissions and only exists because the EU has a govern-
ment, which the world does not. A global tax would require that all fossil 
fuels be taxed at the same rate. This seems nearly as impossible as global 
cap-and-trade.
Consequently, it is far more realistic to consider simple global commit-
ments instead of complex global policies. Global cap-and-trade only means 
committing to a set of country-specific permit allocations and to restrict-
ing emission to permits. A global price commitment only means national 
commitments to a global price. In both cases, countries would choose from 
such policies as domestic cap-and-trade, the EU ETS, various fossil fuel 
taxes, and other pricing policies. None of these policies would be governed 
from the top.
The Kyoto Protocol is a model for global cap-and-trade. It covers a 
broader territory than the EU, and so the Protocol has no corresponding 
government. A similar protocol could potentially support a global cap-and-
trade treaty. But the Kyoto Protocol is a form of cap-and-trade that does not 
price carbon emissions, and neither would global cap-and-trade. We explain 
this next.
Global Cap-and-Trade The Kyoto Protocol implements a small version of 
global cap-and-trade, but it does not implement anything like the EU ETS, 
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California’s cap-and-trade, or Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in 
the eastern United States. All these markets require emitters to own carbon 
permits. They all price carbon emissions. The Kyoto Protocol does not.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, governments, not emitters, must own all the 
carbon permits for their whole country even if the government were to emit 
nothing. This creates a disconnection. Kyoto’s international carbon permits 
are called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). If the AAU market worked (which 
it does not) and priced AAUs at, say, $30/ton, then that would not mean 
that any emitter would be charged $30 for one ton of carbon emissions. The 
government must curb emissions, but it can do that however it pleases. It is 
not required to price carbon. Of course it is allowed to price carbon, and it 
might do so. But if the EU ETS is any guide, it will not price carbon emissions 
at the price of international carbon permits—the AAU price.
Suppose a government has 1.2 billion AAUs and its country is emitting 
only 1 billion tons of carbon. It can sell its 0.2 billion AAUs at the global 
market price of, say, $30/ton, and it doesn’t need to cut back on its emis-
sions at all. Therefore, it has absolutely no need to price carbon. So why is 
there an almost universal pretense that global cap-and-trade would price all 
carbon emissions at a uniform AAU price?
In effect, the following is the economic story behind this pretense. The 
government will freely choose to tax carbon usage at $30 per ton (the AAU 
price). It’s a clever tax because it will cause the country to emit less than 1 
billion tons, and this will free up more permits, say 0.1 billion more, to sell 
to other countries. Now the government can sell a total of 0.3 billion per-
mits on the international market for $9 billion instead of selling 0.2 billion 
permits for $6 billion.
It’s a nice theory. But for the government, there is a cost. It must 
impose a potentially unpopular carbon tax (or permit requirement) that 
collects $30 times 0.9 billion tons, or $27 billion domestically. Some will 
ask, why? Especially when the country has more than enough permits to 
start with.
It didn’t work like the economists’ theory predicted under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol. Russia and other East-European countries didn’t do that. The same 
theory says that all of Europe would have done this, but no country did. 
The EU did implement the ETS, and some countries did impose a carbon 
tax, but not for this reason. Mainly, they chose to subsidize solar and effi-
ciency measures, causing “implicit carbon prices” to range from 0 to 1,000 € 
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or even more, instead of being uniform (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 10, this 
volume). In other words, in a major real-world test of global cap-and-trade, 
it did not price carbon emissions—it did not come even remotely close to 
accomplishing its central purpose.
A Global Carbon-Price Commitment A global carbon price commitment is a 
commitment made by countries to price their domestic carbon emissions, 
on average, at least as high as the agreed-on global carbon price. Like global 
cap-and-trade, a global carbon price commitment does not specify national 
policies. It would allow the EU ETS or fossil taxes, or a combination (as 
actually exists), and various other policies. But unlike global cap-and-trade, 
a global carbon price commitment will not count pure command-and-con-
trol policies. This does not mean countries cannot continue such policies. 
A global carbon price commitment simply ignores them.
In fact, command-and-control policies could even continue to be part 
of a separate international pledge-and-review system. Hopefully, the most 
wasteful of these policies would die out, and the beneficial, well-designed 
ones that plug holes in the carbon-pricing approach would be retained. 
(Later we will see that the climate fund used with a global carbon price 
commitment can provide incentives for good, nonprice policies.) A global 
carbon price commitment would also prominently raise the question of 
how much it is really costing a country to abate carbon. This will expose the 
wastefulness of some policies, and we believe this will strongly encourage 
greater efficiency through the use of price-based approaches.
A strict version of a global carbon price commitment would allow only 
true carbon pricing, such as cap-and-trade, fossil taxes, and bonus-malus 
(AKA feebate) pricing schemes. But at the start, it might be necessary, for 
political reasons, to count renewable energy subsidies as well. These would 
be credited only for carbon abated and not for the money spent on subsi-
dies. An estimate would be made of the carbon price the country would 
have needed to abate as much without the renewable subsidies. It would 
then be credited with that carbon price.
So a global carbon price commitment, although not interfering with 
command-and-control measures, would actively encourage countries to 
engage in the efficient carbon pricing to meet their commitments. At first it 
would likely allow borderline pricing policies (like the renewable subsidies 
just mentioned), but eventually a global carbon price commitment would 
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become far more efficient than global cap-and-trade is likely to be. But even 
then, a carbon price commitment will be tremendously flexible. Different 
emissions from different fuels and different polluters can be priced differ-
ently. Automobile efficiency can be subject to highly effective bonus-malus 
pricing to address consumer myopia. Of course countries can use cap-and-
trade or even join regional or global cap-and-trade networks. Also price 
credits could be traded and banked from one year to the next.
Although this flexibility will not lead to a completely uniform price 
by any means, it should lead to a much more uniform cost of abatement 
(implicit price) than global cap-and-trade, and it would make sense to put 
some restriction on the nonuniformity of carbon prices used to meet the 
global price commitment.
Figure 4.2 illustrates both the similarities and differences between the two 
approaches. Both allow all possible climate polices, but global carbon pric-
ing will not count pure command-and-control policies toward the global 
commitment, whereas global cap-and-trade will. Instead, carbon pricing 
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will accommodate parallel pledge-and-review commitments, whereas global 
cap-and-trade will not. At least for a while at the beginning, policies such as 
subsidies for renewables would have their abatements counted toward pric-
ing. In these ways, global carbon pricing will shift the policy mix away from 
command-and-control and toward pricing carbon emissions (although it 
will provide some incentive through climate-fund rules for good nonprice 
policies).
The end result will be that global cap-and-trade will do little, if anything, 
to price carbon emissions, whereas global carbon pricing will do much to 
shift national policies in this direction by only giving credit for true carbon 
pricing or for a price-equivalent value of measured abatement.
Fairness
Perhaps the toughest problem for international negotiations is burden shar-
ing. Who will bear the cost of stopping further atmospheric damage? The 
essence of the problem would seem to be fairness, a subject notoriously 
susceptible to bias. But the only focal point for fairness is to divide rights to 
the atmosphere equally among the entire human population.
This proposal might be as fair as possible for a simple rule, but there are 
two decisive arguments against making use of it. First, it will continue to 
be blocked by a large number of claims for alternative “fair” ways to share 
the burden. Second, it would surely be blocked by many richer countries.
Because this approach is decisively blocked, we suggest considering a 
focal principle that is not based directly on fairness but that would nonethe-
less contain checks and incentives that would pull it substantially toward a 
fair solution. This principle can be stated as follows.
Burden-sharing principle: The costs of improving the climate should be 
assigned in such a way that the climate is most improved.
This is not such a new idea. It has been long employed by Frankel (1998) 
in his quest for an effective common-commitment formula for the alloca-
tion of free carbon-emission permits. It has also been used by Cramton and 
Stoft (2010, 2012a,b) in their green climate-fund design for a number of 
years.
This principle has advantages, some important. First, its only built-in 
bias is toward countries that will be harmed most by climate change—
because its goal is to maximize climate benefits. In principle, this could be 
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problematic. But in reality, there are stronger opposing biases, such as one 
caused by free-riding on future generations.
Second, the principle provides concrete guidance on how to negotiate 
equity transfers. In the next section, we use this principle to help allocate 
payments into and from the climate fund.
A More Realistic Treaty Design
We have now demonstrated how a common commitment to a carbon price 
could lead to cooperation in a highly simplified world. That involves a com-
mitment to the lowest pledge submitted, which works perfectly, although it 
sounds like a weak approach. From here on we will refer to it as consensus 
voting because the lowest pledge is also the highest pledge that could elicit 
a consensus (100%) in its favor. This section introduces the two toughest 
problems facing climate negotiators:
1. Low motivation
2. Fairness questions
For various reasons, some countries may want to do much less than oth-
ers; hence, they might vote for a carbon price as low as zero. As a result, 
consensus voting is ruled out as an effective negotiation tool. Second, some 
countries will need help with the costs of abatement, so a climate fund will 
need to be included in negotiations.
Preventing Too Low a Price
The first problem, low motivation, arises for several reasons. First, poor 
countries may heavily discount the future because they are so concerned 
with the present. Second, some northern countries may be somewhat 
ambivalent about being warmer. Also, countries that export oil may want 
the carbon price to be zero because a higher price suppresses the demand 
for oil and reduces their profits.
Because some countries may want too low a price, the minimum-price 
rule of the previous section would produce an unacceptably low carbon-
price commitment if applied to all countries. To fix this, we must limit 
voting rights by excluding, in some way, the lowest votes from the deter-
mination of the global price. This can be done by forming a “coalition of 
the willing,” which is essentially the same as the idea of a Climate Club 
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suggested by Nordhaus (chapter 7, this volume, and 2015). Such a coali-
tion could be formed through informal negotiation or a formal voting 
procedure.
Although it is easy to think of a procedure, such as forming the coalition 
from countries that vote for the highest global price, there are subtle incen-
tive problems with many of these, so an informal procedure may be best. It 
is clear, however, that if the coalition has some power to reward those who 
cooperate with its pricing policy or punish those who do not, it will be eas-
ier to form a large coalition that agrees on a high price. In fact, enforcement 
is recommended by Nordhaus (chapter 7, this volume), Stiglitz (chapter 6, 
this volume), and Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume).
Fortunately, enforcement may be less necessary than is predicted by 
standard economics. Ostrom (1990) finds that “the fines assessed in these 
[common-pool governance] settings are surprisingly low. Rarely are they 
more than a small fraction of the monetary value that could be obtained 
by breaking the rules.”
In any case, we will postpone the discussion of enforcement until the 
next section and simply assume here that we can form a coalition that 
excludes uncooperative countries. Within this coalition, we can use con-
sensus voting to select the highest global price that is acceptable to all.
A Green Climate Fund
The problem of burden sharing has been the most divisive and was 
addressed by the UN’s famous phrase in its Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), stating that countries have “common but 
differentiated responsibilities.” The interpretation of this phrase has been 
most contentious. A global carbon-price commitment resolves this tension 
by making carbon pricing the common responsibility of all countries. Dif-
ferentiated responsibilities are then handled by differing contributions to 
and receipts from a green climate fund.
Carbon prices should not be differentiated for two reasons.9 First, this 
wastes money. More important, as demonstrated in the prior example 
agreement, if coalition members commit to an enforceable common price, 
this eliminates free-riding at least within the coalition. This simplifies 
the negotiation and greatly strengthens the outcome. Because fixing the 
20-year-old negotiation impasse is our primary objective, it’s best not to 
undo the progress we’ve made so far.
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So differentiation of responsibilities should be accomplished with a cli-
mate fund and not by differentiating prices. This poses the obvious prob-
lem of how much each country should contribute or receive, which could 
be as complex a problem (although smaller according to Weitzman, chapter 
8, this volume) as deciding carbon permit allocations under global cap-and-
trade. But just as that problem is solved by replacing individual commit-
ments with a common commitment, so can the climate-fund problem be 
solved with a common-commitment formula.
The most obvious climate-fund formula was invented independently by 
both cap-and-trade and carbon-pricing proponents and can be found in 
Stoft (2008, 2010), Cramton et al. (2010, 2012a,b) and Gollier and Tirole 
(chapter 10, this volume). Admittedly, it is too simple, but it is quite instruc-
tive and demonstrates most of the good properties that could be approxi-
mated with a more realistic formula. The formula is10:
Payment into the climate fund by country i, Gi = g × Xi × P, 
where g is the generosity parameter, Xi is the excess emissions of country 
i, and P is the global price.
Excess emissions are defined as emissions above what would occur if the 
country had the global-average per capita emissions rate. Negative values of 
Gi (resulting from below average per capita emissions) indicate a payment 
from the climate fund. Because there is a high correlation between emis-
sions per capita and income per capita, this formula transfers funds from 
rich to poor countries. However, a realistic formula would need to be a bit 
more complicated to compensate for various anomalies.
The climate-fund formula has one primary effect and three beneficial 
side effects:
Primary effect: because of g, the formula makes successful negotiations 
possible.
1. It provides an incentive for poor countries to vote for a higher level 
of P.
2. It provides every country with an extra incentive to reduce emissions.
3. It can be used as a friendly enforcement mechanism for compliance 
with P.
The primary effect of the formula is to simplify the n-dimensional 
problem of negotiating payments for n countries into a one-dimensional 
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problem of negotiating g, the overall generosity of payments from rich to 
poor. Although this is essential, the side effects are also surprisingly benefi-
cial and important.
The first side effect, an incentive to vote for a higher P, is most essential. 
As already noted, poor countries will tend to favor a low value for P. The 
climate-fund formula overcomes this problem because poor countries see 
that if the price is doubled, their climate-fund payments will double. This 
gives them an incentive to pledge and lobby for a higher carbon price, P.
The second beneficial side effect, an additional incentive to abate, hap-
pens automatically because any additional abatement reduces a country’s 
excess emissions. So a country with high emissions would pay less and one 
with low emissions would receive more. The third benefit is activated by 
making a rule that the climate fund is paid only to countries that are in 
compliance with the global carbon price. This also makes rich countries 
feel like they are “getting something for their money,” which makes these 
payments more palatable. However, requiring contributions from devel-
oped countries still makes them less likely to participate, but techniques 
described next, for maximizing the coalition’s chosen price, should still 
help produce the strongest possible price agreement.
How the Carbon Price and the Climate Fund Interact
We have now specified a two-phase negotiation process that works as 
follows:
1. Negotiate climate-fund generosity g (payment = g × Xi × P).
2. Negotiate a “Climate Club” price P for a “coalition of the willing.”
Breaking the negotiation in half, as this does, is enormously benefi-
cial. Otherwise, when countries attempt to reduce their own burden, they 
unintentionally destroy the climate ambition of the treaty. This happens 
under cap-and-trade negotiations, where individual-country permit alloca-
tions add up to the total cap. As an additional benefit, these two nego-
tiation phases also interact beneficially. These are the two complementary 
interactions:
1. The climate-fund negotiation over g is used to improve P.
2. Subsequent negotiation over P makes the g-outcome acceptable.
First, note that negotiating g does not require unanimous agreement 
because countries can protect themselves in phase 2. To understand 
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interaction 1, note that if too high a level of g is selected, then rich coun-
tries will pledge a low P to hold down their payments into the climate fund 
(see the equation for the payment into the climate fund above). Similarly, 
if too low a level of g is selected, poor countries will pledge a low P to 
avoid the abatement costs that come with higher values of P. So with either 
extremely high or low values of generosity g, one group or the other will 
opt for a low global price.
If either rich or poor pledge too low a price, then the global carbon price 
will be too low. So, with a coalition of rich and poor, both extremes of g 
must be avoided so that neither group will pledge too low. So by setting g 
at the right intermediate value, the highest possible price will be agreed on. 
This is in keeping with the burden-sharing principle suggested earlier.
Consequently, it is best if g is determined by countries that do not have 
a conflict of interest regarding climate-fund payments. These will be coun-
tries that have near-zero excess emissions and hence participate little in the 
climate fund. Such countries will be inclined to focus on getting a success-
ful climate treaty with a high carbon price.
The second interaction guarantees that countries in the coalition of the 
willing will find both their climate-fund obligation and the global price 
acceptable. If they did not, then they would have pledged a lower value 
of P and that value would have become the coalition’s agreed-on value. 
In the extreme, this could lead to a price of zero and no climate-fund pay-
ments, but for two reasons this should not happen. First, the coalition will 
be selected to contain cooperative countries. Second, offering the protec-
tion of the second interaction will make those selecting g especially careful 
to select a reasonable value. The result should be that few countries feel 
they need protection from the chosen g. So they will be willing to vote for 
a high global price in phase 2 of the negotiations.
Conclusion
We have considered two factors that tend to weaken a climate treaty: low 
motivation and fairness questions. Our strategy has been to avoid disrupting 
the common price commitment that serves to solve the free-rider problem. 
To maintain this common price, we have separated the “willing” from the 
unwilling and handled “differentiated responsibilities” with a climate fund.
To simplify climate-fund negotiations, we suggest using a formula. To 
make this easier to negotiate, we allow countries to opt out of a climate-fund 
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formula they perceive as unfair by not joining the coalition, although 
there will eventually be some penalties for opting out. This also motivates 
construction of a fair formula so that few will opt out.
Why Price Negotiations Work Better Than Quantity Negotiations Compare this 
process with negotiating a Kyoto-style treaty. Such a treaty allocates quanti-
ties, Qi, of free carbon permits to participating countries. These quantities 
serve double duty. The total of all Qi determines world carbon emissions, 
and individual Qis determine wealth transfers to each country. If your Qi is 
higher by one ton, then you will be richer by the price of one ton of car-
bon. So every country will be paid handsomely to negotiate as high a Qi as 
possible, which means every country is paid to do all they can to increase 
global carbon emissions.
Price negotiations eliminate this incentive to obtain a free ride from the 
negotiations. Some will see this flexibility and accommodation as a weak-
ness and will want to enforce the “scientifically correct” commitment. This 
view is backward. A heavy-handed approach will only produce conflict or, 
at best, a treaty that quickly unravels. The source of this weakness is the 
lack of a global government. Given this weakness, procedures that reduce 
risk and eliminate adverse free-riding incentives will produce the strongest 
possible sustainable treaty.
Climate Clubs, Enforcement, and Reciprocity
Some say enforcement is the key to cooperation. This is half true, but we’ve 
already seen that enforcing independent commitments does not produce 
cooperation. Think of a road speed limit. If we independently set our own 
speed limits, then there would not be much use enforcing them. But if the 
limit applies to all, we have good reason to choose a moderate limit, and 
then enforcement is necessary and effective.
Fortunately, there are gentle types of enforcement, such as “internal 
enforcement” discussed next, social pressure, and rewards for poor coun-
tries that comply with the common commitment. These will be particu-
larly useful at the beginning. Nordhaus (chapter 7, this volume) discusses 
Climate Clubs (coalitions) and a strong style of enforcement but makes 
little mention of a common commitment. However, as he explains, he still 
considers a common price commitment essential.
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No other chapters in this volume focus on clubs, but several of them 
agree (and none disagree) that some enforcement, probably trade sanctions, 
will eventually be necessary. This section shows why Climate Clubs and 
carbon price commitments are just two different views of the same carbon-
pricing-with-enforcement policy, although Nordhaus (chapter 7, this vol-
ume) advocates stronger enforcement than some of the other authors.
Internal Enforcement
Scott Barrett (1994) discusses self-enforcing international environmental 
agreements, and the first type he discusses uses what Nordhaus (chapter 7, 
this volume) refers to as “internal enforcement.” This enforcement is par-
ticularly gentle. To understand it, suppose the world consists of countries 
that are identical except for their size. This means that if one country is 
half the size of the other, then the larger country will experience twice the 
climate damage; if it abates the same amount per capita, then it will incur 
twice the abatement cost. Now suppose that the world has the following 
cost and benefit functions:
C = c A2 and B = b A,
where A is global abatement, C is the cost of global abatement, B is global 
benefit from reduced climate damage, and lowercase c and b are fixed 
parameters. These assumptions are typical and are the ones used by Nord-
haus (chapter 7, this volume).
In this world, a single country acting on its own will realize that its 
own abatement will improve the climate and bring it some climate benefit. 
However, most of the benefit of its efforts will accrue to others. As it turns 
out, if a country is one-tenth the size of the world, then it will abate only 
1/10 of what would be optimal, and it will do this by setting a carbon price 
1/10 as high as it should. Of course the analogous rule holds for any other 
size country.
A Coalition of Two Equal Countries In a world with these cost and benefit 
formulas, would two identical countries be better off if they formed a coali-
tion and made a common (enforceable) commitment? They will realize 
that a higher price would make more sense than when they acted alone 
because if they raise their joint price, then they will benefit from their own 
extra abatement and the same extra abatement from the other country. 
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As mathematics confirms, they will be better off together, even though 
they spend more on abatement. Neither will want to leave and have their 
small coalition fall apart. We will call this “internal enforcement” because 
it only depends on the externalities driving the agreement and not on some 
“external” threat, such as trade sanctions.
The Coalition Size Limit for Internal Enforcement Sticking with our simple 
model, if a large country and a tiny country try to form a coalition, then 
the large country will already have a fairly high price, but the tiny country 
would have a low price. In an equal-price coalition, that means the little 
country would have to work much harder than it would selfishly choose 
to on its own. Of course this extra effort would benefit the large country 
much more than the small one. So tiny countries will not want to form or 
stay in coalitions with large countries. They will prefer to free-ride on the 
large country.
As it turns out, if the small country is bigger than half the size of the 
large country, then it will benefit from joining in a coalition, but if it is 
smaller, it will lose. Similarly, if three identical countries form a coalition, 
each will view itself as just half as big as the other two put together and will 
be indifferent about being in the coalition. Hence, three identical countries 
make a coalition that is just on the brink of falling apart.
If the three countries differ in size at all, then the smallest will want to 
leave and free-ride on a coalition of the other two. This is what Nordhaus 
(chapter 7, this volume) terms the “small-coalition paradox.” It shows that 
internal enforcement is not strong enough to realistically hold more than 
two countries together, which is an argument for common commitments 
with external enforcement.
A Real-World Coalition
Fortunately, the real world may be more cooperative than the world of 
standard economic models. As noted previously, Ostrom (1990) found 
that penalties holding together successful public-goods arrangements were 
generally much weaker than what could be gained by cheating. There is 
now much evidence that weak and strong reciprocal interactions stabilize 
more cooperation than is generally predicted by standard economics that 
assumes static interaction. Let us consider just one possible outcome of this 
type that could be quite useful for getting started.
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If the EU can continue to act as a single country, then the world will 
have three large countries: China, the United States and the EU, accounting 
for about half of all emissions. Together these might be a good nucleus for 
a Climate Club. China, being the largest, would have a positive incentive 
to stay in the coalition, and the EU would (according to the “small coali-
tion paradox”) prefer to leave and free-ride on China and the United States. 
However, reciprocity, together with face saving and public pressure for good 
behavior, may push Europe into such a coalition. So internal enforcement, 
although not as strong as we need it to be, just might be strong enough to 
stabilize a coalition covering half of all emissions.
External Enforcement
Although Nordhaus (chapter 7, this volume) discusses internal enforce-
ment, his Climate Clubs all rely on external enforcement. In particular, 
he favors trade sanctions that are simple yet powerful. These would be 
employed by Club members against those outside the club. Although some 
World Trade Organization (WTO) policies would need to be changed, he 
advocates placing a tariff of something like 5% on all goods sold by non-
members to those in the Climate Club.
This approach is certainly logical in that failing to price carbon is a much 
larger problem than is indicated by the relatively small amount of carbon 
embodied in a country’s exports. However, we would not like to depend 
on this legally complex approach to get started, and we do not believe this 
is necessary. Later, when climate measures need to be stricter and climate 
problems are more obvious, this approach may be needed and may be 
possible.
In the meantime, as was mentioned previously, a substantial climate 
fund can be made use of as external enforcement, and it would likely be 
far more acceptable to developing countries. As noted, it would pay cli-
mate funds only to countries that meet the common price commitment. 
Also “internal enforcement,” discussed earlier, will help stabilize the initial 
coalition.
Reciprocity and Enforcement
Trust and reciprocity are essential to (and what Ostrom (2009) calls the 
“necessary central core”) of successful collective action. Broadly speak-
ing, positive reciprocity means responding kindly to kind actions, whereas 
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negative reciprocity means responding unkindly to unkind actions. Both 
responses can act as enforcement.
Economics distinguishes two fundamental types of reciprocity: weak 
and strong. (Both can be positive or negative.) Strong reciprocity refers 
to actions that are similar to altruism, in that they do not serve narrow 
self-interest and often serve the common good. Weak reciprocity (more 
common) is motivated by narrow self-interest to gain better treatment by 
others. This is, of course, the point of any deliberate system of enforcement. 
Having explained this, we will discuss them all together and call any com-
bination of them simply “reciprocity.”
We have suggested several ways of including reciprocity in the design:
1. Coalition members only commit to a price as high as others.
2. Poor countries that join the coalition will be rewarded.
3. If a county does not join the coalition, then it could be subject to trade 
sanctions.
This approach to treaty design should not be surprising because all dis-
ciplines dealing with human cooperation find that reciprocity is the key 
principle underlying cooperation. It is the most robust pattern of coopera-
tion seen in laboratory, field, and theoretical studies of free-rider situations, 
and it is consistently found to stabilize higher cooperation levels. This has 
been thoroughly explained by scholars across all disciplines dealing with 
human cooperation (Bowles and Gintis, 2013; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; 
Kraft-Todd et al., 2015; and Ostrom, 1990, among many others). Without 
reciprocity, a public goods dilemma such as climate change will result in 
the tragedy of the commons.
Group Reciprocity Requires a Common Commitment
With only two parties, it is quite common for reciprocity to be asymmetri-
cal—I will fix your sink if you pay me $100. With three parties, it becomes 
difficult. You may suggest I will do x if Alice does y and Charlie does z. But 
Charlie may think he should do less and Alice more, which would be OK 
with Alice if you did more too. So the negotiation quickly becomes more 
complex as the number of parties increases.
Under pledge-and-review, every pledge will be of a different type, and all 
will need to compare the others’ pledges to their own. But in reality, they 
will not find that worthwhile and will just focus on their own contribution. 
So there will be little, if any, reciprocity.
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The complexity of many individual commitments makes effective reci-
procity impossible without a common commitment. This could, in theory, 
take many forms, but none based on emissions quantities has been found to 
garner even modestly broad support. However, supporters of cap-and-trade 
and carbon pricing both agree that carbon prices around the world should 
be equal. That is the entire point of the “trade” in cap-and-trade, and that is 
all that is needed for a common price commitment—every country should 
commit to the same price.
Conclusion
Reciprocity is the key to cooperation, and enforcement is a form of reciproc-
ity. To utilize reciprocity in a group, a common commitment is required. 
As previously suggested, this will need to take the form of a global carbon 
price. Simply agreeing to this common commitment is a form of reciproc-
ity: “I will implement the global price if you will, and I won’t if you won’t.” 
Trade sanctions and climate-fund payments are negative and positive forms 
of reciprocity that can stabilize and enlarge a Climate Club or a coalition 
of the willing.
One reason that negotiating a global carbon price strongly facilitates 
a common agreement is that a uniform price is efficient and fair and thus 
a salient focal point for the negotiation. A focal point greatly reduces the 
complexity of multiparty and multi-issue negotiations and thus enables 
successful coordination and cooperation (Schelling, 1960). There is no 
salient focal point when negotiating global cap-and-trade.
However, many other actions, such as tech transfer or support in 
various international forums, could be used informally to help stabilize 
and strengthen a climate treaty. The real message of this section is that all 
countries should stop thinking in terms of altruistic climate aid and think 
instead about reciprocal actions of many kinds to encourage and stabilize a 
strong climate commitment. But none of these will work well until we have 
a global treaty based on common commitments. This is the most funda-
mental message shared by all experts contributing to this book.
The Enormous Risk of Trading
We turn now to one of the most serious but rarely mentioned problems 
of global cap-and-trade. So far, all workable forms of global cap-and-trade 
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require long-term allocations of permits to countries, so these must be 
based on long-term estimates of future business-as-usual emissions. When 
these estimates prove wrong, countries can find themselves with surpris-
ing windfall gains and losses, which have nothing to do with good cli-
mate policy.
Global cap-and-trade needs international trading of carbon permits 
for two reasons. First, some countries need to be given extra permits to 
sell as a way of reducing their burden. Second, some countries can abate 
more cheaply, so countries where abatement is costlier can (and should) 
take advantage of this efficiency gain by buying permits from them. This is 
equivalent to one country paying another to abate on its behalf.
Sometimes we may want to place no burden on a country by giving 
them all the permits we think they will need. However, by accident, we may 
give them too few permits, which could force them to spend a lot of money 
buying permits from foreign countries (or abating excessively, which would 
cost them even more). We call such trading “prediction-error” trading.
To understand the following example of prediction-error trading, it is 
useful to first understand two concepts: business-as-usual emissions and 
business-as-usual targets. Business-as-usual emissions are simply the emis-
sions that would occur without a climate policy. Suppose this is one giga-
ton per year of emissions. In that case, a business-as-usual target gives the 
country one gigaton of free carbon permits per year. This means that it can 
ignore this climate policy and continue to emit one gigaton per year with 
no consequences because it has enough permits. But if it’s smart, it will real-
ize that it can find some cheap ways to abate more carbon; by taking these 
opportunities, it will find it has leftover permits, which it can sell to other 
countries at a profit. In this way, giving a country a business-as-usual target 
keeps it safe—it can do nothing and have no cost, and it also gives it an 
opportunity to abate and make some profit selling permits.
Frankel on the Safety of Business-as-Usual Targets
Jeffrey Frankel served on the US President’s Council of Economic advisors 
during the Kyoto negotiations. In July 1998, he wrote, “Let us consider a 
plan under which developing countries commit to their ‘business-as-usual’ 
emission paths in 2008–2012.” He considered that a bit more generous 
than was likely because, at that time, cap-and-trade advocates were favor-
ing stricter targets than business-as-usual.
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Then he wrote about countries such as China: “The first thing you 
should notice is that this system is not going to hurt you.” He explained 
exactly what we explained earlier about a business-as-usual target. How-
ever, his explanation and ours both apply to targets that actually do 
match business-as-usual emissions, and this is not what his claim of “not 
going to hurt you” applies to. He was talking about setting a target in 
1998 for the Kyoto compliance period of 2008–2012, which is what the 
Kyoto treaty did. So there is no reason to believe there actually would be 
a perfect match between the so-called business-as-usual target (the alloca-
tions of free permits) and the actual future business-as-usual emissions of 
various countries.
China Comes Up 29 Billion Permits Short
Because Frankel mentions China in this discussion, let us look at how 
China might have fared. The US Department of Energy’s (DOE) 1999 Inter-
national Energy Outlook predicted that China’s CO2 emissions in the target 
years would total 7.5 billion tons. In reality, they turned out to be 36.6 bil-
lion tons. So China would have been short 29.1 billion permits. At a permit 
price of $30/ton, China would have had to spend $874 billion buying per-
mits, mostly from developed countries, had it not cut emissions.
Of course they would have found some emission that could be cut more 
cheaply than buying permits, so that might have brought the bill down to, 
say, $600 billion, but then again trying to buy an unexpected 20 billion 
permits from the market might well have sent the price up above $30/ton. 
In any case, the Chinese might have taken issue with Frankel’s assurance 
that “this system is not going to hurt you,” especially when they realized 
their rich trading partners would be selling them permits at the marginal 
cost of abatement, which is always higher than the average cost. Hence, 
rich countries would have profited from China’s bad luck, quite possibly by 
more than $100 billion.
Frankel Proposed a Fix and Then Dropped It
To be fair, a few pages after estimating that, “If China were to join, it would 
capture almost $4 billion a year” in gains from trade,11 Frankel does issue a 
warning: “One problem is the uncertainty of the business-as-usual path. It 
is difficult to forecast ten years ahead what a country’s emissions would be 
in the absence of policy change.”
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He then suggests, “I have a possible response to this problem. It is a sug-
gestion to index the emissions target, to such variables as GDP in the year 
2007.” This would have helped, but the GDP prediction for 2007 from back 
in 1999 was only 26% short of the mark, whereas the CO2 prediction was 
80% too low. This correction technique, although helpful, would only have 
eliminated roughly one-third of the problem.
Frankel also suggested, in 1998, that the business-as-usual path could 
be determined by “objective experts,” which would seem to correspond to 
the DOE forecast used previously. In 2014, when describing his most recent 
formulas for determining future free permit allocations for a global cap-
and-trade system, he suggests, business-as-usual “is defined as the path … 
countries would experience in the absence of an international agreement, 
preferably as determined by experts’ projections” (italics added). So 16 years 
later, he has settled on the method (experts’ projections) that produced the 
29-billion-ton underestimate of the business-as-usual target, as still the best 
estimation method he can come up with. The point is not to fault Frankel 
but rather to indicate that the problem of setting even roughly accurate 
business-as-usual targets appears unsolvable.
Comparing Global Price versus Global Cap Commitments
Suppose that China had agreed to a global carbon price commitment 
instead of global cap-and-trade in 1999. Let us add some detail that, 
although speculative, is in no way implausible. Rather it consists of exactly 
the sort of assumptions the Chinese should have made, and perhaps did 
make, when determining whether to accept the type of “binding commit-
ment” they were being asked for. Suppose, to make comparison simple, that 
the expected carbon price under either global cap-and-trade or a comparable 
global carbon price commitment would have been $30/ton. Further assume 
that, given the surprising increase in China’s business-as-usual emissions, 
the global carbon price under cap-and-trade would have risen to $45/ton 
and a $30 carbon price would cause 20% abatement and a $45 price would 
cause a 30% abatement.
Under either system—a cap or a price—there would be abatement costs, 
which are reasonably and traditionally calculated with the following cost-
of-abatement formula: C = P × A/2, where P is the carbon price and A is the 
abatement.
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With this formula, we calculate the cost of abatement as $247 billion 
under cap-and-trade and $110 billion under carbon price commitment. 
The cost is less under a price commitment because the price cannot rise, 
whereas under a cap the surprise emission shock pushes it up to $45 
billion. But there would still be 25.6 gigatons of unabated emissions 
under cap-and-trade, only 7.5 of which China would have permits for. So 
it would have had to buy permits for 18.1 billion tons of emissions at $45/
ton, for a cost of $817 billion, and a total cost under global cap-and-trade 
of $1.1 trillion over the five-year life of the Kyoto treaty.
But remember, some abatement cost ($22 billion) would have been 
expected under either system if the 1999 emission prediction had been 
accurate. Under cap-and-trade, the permits for the abated tons could have 
been sold at a profit of $44 billion. The net gain (trading cost minus abate-
ment cost under cap-and-trade) would have been $22 billion if everything 
had turned out as expected.
The net unexpected cost under a carbon price commitment would have 
been $110 – $22 = $88 billion (unexpected minus expected abatement 
costs). The final result is that the unexpected cost to China would have 
been more than 12 times greater under global cap-and-trade than under a 
matching global carbon price commitment, and it would have been more 
than $1 trillion greater.
It should also be noted that, although the unexpected cost of $88 billion 
(over five years) is still fairly large under a global carbon price commitment, 
this cost would have gone mainly toward cleaning up their coal industry 
and solving a major internal pollution problem. The $817 billion spent on 
purchasing carbon permits from, say, the United States and EU would have 
caused unimaginable domestic political recriminations had it been carried 
out. These costs are illustrated in figure 4.3.
In figure 4.3, areas represent costs, and the sloped line represents the 
demand-curve for carbon emissions. The higher the price of carbon, the 
lower the emission level. The rectangle shows the cost to China of purchas-
ing permits after doing extra abatement due to the unexpected $45/ton 
cost of permits. China’s unexpected abatement cost is the combined area 
of the two trapezoids. The smaller trapezoid (on the right) is the cost of 
unexpected abatement under a fixed global carbon price of $30. The area 
of the triangle represents the cost of abatement that was expected under 
either system due to a $30 carbon price and the DOE-predicted level of 
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emission. (The triangle has the right area but has been moved and reshaped 
from where its area was calculated—at the DOE prediction.) From China’s 
perspective, abatement costs in the two trapezoidal areas have considerable 
benefit and, hence, low net cost. The trading costs under cap-and-trade are 
far larger, have no benefit, and carry a considerable political liability.
Conclusion
The previous example was not cherry picked. It was chosen by a leading 
advocate of global cap-and-trade, who simply was uncertain of what the 
future would bring. It should be noted that this is not the only surprising 
change in business-as-usual emissions we have witnessed. There was also 
the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the Fukushima disaster, among others. 
Global cap-and-trade is designed so that it turns such unexpected shocks 
into huge windfall gains or losses, which will inevitably destroy any treaty 
with an effective carbon price based on this approach.
Almost all comparisons of global capping and pricing made by capping 
advocates have used what is called a “certainty equivalent” model. This 
ignores all prediction errors as if being right on average was the same as 
being right all the time. Yet two of the most serious problems with global 
cap-and-trade are due to price and business-as-usual uncertainty. Both of 
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In the case of business-as-usual uncertainty, it seems likely that, as 
Cooper (chapter 5, this volume) explains, developing countries will want 
caps that assume a business-as-usual CO2 growth rate something like 
China’s because that might happen, and they do not want to be seen as 
projecting anything less than stellar growth. They also do not want to risk 
having to buy billions of dollars’ worth of carbon permits from rich or rival 
countries. Accepting permit allocations that accommodate such hopes and 
fears will result in a global cap that is far too high to have any significant 
effect on the climate.
Does Cap-and-Trade Have a Record of Success?
Two systems claim to achieve a fairly uniform carbon price: global cap-
and-trade and global carbon pricing. We have already made several com-
parisons, but one misconception still needs to be addressed. Has global 
cap-and-trade already been widely implemented and found to work quite 
well? If so, what is the point of analyzing its shortcomings?
The Kyoto Protocol is global cap-and-trade. It allocates international 
emissions permits (AAUs) and sets up a system for trading them. The argu-
ment for trying this was largely that standard cap-and-trade had been tried 
in the United States, and it worked well. In fact, it did work well for curbing 
sulfur emissions, but that argument is without merit. Global cap-and-trade 
and standard cap-and-trade are fundamentally different.
1. Standard cap-and-trade is run by a government, whereas global 
cap-and-trade is not.
2. Standard cap-and-trade can subsidize participants with somewhat 
hidden transfers, whereas global cap-and-trade transfers are far more 
transparent.
3. Standard cap-and-trade prices carbon emissions, whereas global cap-
and-trade does not.
The only track record for global cap-and-trade is the dismal record of the 
Kyoto Protocol.
There’s No Government
Under standard cap-and-trade, the government sets and enforces the cap. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, because there is no global government, no one 
even talked about what the cap would be, and no one enforced it. The cap 
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was determined indirectly, not by the Protocol, but by the sum of the AAUs 
eventually allocated to those who ratified the treaty. This is like having the 
coal-fired power plants discuss among themselves but decide individually 
how many sulfur emission permits each would get.
Profits from Permits, but Not for Countries
It is often claimed that global cap-and-trade will be good for hiding 
compensating transfers to polluters (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 10, this 
volume). This is true but could be misleading because these systems 
hide some of their transfers in a way that will not work under global 
cap-and-trade.
Standard cap-and-trade causes companies to raise their prices (due to 
the “opportunity cost” of not selling the permits, which we will not explain 
here). The result is that standard cap-and-trade can actually increase the 
profits of polluters without any money passing from the government to 
the polluters. This will not work for international financial transfers, how-
ever. Poor countries cannot profit by raising prices on their own citizens. As 
Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) point out,
To be certain, the transfers made under national cap-and-trade programs are differ-
ent in their economic and political nature from international payments for inter-
national permits.
… transfers associated with an allocation of free permits are not that hard to 
compute and one would imagine that politicians (privately or publicly) opposed 
to an ambitious climate change agreement would quickly publicize the numbers (if 
unfavorable to the country) so as to turn their domestic public opinion against the 
agreement.
In fact, under the Kyoto Protocol, AAU trading became so controversial that 
Japan had to publicly deny purchasing AAUs from countries previously in 
the Soviet Bloc (Cramton et al., chapter 12, this volume). The argument 
that standard (domestic) cap-and-trade demonstrates that global cap-and-
trade can hide international transfers from the rich countries and their 
citizens while making them transparent to the poor countries and their 
citizens is questionable.
Global Cap-and-Trade Will Not Price Carbon Emissions
Previously, we showed that global cap-and-trade does not require coun-
tries to price emissions. In reality, under Kyoto, the AAU market was so 
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illiquid and secretive that there was no “market price,” and the price of 
few transactions was known. This did not result in any carbon pricing 
policies at all. The main Kyoto Protocol compliance policies were subsi-
dies and requirements for wind, solar, and energy efficiency. These do not 
put a price on emissions even though the implicit cost of saving carbon 
ranged as high as 800 euros per ton (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 10, this 
volume). Global cap-and-trade is unlikely to cause much pricing of carbon 
emissions, unlike standard cap-and-trade, which requires the pricing of car-
bon emissions.
Why Global Cap-and-Trade Negotiations Cannot Succeed
The most decisive flaw in global cap-and-trade is that a strong treaty could 
never be negotiated, and if it could be, it would unravel. The three main 
parts to this argument are:
1. Trading risk would unravel a strong global cap-and-trade treaty
2. Free-style permit negotiations would likely end in deadlock
3. No common-commitment formula can be found to replace freestyle 
negotiations
Note that we cannot rule out a weak global cap-and-trade agreement— 
one that has too little impact on the climate to warrant attention. How-
ever, we ignore this possibility because it is essentially useless, and instead 
we focus exclusively on the problems of strong global cap-and-trade 
agreements.
The Risks of Prediction-Error Trading
Earlier we discussed prediction-error trading risk in detail and concluded 
that unexpected shocks to business-as-usual emissions would lead to defec-
tions. This point is not necessary for the present argument because we will 
argue next that a strong treaty could not even be negotiated. However, 
this risk is reason enough not to embark on such an adventure. The cost 
in time (decades) and effort to put such a system into place should not be 
squandered on one that would have disintegrated in just 10 years had it 
been built 15 years ago.
We also argued that the knowledge of such individual country 
risks would drive the developing countries (and likely others) to demand 
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larger allocations of carbon permits than they will likely need just to pro-
tect against risk (see Cooper, chapter 5, this volume). This factor, in addi-
tion to the ones we are coming to, will weaken any global cap-and-trade 
treaty.
Why Freestyle Negotiations End in Deadlock
As explained by Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume):
Free-style negotiations among n countries are exceedingly complex and are very 
likely to lead to a deadlock … [concerning] the allocation of free permits among 
countries under cap-and-trade.12
The extreme complexity they mention is only half the reason that deadlock 
is inevitable, but it is still decisive. Such complexity is obvious from the 
dozen or so different variables that Kyoto negotiators attempted to account 
for when they tried to invent formulas for allocating permits (Depledge, 
2000). Many factors were ignored—for example, access to renewable 
resources.
But Weitzman (2014, chapter 8, this volume) and Cramton and 
Stoft (2010, 2012a,b) emphasize a different problem with freestyle 
negotiations—free-riding. With freestyle negotiation of permit allocations, 
ever country’s self-interest is to gain more free permits. This dramatically 
weakens freestyle commitments. As noted, the risks of prediction-error 
trading will make countries even more aggressive in their demands for 
free permits.
On top of the free-riding problem of freestyle negotiations, we have 
the extreme complexity noted by Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this 
volume), which includes the mixing of climate policy with burden shar-
ing. This makes it that much easier to find excuses to hide behind when 
free-riding.
But none of these effects leads directly to a deadlock. Instead, they 
only seem to lead to weak national commitments, Qi. Because the sum 
of all such commitments is the global cap Q, there will be a high (weak) 
global cap.
But Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) make the first step in 
their negotiation process the selection of Q, the global cap, and assert that 
this should be consistent with a 2°C limit. Because the outcome of this 
first step in the negotiation does not commit any country to do anything 
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in particular, all will want to show their “ambition” by agreeing to a tight 
cap, probably consistent with the 2°C limit, as has been the case with some 
previous aspirational agreements, including COP21’s Paris agreement.
But with a 2°C cap locked in place, the weak individual-country commit-
ments, which sum to a weak global cap, can now be seen to lead to dead-
lock. Deciding the global cap by two completely different processes, one 
that leads to unchecked optimistic aspirations and one that leads to nearly 
unchecked self-serving caution, will never produce consistent results. 
Hence, deadlock is inevitable.
Why a Common-Commitment Formula Fails for Quantities
As just seen, a freestyle negotiation leads to deadlock, but we have 
argued that a common-commitment simplifies negotiations and solves the 
free-rider problem. So why doesn’t this work for a quantity-based treaty? 
We first noted that a 20-year search for a common quantity commit-
ment has turned up no satisfactory proposal. This history of failure is no 
accident.
The root of the problem is the nature of the quantity approach. Every 
allocation of free permits plays two contradictory rolls. Permits are money 
with which to solve the burden-sharing problem, and, collectively, permits 
must curb emissions. In “theory,” they could do both at once, but that 
requires the allocation of permits by a fair world government with perfect 
foresight.
Kyoto’s Formulas The Kyoto negotiations first tried a simple rule— 
equal percentage reductions from 1990 emissions levels. When that failed, 
they went on to try nine more-complex rules (Cramton et al., chapter 12, 
this volume; Depledge, 2000). But all of these failed as well, and coun-
tries were left to choose their own commitments—a freestyle negotiation 
indeed.
Frankel’s Formula After Kyoto, it was obvious that no acceptable allocation 
rule was in sight, and including the developing countries would make find-
ing an acceptable rule far more difficult. It was also obvious from the US 
Senate’s 95 to 0 vote that, without the developing countries, the United 
States would not join. Understanding this, Jeffrey Frankel (1998) took up 
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the challenge and worked on politically acceptable allocation formulas. 
These evolved over the next 16 years and are quite sophisticated (Bosetti 
and Frankel, 2014). They specify free permit allocations in terms of several 
parameters, including business as usual emissions, emissions in 1990, and, 
for the initial-year formula, emissions in the year the country signs the 
cap-and-trade agreement. So far, there does not seem to be much inter-
est in these formulas, which may not be as transparent as required for 
acceptability.
Stiglitz (2006a, 2006b) argued that it would be impossible to find a for-
mula for free permits that the world could come close to agreeing on, and 
Weitzman (chapter 8, this volume) has taken a similar position. History 
seems to be confirming these judgments.
Conclusion
The Kyoto negotiators knew they needed a common-commitment formula 
and invented 10 of them. They could not agree on any. After Kyoto, it 
became clear the problem would become far more difficult because devel-
oping countries would need to be included. Realizing this, Frankel began 
proposing formulas in 1998 that covered all countries. There has not been 
much interest in these perhaps because of their complexity, and after 16 
years there seems to be less interest than ever.
The possibility that an easily agreed-on common-commitment formula 
for global cap-and-trade will someday be discovered cannot be ruled out 
with certainty. However, it seems that after 20 years of failure and a general 
loss of interest, it is time to take global cap-and-trade off the table.
Problems with Global Carbon Pricing
Although a global carbon price commitment is a more direct and simple 
approach to carbon pricing than is global cap-and-trade, a strong enough 
version of a carbon price commitment will still be difficult to implement. 
But difficult is better than impossible. Here we examine the points that may 
need the most attention from negotiators and researchers. The key problem 
areas are enforcement and climate-fund transfers.
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Enforcement
There are always two parts to enforcement: monitoring and incentives. To 
enforce, you must find out whether the party is in compliance. That’s mon-
itoring. To get them to comply, there must be an incentive. The incentive 
can be a carrot for compliance or a stick for lack of compliance.
Incentives The incentive problem is much the same for any climate com-
mitment. There are social-pressure incentives and there are financial incen-
tives. It is not clear whether the former will be strong enough, and it is not 
clear that the latter can be implemented. This is equally true of global cap-
and-trade or a global carbon price commitment. But one thing is certain: in 
either case, the problem is much worse without a common commitment. 
As we argued earlier, such a commitment is almost certainly impossible for 
global cap-and-trade.
In fact, without a common commitment, strong enforcement is coun-
terproductive. If you think you don’t want to drive faster than 70 mph, 
then you might commit to that individually out of a spirit of cooperation 
with weak enforcement, but with strong enforcement, say a $10,000 fine, 
you will certainly not commit to anything under 90 mph, “just in case.” 
Although enforcement may be hard to arrange, at least with a global carbon 
price commitment, it is of some use and not counterproductive.
Monitoring The primary challenge for monitoring price is the possibility 
that a government will cook its books with regard to revenues collected 
from carbon charges. For most countries, this should not be a problem 
because they will either provide reasonably reliable public data (most of the 
Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol) or they will be poor countries 
receiving some climate-fund assistance that can be withdrawn if they do 
not fully open their books.
For the problematic countries, and there may be a couple of large ones, 
there are three recourses. First, if they do not open their books to careful 
auditing, they could be deemed noncompliant regardless of claims concern-
ing carbon revenues. Second, four international organizations—the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Energy Agency, 
and the WTO—already conduct similar audits. In fact, such audits would 
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be needed to monitor global cap-and-trade with regard to carbon pricing 
of exports—one of the most difficult segments of society to monitor. Of 
course, whichever organization performs this function will need additional 
funding, but that will be a small burden relative to other costs.
Finally, the price of most fossil fuels has easily visible public indicators. 
The price of gasoline is no secret, and that accounts for roughly one-third 
of fossil-fuel use. The price of electricity to residential and commercial 
users can also be discovered easily, as can the price of heating fuels to these 
groups. Monitoring will not be perfect, but with a little effort, it may well 
be as good as or better than the monitoring of emissions.
Green Climate Fund Transfers
We have discussed how to allocate responsibility for and benefits from 
a climate fund. A higher level question is perhaps just as difficult. How 
can significant funds be transferred from rich to poor countries without 
triggering too much political opposition in wealthy countries, especially 
those on the hook for larger transfers, due to their wealth and high emis-
sion levels?
Hiding Transfers One approach is to hide the transfers. This is often cited as 
a benefit of cap-and-trade, but as explained earlier, this is largely based on 
a fallacious analogy between global and national cap-and-trade programs.
However, Frankel suggests that poor countries could be given free per-
mits, and they could give the permits to private companies, who would 
then sell them to private companies in rich countries. In this way, the 
financial transfers would be kept private and less visible than the financial 
transfers between governments that are generally envisioned for the Green 
Climate Fund.
This method would not be as surreptitious as it might seem because 
companies in the rich country will be required to return the permits to the 
UN in order to make use of them, and the UN will be required to keep a 
full accounting. This transfer will be made public, at which point the press 
will write stories about how much money went where. It may take a few 
years before this information is fully utilized by the forces that wish to gain 
political advantage from stopping the transfers, but that outcome seems 
inevitable.
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If this ruse is thought to be effective, then a similar process could be 
arranged under a global carbon price commitment. If the United States 
had been allocated a responsibility for $10 billion of climate fund con-
tributions and the global carbon price was set at $20/ton, then half a 
billion carbon-price credits could be issued and marked as redeemable in 
the United States only. These could then be distributed to poor countries, 
which would give them to their businesses, which would sell them to US 
businesses, which would then not be charged for that many tons of carbon 
emissions.
One advantage of price-based climate-fund transfers (as opposed to per-
mit transfers under a cap) is that their value would be far more predictable. 
For example, with global cap-and-trade, the carbon price would drop pre-
cipitously in the case of a global slowdown. In this case, permit transfers to 
poor countries would suddenly become far less valuable and perhaps nearly 
worthless. However, the global carbon price might spike while a developed 
country is in recession, and it would find itself making double or triple 
climate-equity payments at just the wrong time. Such risk would not be 
present under a global carbon price commitment.
Making Transfers More Appealing Jonathan Gruber, an economist who con-
sulted on the design of President Obama’s Affordable Care Act, is now 
famous for explaining that the “Lack of transparency is a huge political 
advantage” for “getting the bill passed.” In the long run—and no policy is 
longer run than climate policy—attempting fairly transparent deceptions 
involving tens of billions of dollars may prove counterproductive. Better 
approaches are available.
The first principle for making equity transfers more palatable is to make 
sure they are reciprocal. Traditionally, this would mean requiring the 
money be used for some approved “green” project, hopefully related to 
climate. Unfortunately, history has shown that this leads to corruption—
witness the Clean Development Mechanism, the Joint Implementation 
Mechanism, and even the enormous subsidies for corn ethanol in the 
United States and elsewhere.
The basic formula for reciprocity should be that equity transfers are con-
ditional on compliance with either a global cap-and-trade or a global car-
bon price commitment. This will provide funders with far more assurance 
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that they are getting something worthwhile for their money while provid-
ing a useful incentive mechanism for enforcing compliance.
A number of other standard techniques are available for making trans-
fers more palatable. One is to require funds to be spent in the donor coun-
try. This would not be possible with global cap-and-trade. Another way is 
to earmark tax receipts from the most unpopular domestic polluters to be 
used for equity transfers.
Summary and Conclusion
If steady progress was being made with global cap-and-trade, then even 
a promising new approach would seem questionable. But after 20 years 
of real-world testing and academic theorizing, no obvious progress can be 
seen. Our discussion leaves global cap-and-trade with four decisive failures, 
all of which are addressed by global carbon pricing.
Carbon Pricing Eliminates Huge Trading Risks
Global cap-and-trade needs to lock in targets for a decade or two. During 
this time, business-as-usual emissions change unpredictably. As shown pre-
viously, this can be extremely risky for participating countries. This leads to 
demands for more generous targets or even refusal to participate. If a strong 
treaty were ever implemented, then it would lead to defections and unrav-
eling. Global carbon pricing nearly eliminates this source of risk.
Carbon Pricing Actually Does Price Carbon Emissions
Neither the Kyoto Protocol nor global cap-and-trade, as specified in this 
volume, requires that emitters acquire emission permits. Instead, govern-
ments must own permits similar to Kyoto’s AAUs. In idealized economic 
theories, the price of AAUs would be transmitted, with the help of govern-
ment regulations, to actual carbon emissions. There has been no sign of this 
under the Kyoto Protocol, and there is no reason to believe things would be 
different under a newly proposed global cap-and-trade policy. In contrast, 
global carbon pricing would require countries to price carbon emissions to 
meet the global carbon price commitment. So global carbon pricing would 
strongly promote efficiency, and global cap-and-trade would do little to 
promote efficiency.
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Pricing Rewards Environmental Ambition
A global cap, if it works as intended, will control the total emissions of the 
participating countries. If one country emits less, that will free up permits 
so other countries can emit more. If one emits more, others will be con-
strained to emit less.
The consequences are obvious. If any country, province, social group, 
or individual voluntarily does more than is in their narrow self-interest, 
it will not benefit the climate at all. All such altruistic efforts will be negated 
by the market. Ambitious action by some will simply make it cheaper for 
those who are not ambitions to do less, and they will do less. If they do not 
do enough less to negate all environmental ambition, then the market will 
depress the price of carbon even more and make sure selfish people do even 
less. The cap will be met.
Global carbon pricing does not discourage ambition at all. Extra abate-
ment does not change the price faced by nonambitious groups and indi-
viduals, so the ambition of others does not encourage them to do any less. 
The result is that every ton of ambitious abatement reduces global emis-
sions by a full ton.13
Pricing Stops Free-Riding in the Negotiations
Climate change is a problem of managing the collective commons, and 
the essence of that problem is that countries can free-ride on the use of the 
atmosphere. Requiring them to pledge some action, even if the action is to 
join a global cap-and-trade agreement and choose a “target”—an allocation 
of emission permits—does not prevent free-riding. Instead of free-riding by 
just emitting, countries can now free-ride by taking a high target and either 
emitting more or profiting from selling extra permits.
To stop free-riding, we need to replace individual commitments with a 
common commitment. For 20 years, Kyoto negotiators and academic econ-
omists have tried to find ever more complex formulas to create a common 
quantity commitment, with no signs of progress. Global carbon pricing 
provides an obvious solution. All countries should commit to price at the 
same global price. There is still a problem of negotiating climate-fund trans-
fers, but decoupling these two problems greatly simplifies them and largely 
insulates climate policy from disputes over monetary transfers.
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Conclusion
Global carbon pricing was designed to facilitate negotiation and coopera-
tion. To many this will seem backward—it should have been designed “for 
the climate.” But the real problem is not the climate; the real problem 
is people—and their lack of cooperation. After 20 years of pretending to 
do what is right for the climate, and actually doing almost nothing, it is 
time for a change. We should design the negotiations and our policy goal 
to maximize cooperation and accept that we cannot do better than the 
best we can do. Unfortunately, COP21 in Paris was a step back from this 
perspective. Paris focused on nonbinding, nonenforceable, incomparable 
“intended nationally determined contributions,” which is the opposite of a 
reciprocal, common commitment. As a result, contributions do not add up 
to what is required, and carbon pricing was hardly mentioned in the final 
agreement. This is a recipe for inaction, and thus disaster.
Carbon pricing is a simple idea. But the change of focus from supposedly 
scientific round numbers, 1 trillion tons, 2.0 degrees, 450 ppm (or some say 
350), to a focus on how people cooperate makes all the difference. Elinor 
Ostrom spent her life studying how people actually solve common-pool 
resource problems. She found the answer was always “trust and reciproc-
ity,” not numerology. Virtually all cooperation research agrees. Global car-
bon pricing is designed to build trust with reciprocity.
Frequently Asked Questions About “Global Carbon Pricing”
Q1. Does it mean a global tax? No. It does not require that any carbon 
taxes or fossil fuel taxes be implemented. See Q3.
Q2. What is it? An agreement between countries responsible for most of 
the world’s greenhouse gas emissions to price their own fossil-fuel emis-
sions at least as high (on average) as the agreed-on global price, P.
Q3. What does “to price their own emissions” mean? Quite simply, a coun-
try’s average carbon price—carbon revenue per unit emissions—must be at 
least as high as the global carbon price. The simplest way would be with 
a carbon tax, which could be used to replace other taxes. Cap-and-trade 
could also be used, as well as other methods. Renewables could be given 
credit based on carbon saved and the global price.
Q4. What does “on average” mean? Countries could price gasoline at one 
level, diesel at another, and coal at another. All that matters is (total carbon 
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revenue)/(total carbon emissions) ≥ P . There could even be averaging from 
one year to the next.
Q5. Who would set the global price? It would be negotiated by a “coali-
tion of the willing,” AKA a Carbon Club. This coalition will be a group of 
countries that encompass most emission and are willing to set a reasonably 
high price.
Q6. Why does a price agreement help? It forms a common commitment, so 
each country in the coalition is saying, “We will price carbon at P if all of 
you will too.” Read the preface to see how this works.
Q7. Is it fair to poor countries? A green climate fund is needed because with-
out one there would be no international payments. This negotiation must 
be separate but related. The UNFCC requires “common but differentiated 
responsibilities.” The global price is the common part and the climate fund 
is the differentiated part.
Q8. Why not stick with global cap-and-trade? There’s a reason it has been 
getting less popular for 20 years. It was accidentally designed to be hard to 
negotiate. The idea was to make it safe for the climate but risky for coun-
tries. Global pricing was scientifically designed for cooperation, and it can 
be adjusted to hit climate targets just as well, probably better, than global 
cap-and-trade.
Q9. Who’s in favor of it? Everyone on the list of contributors to this book 
is in favor of global carbon pricing. The authors have alternative views on 
how best to implement it.
Q10. With your green climate fund, how big would the transfers be from rich 
to poor? At the start, a high-end estimate might be €36 billion per year, 
and a low-end estimate might be €5 or €10 billion. But this is, of course, 
speculative. It will be determined by negotiation, not science, so it can’t 
really be calculated. Negotiators will balance rich-country reluctance 
against poor-country needs and demands.
Note that the high end is about one-third of what US Secretary of State 
Clinton promised at Copenhagen. To put this in perspective, this is about 
one-tenth of 1% of the rich country’s GDP. This is for a €30/ton carbon 
price. Eventually, it would need to go much higher, but by then the world 
will likely have seen enough to be willing to spend more.
Consider the high estimate first. World CO2 emissions from fossil fuel are 
a bit less than 36 billion tons. China has said it doesn’t need climate-fund 
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subsidies, so that leaves about one-third of the emissions (12 billion) com-
ing from poor countries that need climate funds. A tremendously strong 
start would be a €30/ton carbon price, and that might reduce emissions 
by as much as 20%, or by 2.4 billion tons in poor countries. Some abate-
ment will be cheap to free, and some would cost as much as the €30 car-
bon prices, so on average the cost would be about €15/ton, for a total cost 
of 15 × 2.4 = €36 billion/year. So the high-end number assumes that rich 
countries pay 100% of the costs and somewhat more because when the 
poor countries stop subsidizing fossil fuel, that actual saves them money (it 
prevents waste).
But €30/ton is a high starting price, and 100% is a high subsidy rate, 
and not all of these countries will join and need subsidies (e.g., some of 
the OPEC countries). In fact, it may be necessary to begin quite slowly. But 
after 20 years without any global cooperative agreement, a slow but solid 
beginning would be enormous progress. Also remember that without any 
transfer from rich to poor, little is likely to get done.
Q11. What carbon price do you think the EU countries, for example, would 
vote for? This brings up the central advantage of global carbon pricing. 
But first, note that the United Kingdom is already paying more than ₤10014 
and more per ton of carbon saved, and the OECD15 finds that feed-in-tariffs 
cost an average of €169 per ton saved, and there are other subsidies on top 
of those.
Second, notice that a ₤100 carbon tax, if implemented as a tax shift, 
would be close to free. The tax that was shifted away would return as much 
revenue as the carbon tax collected, and the distortions and inefficiencies 
of the old tax would be eliminated. These would roughly match the cost of 
carbon abatements, and those abatements would have the added benefit 
of reducing damage from domestic pollution. So not even counting the 
climate benefit, this policy might produce a net benefit.16
Now turn to our best feature. Global carbon pricing is not an individu-
alistic approach. The EU would not be doing this without major partners, 
at least the United States and China, and probably more, even at the start. 
The agreement would be that all countries price as high as the global price. 
Now we have no illusion that the EU will suddenly impose a ₤100 carbon 
charge. More likely, it will be inclined toward some timid level, such as 
€25/ton. But with our proposal, the EU would then realize that if it advo-
cates €35, then getting that accepted would bring China, the United States, 
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and others along with it. So why not advocate €35? You only have to do 
that if you gain the satisfaction of finally bringing the United States and 
China along with you, and bringing them along would at least quadruple 
the impact of that €10 increase.
So we can’t predict the EU’s price proposal, and we certainly cannot pre-
dict what the coalition of the willing will agree to, but we can tell you that 
even a €30 price on carbon could save a lot of money while doing far more 
good for the climate than current policies.
Q12: What if some countries have large-scale, relatively cheap, and measurable 
carbon-capture potential (e.g., afforestation)? How could that potential be har-
nessed with a global carbon price? This will require an add-on mechanism, 
but a fairly simple one once the negative emissions become measurable. 
The measurement process would supply the negative-carbon facility with a 
one-ton carbon credit for each ton captured. The add-on mechanism would 
require that all private carbon emitters can use a negative-carbon credit (a 
negaton) in place of buying a carbon credit in their cap-and-trade market 
or in place of paying their fossil-fuel tax. Every country in the climate coali-
tion would be required to allow this.
The negative-carbon credits would be purchased by those subject to the 
highest carbon prices anywhere within the coalition. Competition would 
then set the price of negatons of carbon at the highest carbon charge 
imposed, and because the global price, P, is the average of all such charges, 
the price of a negaton would always be higher than P.
Q13: Do you think global carbon pricing is all that is needed? No. Although 
global carbon pricing facilitates cooperation and is an essential climate 
policy, it is of course not the only policy needed to effectively address cli-
mate change. Investments in green research are needed, too, and there is 
a role for some command-and-control style regulation, such as building 
standards. But the lack of a common commitment on carbon pricing is the 
primary source of the problem, and so correcting this is what this chapter 
and book is about.
Notes
1. This first section does not cover global carbon pricing directly. Rather, it orients 
the reader to a different way of thinking about international climate negotiations. 
For a more direct approach, start with “The Solution.” 
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2. This can often be better than having it done by a higher government. However, 
Ostrom (2012) does not say this is always best: “People want to make me argue that 
community systems of governance are always the best: I will not walk into that 
trap.” At the global level, there is no government. The chapters in this book discuss 
how the countries of the world can self-organize a global system of climate gover-
nance that builds in reciprocity and allows trust to develop. For a global public good, 
a global governance (not government) is required.
3. Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform. Non-Paper, ADP.2014.6. July 7, 
2014.
4. We often refer to Elinor Ostrom (although she did not directly speak about coop-
eration among governments) because she has pioneered some of the most important 
cooperation research and was particularly concerned with solving common resource 
problems without top-down help from a government, which is the problem faced at 
the international level. Also, her work on the role of reciprocity for cooperation has 
been robustly supported by the general science of cooperation, and it is relevant for, 
and fully consistent with others’ view of, international climate negotiations (see, 
e.g., MacKay et al., chapter 2, this volume).
5. These would likely be carbon-revenue credits—in other words, credit for collect-
ing, say, $1 million of revenue from carbon charges (see Stoft, 2009).
6. It would likely be best to start the negotiation process in a small group of big 
emitters so that certain basics are agreed on before involving the UN (see chapter 12, 
this volume).
7. See MacKay et al. (2015) for a similar treatment.
8. We note that what is proposed here is fully multilevel, in other words, “polycen-
tric,” as Ostrom uses that term. There would be an international agreement on price, 
but each country would decide all of the pricing details and what to do with reve-
nues and monitoring and enforcement details. Countries would be free to delegate 
responsibility to provinces, and provinces could delegate to cities. Most actual 
change would happen at the local and even individual level.
9. We agree with Parry (chapter 3, this volume) that local carbon-related externali-
ties are a reason for allowing countries to use different carbon prices, but we think 
this is best handled by a uniform price commitment and some form of tradable 
pricing credits.
10. Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) give the formula in terms of per-
mits; our equation converts it to dollar transfers by using the price of permits.
11. It would cleverly engage in some cheap abatement and sell the resulting excess 
permits.
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12. As they note, this also applies to negotiations over the Climate Fund contribu-
tions.
13. Of course, other aspects of the problem, particularly land use, technological pro-
gress, and the dissemination of accurate scientific information, are all consistent 
with carbon pricing.
14. Take the CFD strike prices for new onshore wind or new nuclear, roughly 90 
per MWh, or recent RO bands (roughly 45 pounds per MWh subsidy). If this is sub-
stituting for gas-generated electricity at 450kg/MWh, then we have a subsidy of 45 
pounds per 0.45 t CO2 abated, or 100 pounds per ton.
15. “Climate and Carbon: Aligning Prices and Policies,” OECD Environment Policy 
Paper 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2013.
16. An economy-wide tax shift involving a carbon price of 100 pounds per ton and 
reductions of other taxes would have little effect on the budgets of a typical family, 
although there might need to be distributional corrections, such as already exist 
(e.g., winter fuel payments targeted at all old people and other social mechanisms to 
protect those in “fuel poverty”).
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5 The Case for Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions*
Richard N. Cooper
Introduction
This chapter argues for imposing a globally uniform charge on all emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), insofar as practicable. It will focus for 
concreteness on carbon dioxide, the most prevalent and long-lasting green-
house gas. It argues that such a charge would be superior to a system based 
on quantitative international targets with provisions for trading emission 
rights, global cap-and-trade for short.
Climate change is a global problem, not a localized one; to be effective, 
it requires a global approach to the reduction of GHG emissions. “Global” 
does not necessarily mean universal, although that would be desirable. It 
would be sufficient to engage the 30 to 40 largest emitting countries, at least 
for the next decade or two. These countries account for the overwhelming 
majority of fossil fuel consumption and also include countries covering the 
bulk of changes in land use that result in CO2 emissions.
But several economies, most notably the European Union (EU), have 
embarked on a cap-and-trade system. It is worth asking, therefore, whether 
the two systems can coexist and comply with a uniform international 
charge on carbon. The answer is affirmative, provided several conditions 
are met. These conditions would assure that the combined charges from 
fossil fuel taxes and carbon permits issued under cap-and-trade equaled the 
requirements of the uniform international charge (for further discussion, 
see Cooper, 2008).
The case for a charge on carbon as opposed to a global cap-and-trade 
scheme is based partly on the negatives associated with cap-and-trade and 
* Originally published as “The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” 
Discussion Paper 2008–2010, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Project on International 
Climate Agreements, October 2008.
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partly on the positives associated with the carbon charge. Let us take up the 
negative component first.
International Cap-and-Trade
How well would a cap-and-trade system work at the global level? It would 
require allocating emission targets, covering many years, to states. To be 
effective, the total targets would have to be tight enough to cut emissions sig-
nificantly from what they would otherwise be. In my view, it will be impos-
sible to negotiate meaningful national targets. The reason is straightforward. 
Developing countries understandably place a higher priority on economic 
development than they do on mitigation of climate change, and they will 
not agree to binding emission targets that they believe will compromise their 
development objectives (Stiglitz, 2006b; chapter 6, this volume). Moreover, 
we now have several examples of countries that have grown 8% to 10% for 
two decades or more, and most developing countries will aspire to achieve 
such growth rates, even though most countries will fail to achieve them. But 
aspirations, not ex post realities, will shape their positions in international 
negotiations. With generous targets allotted to the leading developing coun-
tries, the rich countries, especially the United States, will not agree to com-
pensate with targets so stiff that they seriously threaten standards of living in 
those countries. In short, meaningful binding global targets are not feasible.
Even if this (decisive) argument is put to one side, there is another 
acute problem with a global system based on cap-and-trade. To work, the 
national targets (i.e., emission rights) must be allocated to the entities that 
actually make decisions about what kinds and how much fossil fuels to con-
sume, that is, to electricity-generating firms and energy-intensive industrial 
firms. The idea of cap-and-trade is that each covered firm would be given 
an emission target for the coming year, perhaps declining from year to year, 
and each firm would either have to meet its target or purchase emission 
rights from other firms that had reduced emissions below their targets. This 
would require a market in emission permits, of which one has functioned 
in Europe since 2005. Although there were a number of glitches, Europeans 
have demonstrated that such a market can work. But the European system 
covers less than one half of European CO2 emissions. For compelling practi-
cal reasons, Europeans have not yet extended the system to all or even most 
emissions, particularly those in the transport and heating sectors, and in 
much of industry.
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Unless the permits are auctioned, raising the separate question of how 
a fair auction is ensured, the permits are allocated to the covered firms free 
of charge. In countries with loose governance (i.e., most countries), this 
is an invitation to favoritism: the government is allocating permits that 
have significant financial value, and most governments are likely to do that 
in a biased way. Put more bluntly, it is an open invitation to corruption. 
This is a fatal flaw in a global cap-and-trade system because well-governed 
democratic countries will be unwilling, and they should be unwilling, to 
impose burdens on their own citizens to enrich political favorites in less 
well-governed countries through international trade in emission permits. 
Concretely, no US senator who understood the process would vote in 
favor of a treaty with this implication. In other words, the United States 
would not participate in such a global scheme even if it had adopted a cap-
and-trade system domestically.
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, what senator, once he or 
she understands the full implications of a trading regime, can vote for a 
procedure that could result in the unconditional transfer of billions of 
dollars, even tens of billions, to the government of communist China, to 
Castro’s Cuba, or to Putin’s Russia? That would be politically unacceptable, 
at least in the United States and probably elsewhere.
This implication of unwholesome international transfers could be 
avoided if each participating country had its own national cap-and-trade 
system (EU-wide in the case of the EU). But that would vitiate much of the 
“trade” part of a cap-and-trade system because we have reason to believe 
that emission reductions will be much less costly in many developing coun-
tries than they would be in many rich countries. Denying international 
trade in permits would reduce greatly the efficiency of the cap-and-trade 
system. High-cost emission reductions would yield to lower-cost reductions 
only on a national basis, not internationally.
That is the negative case for carbon charges: the main alternative, cap-
and-trade, cannot be made to work effectively and efficiently at the global 
level. Yet a global solution is required.
Carbon Charges
The affirmative case for carbon charges contains a number of elements. 
First, it uses the price system, which is the only way to reach the billion-
plus decision makers around the world who decide what and how much 
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energy to consume. They will be encouraged to either consume less or 
switch to less carbon-intensive sources of energy.
Second, the charge can be applied to all fossil fuels at choke points—oil 
refineries, main gas pipelines, and principal coal transit points—with high 
confidence that the charge would affect downstream prices, that is, those 
faced by businesses and households. Separate provision could be made for 
the relatively few exceptions (e.g., a power plant located at a coal mine).
Third, the charge can and should (by negotiation) be made uniform 
(with perhaps a time lag of a few years for some developing countries), thus 
neutralizing the important issue of competitiveness of national energy-
using industries in international markets. For example, the steel industry 
in all important steel-making countries would pay the same carbon charge, 
so none could complain that they were being put at a competitive disad-
vantage by a different GHG regime in other countries. It is noteworthy that 
many European countries levy much lower electricity charges to business 
than they do to households, using “competitiveness” as the rationale; and 
they were disproportionately generous to some industries in the allocation 
of emission permits to some industries on similar grounds.
Fourth, a carbon charge would generate revenues for many years, badly 
needed by most governments these days (Norway and Qatar may be excep-
tions). These revenues could be used as each government saw fit, provided 
the use did not undermine the purposes of the agreement (viz. to reduce 
GHG emissions). Some would reduce deficits, some would finance needed 
expenditures, some (probably including the United States) would reduce 
other taxes, and many would perhaps help adaptation to climate change in 
poor countries. Properly used, the revenue from the charges could enhance 
growth. Auctioning permits in a cap-and-trade system would also produce 
revenues, but if the legislative process in Europe and the United States pro-
vides any guidance, auctions will be resisted strongly in favor of free alloca-
tion. The EU has agreed that in principle all permits will be auctioned by 
2027—22 years after the first introduction of its cap-and-trade system—and 
it remains to be seen whether this agreement will actually be carried out. 
The carbon charge can be phased in gradually, on a certain timetable, to 
limit any unwanted macroeconomic effects of a significant new tax.
The impact of a carbon charge on economic growth would be low and 
could even be positive if the revenues are used in growth-enhancing ways 
(e.g., to reduce distortionary taxation or finance research, development, 
and dissemination of new knowledge).
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It will not be easy to negotiate a uniform charge among the major 
emitting countries. But “difficult” is much easier than “impossible,” which 
I believe to be the case for a meaningful global cap-and-trade system. The 
current international negotiations through the conferences of parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change cannot, in my view, lead to a 
meaningful mitigation of climate change (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 10, this 
volume). There are too many (193) participants, with too diverse interests 
and objectives, operating under a parliamentary rule of “consensus,” which 
permits a small number of countries, even countries that are not relevant to 
GHG mitigation, to block action. The focus has been agreeing on binding 
quantitative restrictions on emissions for only a subset of relevant countries, 
although the last restriction seems to be easing. To get somewhere, the nego-
tiators need to shift away from quantitative emission targets to meaningful 
actions (such as a common charge on CO2 emissions, although others are 
imaginable) by the relevant emitters, and initially only those emitters need 
to participate in the negotiations. It is much easier to focus on one quan-
titative target than on national targets of all members (see Cramton et al., 
chapter 4, this volume, and Weitzman, chapter 8, this volume).
Some will object that a charge on carbon will leave the resulting reduc-
tion in emissions uncertain because we do not know ahead of time how 
responsive businesses and households will be to the charge. That is entirely 
true. If the response is judged to be too slight, then the charge can be raised 
in future years after an initial trial period of 5 to 10 years. But the cap-and-
trade system also has its uncertainties. As we learned from European expe-
rience, the permit price can decline to such a low level that conservation 
and fuel-switching is not encouraged at all, a result produced in part by two 
recessions that were not anticipated when decisions were announced on 
the permits to be allocated. 
Moreover, from basic principles, it is preferable to have a stable emis-
sions price than one that varies with macroeconomic conditions or other 
disturbances to supply or demand for energy (Weitzman, chapter 8, this 
volume). The stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, not the current 
inflow, influences the climate. The “externality” of emissions pertains to 
stock, not to flows, and is the same per ton of CO2 whether the flow is low 
or high. Thus, the price on that externality should be relatively stable, not 
variable. Moreover, although European experience has been with unexpect-
edly low prices, it is a reasonable presumption that if the price had instead 
risen sharply to great heights, the political processes in Europe would have 
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taken steps to limit the high price rather than see it generate an overall 
economic slowdown.
Compliance
What about compliance? This issue is for any international agreement 
that imposes unwelcome costs on the participants. The temptation to 
“free-ride”—to shirk while others are (presumably) carrying out their 
obligations—is ever-present. That is as true of a global cap-and-trade agree-
ment as an agreement involving carbon charges. In either case, monitoring 
would be required, made easier by constant improvements in long-distance 
sensors, but on-the-ground sensors and international inspections should 
also be introduced. In the case of carbon charges, the national legislation 
introducing such charges would be relatively easy to track. Harder would 
be the actual collection of emission charges. But the Fiscal Department of 
the International Monetary Fund is already familiar with the tax systems 
of all member countries (only Cuba, North Korea, Taiwan, and the small-
est economies are not members, all except Taiwan being low emitters). It 
could be charged with monitoring the collection of carbon charges by each 
participant in the agreement, which could then be compared with the 
information from the sensors and inspections.
If a country were found to be out of compliance, then it could be asked 
in informal consultations, and ultimately in formal international panel 
reviews, to explain its position. Systematic cheating could of course be pos-
sible on a small scale. It would be more difficult on a large scale and would 
have to involve the complicity of many officials, something that is increas-
ingly difficult in the age of the Internet and whistle-blowers.
If a country were significantly and persistently out of compliance, then 
its exports could be subject to countervailing duties in importing countries. 
The conceptual and legal basis for such duties—to offset government sub-
sidies to exports—has existed for many years and is embodied in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (Stiglitz, 2006a) as well as in national legislation. 
The new element is that, under the international agreement, the agreed 
charge on carbon emissions would be considered a cost of doing business, 
such that failure to pay the charge with government complicity would be 
considered a subsidy, subject to countervailing duty under existing pro-
cedures. Nonsignatory countries could also be subject to countervailing 
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duties. WTO panels have found that imports can be restricted on a discrim-
inatory basis if the originating country is in violation of an international 
environmental agreement (Stiglitz, chapter 6, this volume). This possibility 
would provide a potent incentive for most countries to comply with the 
agreement regardless of whether they were formal signatories. Of course, 
the sanction would apply only to exports, not to domestic sales, by the 
offending country.
Summary
In summary, I conclude that a uniform carbon charge in all major emitting 
countries, revenues to be kept at home, is far superior to cap-and-trade as 
a global arrangement for mitigating climate change. This is partly because 
agreement on an effective and efficient global cap-and-trade regime is hard 
to imagine, both because the global “caps” would be too high and because 
the allocation of permits to domestic agents would invite corruption in 
many countries, leading other countries to decline to trade permits with 
them—for similar views, see Nordhaus (2013), Weitzman (chapter 8, this 
volume), and Cramton et al. (chapter 12, this volume). Agreement on har-
monized national carbon charges would not be easy, but at least agreement 
on common actions would have some chance to succeed if the relevant 
international community decided there needed to be a serious attempt to 
mitigate climate change. It would have several advantages: providing an 
appropriate universal price signal to reduce consumption of fossil fuels, 
generating needed revenue, and dealing directly with widespread concerns 
about international competitiveness and even stimulating growth—an 
important point for developing countries.
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There is by now widespread agreement that climate change represents 
an existential threat, that only by global action can the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere be stymied, and that there has to be 
some appropriate form of burden sharing (see, in particular, Stiglitz, 2011). 
There is even broad consensus over the urgency of action; that unless we act 
soon, there is a serious likelihood of an increase in temperature well above 
the 2°C that was at the core of the Copenhagen agreement. Yet despite the 
broad consensus, there has been little progress. There has been some—but 
the voluntary measures taken by various countries simply don’t add up to 
what is needed. This chapter (like others in this book) attempts to explain 
why that may be the case and points to an alternative framework for nego-
tiations that, I believe, is more promising than that on which the world has 
embarked since the Rio agreement of 1992.
The fundamental issues are simple to state but hard to resolve: the 
global environment is a global public good—all benefit from a good envi-
ronment, and all suffer from climate change (Stiglitz, 1995, 2006a, 2006b, 
2006c). As in the case of any public good, there is a problem of under-
supply: everyone would like to “free-ride” off the efforts of others in sup-
plying the public good. In the case of global warming (climate change), 
there is an additional problem: some suffer more from the consequences 
of climate change than others, the adjustments needed to avoid climate 
* This article is an updated version of an article that appeared in Economics of Energy 
& Environmental Policy, Vol. 4, No. 2, pages 29–36, 2015, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.jsti, reproduced by permission of the International Associa-
tion for Energy Economics (IAEE). 
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change are greater for some than for others, and the ability to take action 
to reduce emissions and adapt to the consequences are greater for some 
than for others. Indeed, it used to be thought that countries such as the 
United States, which are the largest contributors to climate change, would 
suffer the least from it. As we have become more aware of the multiple 
effects of climate change (including on weather variability), that view is 
no longer held so strongly: rich countries such as the United States are 
vulnerable to more property damage from events like Hurricane Sandy. 
Moreover, poor countries today are responsible for an increasing share of 
carbon emissions.
Still, the central issue in reaching a global agreement entails burden 
sharing—who should pay the price associated with reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions? Should it be the large developed countries that have so far 
contributed most to the increase in greenhouse gases over the past 200 
years? Should poorer developing countries be asked to sacrifice their growth 
potential so that the advanced countries can continue in their emissions-
intensive lifestyle?
Some suggest that it should be easy to arrive at an agreement. 
Whenever there are large externalities—and greenhouse gases give rise to 
a huge externality—there are arrangements that are Pareto superior, where 
all would be better off compared to carrying on in a “business-as-usual” 
manner. But the problem in this case is that these Pareto improvements 
would entail developing countries making significant sacrifices that they 
view they can ill afford so that developed countries can continue in their 
profligate patterns—or so that developed countries could be compensated 
for not continuing in their profligate patterns. This is because those in the 
developing world, disproportionately located in the tropics, are likely to be 
hurt most by climate change. However, there is increasing evidence that 
some of the extreme weather events associated with climate change will 
affect even those living in more moderate climates, many of these countries 
will be adversely affected by sea level changes, and all could be affected by 
disease vectors.
Perhaps, in the end, when developing countries face the bleak alterna-
tive of desertification, droughts, flooding, and so on, they will be willing 
to make sacrifices, as unfair as they may seem. Perhaps in the end citi-
zens of more developed countries will feel a stronger moral obligation to 
bear their fair share of the burden. This chapter, however, is written in the 
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hope that there is scope for arriving at a negotiated solution sooner rather 
than later.
The Failure of the Current Approach
The Kyoto approach, based on allocating “emission rights” (which could 
be traded) to different countries, has an inherent problem. It is now widely 
recognized that emission rights have a monetary value—probably on the 
order of $80 to $100 per ton in an emissions control scheme achieving 
the 2°C goal. Giving a country emission rights is equivalent to giving the 
country money. A global agreement has to decide on how to allocate an 
asset worth some trillion dollars a year. No wonder it is hard to reach such 
an agreement.
Inevitably, if there is to be an agreement, the world will have to decide 
on some principles of allocation—a formula. The debate will focus on the 
terms of the allocation formula.
Kyoto seemed based on a principle that worked imperfectly among 
developed countries but will simply not work when developing countries 
are brought in: countries were asked to make a given percentage reduc-
tion relative to their prior levels of emissions. Negotiations focused on 
adjustments up or down from the base rate, defended on the grounds 
of particular circumstances facing particular countries. But this principle 
essentially says that those who emitted more in the past have the right to 
emit more in the future. No developing country would or should agree to 
this principle.
Alternative principles seem more ethically justifiable. One would divide 
the world’s carbon “space” according to population in 1992, when the 
problem of global warming was globally recognized. Some countries, such 
as the United States, have essentially already used up their carbon space. 
Thus, they either need to move to zero net emissions or purchase emission 
permits from others.
There are, of course, more “progressive” allocations. Conventional 
principles would allocate a global asset such as emission rights in a pro-
gressive manner, with poorer countries getting a larger allocation. Many 
would argue that in allocating carbon space, one should go back in time 
well before 1992. Since developed countries were responsible for the 
overwhelming proportion of the increase in carbon concentration over the 
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past 250 years, they would have to reduce their carbon emissions going 
forward even more.
The approach suggested here implies avoiding any attempt at a grand 
solution to the fair allocation of emission rights, but recasting the problem 
in ways that minimize the redistributive aspects of the negotiations.
The Costs of Adjustment
Fair burden sharing requires some notion of the costs of mitigation—the 
societal costs of lowering emissions. Although there have been extensive 
calculations on the costs to different societies, a simple approach suggests 
why those costs will be limited. By most accounts, the adjustments to a low 
carbon economy could be achieved through the imposition of a moderate 
carbon tax (or an equivalent cap-and-trade system). Such a carbon charge, 
say at the rate of $80 to $100 per ton, would, of course, raise substantial 
revenue and allow a reduction in other taxes. The standard approach for 
estimating the societal cost of such a carbon charge is the dead weight loss 
associated with the charge, the sum of the consumer and producer sur-
pluses associated with raising the price of carbon from its current level to 
$80 or $100 per ton. (These calculations do not include the societal benefit 
of the reductions in climate change, just the direct economic cost of the 
“tax.”) These numbers are referred to as Harberger triangles and are typi-
cally relatively small (although perhaps they might not be when emission 
reductions exceed 80%). But the reduction of the other taxes (say on labor 
or capital) would have a corresponding benefit, an increase in consumer 
and producer surplus. Thus, the net societal cost of reducing emissions is 
the difference between the Harberger triangles; the difference is a number 
that is likely to be small for most countries and in many cases will even be 
positive; the difference in the differences can be even smaller.
Thus, it is plausible that most would see their own private gains from 
the reductions in climate change more than offsetting the costs (possibly 
negative) that they would bear. Although some might see themselves gain-
ing more than others, most would see the agreement as positive.
But within many countries, there would be large losers: in the oil-
producing countries, for instance, oil producers and owners of oil assets 
would be worse off. Although in principle, again, the winners could more 
than compensate the losers, such compensation is seldom made. Thus, the 
fact that the country as a whole might be better off does not necessarily 
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mean that the country’s government would actually support the agree-
ment: the losers (the oil industry) may have a disproportionate voice in 
many countries. (That is evidently the case, for instance, in the United 
States.)
Still, the approach we have outlined has even a political economy advan-
tage: an argument that the country as a whole would be better off, even if 
particular special interests would be worse off, should carry weight. Argu-
ments from the oil industry against an agreement would be seen for what 
they are: self-serving.
But one approach would provide even more impetus to a global agree-
ment. If those countries without a large fossil fuel lobby could agree to a 
common level of a carbon price, then none would be viewed as having an 
unfair advantage over the other. In effect, a country that does not charge 
the full social cost of carbon is subsidizing carbon-emitting industries, 
an unfair trade/competitive advantage, not unlike that of a country that 
subsidizes labor. These countries could impose trade sanctions—a cross-
border tax—on those that do not implement the common carbon price 
(Helm, 2010; Stiglitz, 2006a). (As I explain in Stiglitz [2006b], such a cross-
border adjustment would likely be WTO legal.) This would be an effec-
tive mechanism for ensuring compliance with a global agreement, and it 
would provide a strong argument for those not adopting a carbon tax or 
an equivalent mechanism to do so. Any country not doing so would, in 
effect, be granting the tax revenue associated with its carbon emission to 
its trading partners.
Partial versus General Equilibrium
At a deeper level, there would be significant distributive consequences—
consequences that would arise no matter what approach was taken to 
reduce carbon emissions. The intent of any global agreement is to reduce 
the demand for fossil fuels, and that necessarily must reduce the rents asso-
ciated with fossil fuels; the recipients of those rents—the owners of the fos-
sil fuels—will be worse off. That will be the case even taking into account 
any benefits they directly receive from the reduction in the threat of cli-
mate change. That is why one should not expect a fully voluntary global 
agreement among all countries; in the absence of any sense of a global 
social responsibility framework, any country that is exporting a significant 
amount of fossil fuels would likely be worse off (Cramton and Stoft, 2012). 
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Even countries that import only a limited amount might not sign on sim-
ply because of the political influence of the fossil industries.
That is why the target should be more limited: an agreement among a 
“coalition of willing,” countries without a large domestic fossil fuel sector, 
with cross-border adjustments on all other countries. I suspect the combi-
nation of social consciousness and self-interest on the part of the citizens of 
other countries would expand the membership in this coalition until most, 
if not all, countries joined the coalition.
Voluntary versus Enforceable Agreements
The current approach seeks voluntary reductions. Each country would 
“offer” up actions it would take to reduce carbon emissions. There have 
been significant reductions on this basis, and if all countries fulfill their 
intentions, the results would be impressive, but they would still fall far 
short of what is needed. Indeed, it would be remarkable if they did not. In 
no other area has voluntary action succeeded as a solution to the problem 
of undersupply of a public good. This is especially so when there are global 
public goods, the benefits of which are shared by everyone in the world. 
There is simply insufficient “solidarity” at the global level. Social pressure 
works to some extent—but only to a limited extent. That is especially true 
when there are large groups within our societies for whom the direct cost 
of taking action (the loss in value of the fossil fuel assets they own) exceeds 
any direct gain from reduced global warming. It is not a surprise that 
such groups try to convince others that there is no real danger of climate 
change.
That is why the soft approach advocated in recent years by the United 
States, among others, based on voluntary contributions simply will not 
work. Agreements have to be enforceable. In the absence of a global govern-
ment able and willing to impose direct fines, the most effective enforcement 
mechanisms are trade sanctions, including the cross-border adjustments 
described in previous paragraphs.
Flexibility in Making Commitments
But countries should be given flexibility in the manner in which they meet 
their obligations—whether through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system 
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(Cooper, chapter 5, this volume), which could be complemented with regu-
latory mechanisms when their results are sufficiently measurable. Systems 
of auctioned emission rights are equivalent to a carbon tax. In practice, 
over time, there will have to be adjustments in the “caps” and the price of 
carbon. The notion that there is less risk to the global environment with a 
cap-and-trade is based on the presumption that we have good knowledge 
of the level of emissions necessary to achieve any objective in terms of 
changes in temperature.
Some countries seem to believe that the political economy problems 
posed by climate change can best be solved by compensations provided 
through the grants of emission rights. Others worry that such systems are 
subject to unwanted political pressures—and corruption.
Auctioned emission rights or a carbon tax can have large distributive 
consequences within a country, which is why regulatory mechanisms may 
have some advantages: restrictions on housing, urban design, transporta-
tion, and electricity generation can achieve a substantial fraction of what 
is needed; the requisite changes in carbon prices, with the associated dis-
tributive consequences, may be quite large to elicit corresponding changes. 
It is worth noting that much of the efforts of the international community 
have been directed at creating such regulatory standards (e.g., in terms of 
fuel efficiency in cars). However, such an approach opens up difficult ques-
tions: should an industry that does not pay a carbon charge be viewed as 
subsidized if it faces a regulatory constraint that forces it to achieve the 
same level of carbon emissions? It is as if the industry has faced a carbon 
charge but with the proceeds reimbursed to those in the industry as a lump 
sum payment. Clearly, the lump sum payment is a subsidy although it 
is not a carbon subsidy. Firms in countries facing a carbon charge will 
rightly argue that this is unfair competition. Moreover, there are diffi-
cult issues in transparency and comparability: if there were an agreement 
about a global carbon price of, say, $80 per ton, and some country were 
to combine tight regulations with a $70 per ton general price, then how 
would we assess whether it was complying with the regulation? It might 
argue that it should be given the flexibility of imposing, in effect, a higher 
carbon price in some industries (for some technologies) and a lower carbon 
price for others. Put aside for the moment charges of unfair competition 
to which such differential pricing might give rise (which arguably would 
be of limited relevance if the goods in question were nontraded goods). 
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In principle, if we had enough information about the demand and supply 
curves, then we could calculate the reduction in emissions and compare 
that reduction to what would have happened had there been a uniform 
$80 per ton carbon price.
Common and Differentiated Responsibilities
The approach delineated previously does not, however, adequately differ-
entiate among the circumstances of different countries. Such differentia-
tion was central to earlier approaches to climate change.
It is inefficient and likely to be viewed as inequitable for producers in 
developing countries to face a different carbon price from those confront-
ing firms in developed countries, giving rise to charges of unfair competi-
tion. At the same time, those from poor countries struggling to develop 
rightfully feel that any extra costs are taking away funds that could other-
wise be used for advancing developmental objectives.
This leads to two suggestions:
1. A global green fund could be financed by allocating 20% of the funds 
from the carbon tax (or the equivalent) imposed in developed countries. 
Because the magnitude of these revenues would be proportional to emis-
sions of those countries, it would arguably be an appropriate basis for rais-
ing funds for a global green fund. This would be particularly so because 
current emission levels would be highly correlated with past emissions. 
This is not the only basis on which one might raise money for a global 
green fund. One might, alternatively, impose a charge based on consump-
tion on the carbon associated with the goods that individuals in different 
countries consume. (In a competitive equilibrium, of course, charges on 
production and consumption are equivalent. In practice, they may not be. 
There may, however, be more technical difficulties in levying a charge on 
consumption than production.)
The revenues from a global green fund would be used to help finance 
expenditures in developing countries on adaptation and on the incremental 
costs associated with mitigation measures reducing carbon emissions. The 
funds could also be used to help developing countries pursue objectives of 
carbon sequestration—paying them to maintain forests (which would have 
additional global benefits in terms of biodiversity) and even not to extract 
hydrocarbons. The contribution to each of the developing countries from 
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the green fund should be large enough to compensate them for accept-
ing the global carbon price. (It may, however, be problematic to ask each 
country what contribution from the green fund would induce them to par-
ticipate; that would give rise to a bargaining problem where some develop-
ing countries might claim that they need large compensation. Equity may 
require establishing a rule-based allocation mechanism.)
2. Improvements in technology are likely to play an important role in 
meeting the goals of reductions in carbon emissions. Developing countries 
rightly worry that, should they sign on to an enforceable agreement con-
cerning reductions in carbon emissions, meeting those reductions would 
necessitate paying developed countries large amounts to use their technol-
ogy. In effect, a global carbon agreement would be an arrangement to trans-
fer large amounts from developing countries to the developed. Developing 
countries understandably are reluctant to sign on to an international con-
vention that would have that as a result.
In the 1992 Rio agreement, there was a provision for compulsory 
licenses. Yet the United States (and other developed countries) continues a 
stance that entails, in effect, a renegotiation of this provision.
The developed countries are in a better position to finance and conduct 
research leading to technologies that reduce carbon emissions and lead to 
carbon storage at affordable costs. They should provide this technology 
freely to developing countries (perhaps on a sliding scale, with reduced 
charges for middle-income countries). Some of the costs might be met out 
of the global green fund: research expenditures to reduce carbon emis-
sions are a double global public good—research is a global public good, and 
climate change is a global public good.
Conclusion
It is now more than two decades since the world recognized the threat 
of climate change. Yet there has been little progress—too little progress—
beyond a global agreement that we should take actions to limit the increase 
in temperature to 2°C. We are now set on a course in which we will almost 
surely miss even this modest goal.
We have explained why the approaches of the past—voluntary caps and 
actions—will almost surely fail, falling far short of what is needed. We have 
outlined another approach, based on a global agreement around a common 
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carbon price, with flexibility on how each country implements that agreed-
on price. With strong border adjustments, this is more likely to result in 
an agreement. Perhaps the agreement will initially be only among a large 
number of countries, a coalition of the willing, in which some recalcitrant 
countries refuse to join in—most likely those in which fossil fuel industries 
play an important role in the political economy. But we have explained 
how, over time, even many of these will find it desirable to join the coali-
tion. We have explained too how we can incorporate within this approach 
the recognized principal of “common but differentiated” responsibility.
It is time to give this alternative approach a chance. Climate change is 
too important to allow the current impasse to continue.
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7 Climate Clubs and Carbon Pricing*
William Nordhaus
Much progress has been made by scientists and economists in understand-
ing the science, technologies, and policies involved in climate change and 
reducing emissions. Notwithstanding this progress, up to now it has proved 
difficult to induce countries to join in an international agreement with sig-
nificant reductions in emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol was an ambitious attempt to construct an inter-
national climate-change agreement to harmonize the policies of different 
countries. High-income countries agreed to limit their emissions to 5% 
below 1990 levels for the 2008–2012 budget period. Under the Protocol, 
important institutional features were established, such as reporting require-
ments and methods for calculating the relative importance of different 
greenhouse gases.
However, countries did not find the Kyoto Protocol economically 
attractive. The United States withdrew in 2001. The Protocol did not attract 
any new participants from middle-income and developing countries. As a 
result, there was significant attrition in the coverage of emissions under the 
Protocol. Also, emissions grew more rapidly in noncovered countries, par-
ticularly developing countries such as China. The Protocol as first designed 
would have covered 63% of global emissions in 1990, but the actual scope 
in 2012 was barely one-fifth of world emissions. Analyses showed that, 
even if indefinitely extended, the Kyoto reductions would have a limited 
impact on future climate change. It died a quiet death, largely unnoticed 
and mourned by few, on December 31, 2012.
It was apparent even before its demise that the Kyoto Protocol would not 
make a substantial contribution to slowing climate change or, indeed, that 
* This chapter is drawn from the author’s article in Issues, Summer 2015, as well as 
other works in the references.
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it would meet its limited goals. Nations have struggled through a series of 
summits and conferences to find a replacement, with the Paris meeting in 
late 2015 being the latest attempt to reach an agreement that would replace 
Kyoto with an effective international agreement.
The present chapter suggests that the Kyoto Protocol ran aground, and 
that current approaches are unlikely to do better, because of the tendency 
of countries to free-ride on the efforts of others for global public goods. The 
chapter suggests that a “club” model is the most fruitful approach to over-
coming free-riding and describes a Climate Club. The current approaches, 
starting with the Kyoto Protocol, have little chance of success unless they 
adopt some of the strategies associated with the club model of international 
agreements.
But the abstract idea of a club is insufficient; many architectural and 
practical details of club design need careful analysis. One important aspect 
is the question of exactly what the international agreement is to agree 
on. In Kyoto, nations agreed on quantity limits. I suggest here that price 
agreements—more specifically, agreements on an internationally harmo-
nized minimum carbon price—will be the most fruitful way to organize an 
international club agreement.
The Nature of Global Public Goods
Most of economic life involves voluntary exchange of private goods, such 
as bread or blue jeans. These commodities are consumed by one person and 
directly benefit no one else. However, many activities involve spillovers 
or externalities among producers or consumers. An extreme case of an 
externality is a public good. Public goods are commodities where the cost 
of extending the benefits to an additional person is zero and where it is 
impossible or expensive to exclude individuals from enjoying.
More precisely, public goods have two key properties: nonrivalry and 
nonexcludability. Nonrivalry denotes that the consumption of the pub-
lic good by one person does not reduce the quantity available for con-
sumption by another person. Take global positioning systems (GPSs) as 
an example. These systems are used for hiking, missile guidance, and find-
ing a restaurant. These goods are public because people who use them 
are not reducing the value of signals for others. The second feature of a 
pure public good is nonexcludability. This means that no person can be 
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excluded from benefiting from or being affected by the public good (or 
can only be excluded at a high exclusion cost). In the case of smallpox 
eradication, once smallpox was eradicated, no person could be excluded 
from the benefits. Herd immunity from vaccines is an important and 
little-understood public good that is one of the important reasons for 
mandatory vaccination.
The important economic point about public goods is that private mar-
kets do not guarantee efficient production. In this respect, then, production 
of public goods such as GPS signals or herd immunity differs from produc-
tion of bread. Efficient production of public goods requires collective action 
to overcome the inability of private agents to capture the benefits.
The inefficiencies are the greatest for global public goods, whose 
benefits are spread most widely across space and time. Consider issues 
as different as greenhouse warming and ozone depletion, terrorism and 
money laundering, the discovery of antibiotics and nuclear weapons. 
These are global public goods because their impacts are indivisibly spread 
around the entire globe. These are not new phenomena. However, they are 
becoming more important in today’s world because of rapid technologi-
cal change and the sharp decline in transportation and communication 
costs.
Global Public Goods, Federalism, and the Westphalian Dilemma
Although global public goods raise no new analytical issues, they do 
encounter a unique political hurdle because of the structure of international 
law. Whenever we encounter a social, economic, or political problem, one 
of the first questions concerns the level at which the problem should be 
addressed. We expect households to deal with children’s homework assign-
ments and take out the trash; we expect local or regional governments to 
organize schools and collect the trash; we expect national governments to 
defend their borders and manage their currencies.
For the case of global public goods, there exist today no workable mar-
ket or governmental mechanisms that are appropriate for the problems. 
There is no way that global citizens can make binding collective decisions 
to slow global warming, curb overfishing of the oceans, efficiently combat 
Ebola, form a world army to combat dangerous tyrants, or rein in danger-
ous nuclear technologies.
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The decision-making difficulties of global public goods raise what might 
be called the Westphalian dilemma. National governments have the actual 
power and legal authority to establish laws and institutions within their 
territories; this includes the right to internalize externalities within their 
boundaries and provide for national public goods. Under the governing 
mechanisms of individual countries, whether they are acts of democratic 
legislatures or despotic decrees, they can take steps to raise taxes or armies 
and command their citizens to clean their air and water.
By contrast, under international law as it has evolved in the West 
and then the world, there is no legal mechanism by which disinterested 
majorities or supermajorities short of unanimities can coerce reluctant 
free-riding countries into mechanisms that provide for global public 
goods. Participants of the Treaty of Westphalia recognized in 1648 the 
Staatensystem, or system of sovereign states, each of which was a politi-
cal sovereign with power to govern its territory. As the system of sover-
eign states evolved, it led to the current system of international law under 
which international obligations may be imposed on a sovereign state only 
with its consent.
Because nations, particularly the United States, are deeply attached to 
their sovereignty, the Westphalian system leads to severe problems for 
global public goods. The requirement for unanimity is in reality a recipe for 
inaction. Particularly where there are strong asymmetries in the costs and 
benefits (as is the case for nuclear nonproliferation or global warming), the 
requirement of reaching unanimity means that it is extremely difficult to 
reach universal, binding, and effective international agreements. Whether 
bargaining can lead to such treaties is examined shortly.
To the extent that global public goods are increasingly important in 
the decades ahead, one of our major challenges is to devise mechanisms 
that overcome the bias toward the status quo and the voluntary nature of 
current international law in life- or civilization-threatening issues. Just as 
national laws recognize that consumer sovereignty does not apply to chil-
dren, criminals, and lunatics, international law must come to grips with the 
fact that nations acting under the Westphalian system cannot deal effec-
tively with critical global public goods.
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Free-Riding as the Key Obstacle for Climate-Change Treaties
As we look at climate change, the dilemmas raised by their global nature 
take a particular form. Slowing climate change requires expensive national 
investments in reducing CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. But the 
benefits are diffuse in space and time. Emissions reduced anywhere benefit 
people everywhere, and indeed most of the benefits come to generations in 
the future, perhaps distant future.
The concentrated costs and dispersed benefits provide strong incen-
tives for free-riding in current international climate agreements. Free-riding 
occurs when a party receives the benefits of a public good without contrib-
uting to the costs. In the case of the international climate-change policy, 
countries have an incentive to rely on the emissions reductions of oth-
ers without taking proportionate domestic abatement. The failure of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the difficulties of forging effective follow-up regimes, 
is largely due to free-riding.
As suggested by the earlier discussion, although free-riding is pervasive, 
it is particularly difficult to overcome for global public goods. Arrangements 
to secure an international climate treaty are hampered by the lack of ability 
to induce reluctant nations to join international agreements. In essence, 
all international agreements are essentially voluntary (see the Treaty of 
Vienna, 1969, article 34).
Clubs as a Mechanism to Overcome Free-Riding
In light of the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, it is easy to conclude that inter-
national cooperation is doomed to failure. This is the wrong conclusion. 
Despite the obstacles of international law, nations have in fact overcome 
many transnational conflicts and spillovers through international agree-
ments. There are more than 200,000 UN-registered treaties and actions 
that are presumptive attempts to improve participants’ welfare. Countries 
enter into agreements because joint action can take into account the spill-
over effects among the participants. Although global warming is to date 
a failed club, there are many examples of successes. Important examples 
are the international trading system, international financial arrangements, 
military alliances, and the protocols to reduce ozone-depleting chemicals. 
These achievements are a reminder that patient efforts to improve relations 
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among nations are not a fruitless task. In these and other cases, the ten-
dency toward free-riding associated with the Westphalian system has been 
overcome through the mechanism of clubs.
So what is a club? Although most of us belong to clubs, we seldom con-
sider their structure. A club is a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits 
from sharing the costs of producing a shared good or service. The gains 
from a successful club are sufficiently large that members will pay dues and 
adhere to club rules to gain membership benefits. 
The theory of clubs is a little-known but important corner of the social 
sciences. The major conditions for a successful club include the following: 
(1) there is a public good–type resource that can be shared (whether the 
benefits from a military alliance or the enjoyment of a golf course); (2) 
the cooperative arrangement, including the dues, is beneficial for each of 
the members; (3) nonmembers can be excluded or penalized at relatively 
low cost to members; and (4) membership is stable in the sense that no one 
wants to leave.
The basic idea suggested here is that we can make progress in inter-
national climate agreements if we adopt the club model rather than the 
current voluntary model. The idea of a Climate Club should be viewed as 
an idealized solution of the free-riding problem. Like free trade or physics in 
a vacuum, the Climate Club described here will never exist in its pure form. 
Rather, it is a blueprint that can be used to understand the basic forces at 
work and sketch a system that can overcome free-riding.
A Sketch of the Climate Club
Here is a brief description of the proposed Climate Club: an agreement 
by participating countries to undertake harmonized emissions reductions. 
The agreement envisioned here centers on an “international target carbon 
price” that is the focal provision of an international agreement. For exam-
ple, countries might agree that each country will implement policies that 
produce a minimum domestic carbon price of $25 per ton of CO2. Coun-
tries could meet the international target price requirement using whatever 
mechanism they choose—carbon tax, cap-and-trade, or a hybrid.
A key part of the club mechanism (and the major difference from all cur-
rent proposals) is that nonparticipants are penalized. The penalty analyzed 
here is uniform percentage tariffs on the imports of nonparticipants into 
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the club region. Calculations suggest that a relatively low penalty tariff rate 
will induce widespread participation among countries as long as the target 
carbon price is in the range up to $50 per ton.
Games and International Behavior
An important aspect of the Climate Club—and a major difference from 
current proposals—is that it creates a strategic situation in which coun-
tries acting in their self-interest will choose to enter the club and undertake 
high levels of emissions reductions because of the structure of the incen-
tives. To understand the nature of the incentives and strategies, I discuss the 
application of game theory to international environmental treaties.
There is a large literature on the strategic aspects of international 
environmental agreements, including those focused on climate change. 
One important strand is the analytical work on global public goods. The 
clear message is that without special features, the outcome will be a pris-
oners’ dilemma or tragedy of the commons, in which there is too little 
abatement.
This analysis usually takes place in the framework of noncooperative 
(NC) game theory. In the NC framework, countries act in their national 
self-interest. Hence, when a country designs its environmental, macroeco-
nomic, or labor-market policies, it considers the impacts on its own citizens 
and largely ignores the impacts on other countries. Although the idea of 
countries acting in their self-interest may seem narrow-minded or paro-
chial, it is actually the foundation of democratic theory. Most of the world’s 
ills (think particularly of wars) arise because countries, or more often their 
leaders, do not act in their countries’ national self-interest. For national 
public goods with minimal cross-border spillovers, the world’s welfare is 
appropriately optimized when countries act in their self-interest. The prob-
lems we consider here arise for global public goods, where the NC approach 
leads to inefficient outcomes.
Analysis of NC agreements (either one-shot or repeated) leads to three 
major conclusions for climate change. First, the overall level of abatement 
in the NC equilibrium will be much lower than in the efficient (cooperative) 
strategy. A second and less evident point is that countries will have strong 
incentives to free-ride by not participating in strong climate-change agree-
ments. Finally, the difficulty of escaping from a low-level, NC equilibrium 
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is amplified by the intertemporal trade-off because the current generation 
pays for the abatement while future generations are the beneficiaries of 
lower damages. To a first approximation, international climate policy as of 
2015 looks like a NC equilibrium.
Elements of Treaties
NC outcomes assume that countries never bargain to improve the out-
comes. Might coalitions of countries form cooperative arrangements or 
treaties that improve on NC arrangements? This question has been exten-
sively studied analytically using game theory, through modeling, and by 
examination of history.
Theoretical and empirical studies indicate that coalitions concerned with 
global public goods tend to be fragile and unstable. More precisely, these 
studies find virtually universally that coalitions tend to be either small or 
shallow, a result I will call the “small coalition paradox.”
Here is the background. Suppose that countries can form treaties to 
provide global public goods, whether for climate change, public health, 
financial regulation, or whatever. A successful agreement would require 
the participation of most countries. However, to be stable, each country 
must determine that participation—which requires investments with large 
national costs but diffuse benefits—has a higher payoff than nonpartici-
pation. The problem is that stable coalitions tend to have few members; 
therefore, as the number of countries rises, the fraction of global emissions 
covered by the agreement declines. Studies by Scott Barrett have found, 
based on a comprehensive review of existing environmental treaties, 
that few treaties for global public goods succeed in inducing countries to 
increase their investments significantly above the NC levels. Moreover, the 
ones that do succeed include external penalties.
This point was foreseen more than three centuries ago in a discussion by 
David Hume on collective action and free-riding:
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; be-
cause ‘tis easy for them to know each other's mind; and each must perceive, that 
the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole 
project. But ‘tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d 
agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a 
design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to 
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free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others. 
(Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Section VII, 1739)
How can we understand the small coalition paradox? Here is the intuition 
for climate change. Clearly, two countries can improve their welfare by 
combining and raising their abatement (or carbon price) to the level that 
would maximize their joint welfare. Just as with Hume’s neighbors, either 
country is worse off by dropping out. The 2014 agreement between China 
and the United States to join forces in climate policy might be interpreted 
as an example of a small bottom-up coalition.
Does it follow that, by increasing the number of countries in the treaty, 
this process would accumulate into a grand coalition of all countries with 
efficient abatement? That conclusion is generally wrong. The problem 
arises because, as more countries join, the level of abatement, and its costs, 
becomes ever higher and ever further from the NC level. The discrepancy 
gives incentives for individual countries to defect. When a country defects 
from an agreement with many countries, the remainder coalition (of many-
minus-one countries) would reoptimize its levels of abatement. The revised 
levels of abatement would still be well above the NC levels for the remain-
der coalition, while the defector free-rides on the abatement of the remain-
der coalition. The exact size of the stable coalitions would depend on the 
cost and damage structure as well as the number of countries, but for most 
analyses using realistic number, stable coalitions are small and perform 
only slightly better than the NC equilibrium.
As noted previously, the syndrome of free-riding along with the inter-
national norm of voluntary participation appears to doom international 
climate agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. The suggestion here is that 
a club structure—where external sanctions are imposed on nonmembers—
will be necessary to induce effective agreements.
Sanctions for International Agreements about Global Public Goods
Although it is easy to design potential international climate agreements, 
the reality is that it is difficult to construct ones that are effective and stable. 
Effective means abatement that is close to the level that passes a global 
cost–benefit test. The concept of stability used here is that a coalition is sta-
ble if no group (subcoalition) among the countries can improve its welfare 
by changing its participation status. The small coalition paradox motivates 
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the current approach. The goal here is to find a structure that is stable and 
has a large number of participants for a wide variety of country preferences, 
technologies, and strategies.
Both theory and history suggest that some form of sanction on non-
participants is required to induce countries to participate in agreements 
with high levels of abatement. A sanction is a governmental withdrawal, or 
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relationships. A key 
aspect of the sanctions analyzed here is that they benefit senders and harm 
receivers. This pattern contrasts with most cases, where sanctions impose 
costs on senders as well as receivers and thereby raise issues of incentive 
compatibility.
The major potential instrument is sanctions on international trade. Two 
approaches to trade sanctions might be considered. A first approach, and 
one that has been widely advocated and examined, is called carbon duties; 
it would put tariffs on the imports of nonparticipants in relation to the 
carbon content of these imports. For technical reasons, I do not suggest 
this route. A second approach, called uniform penalty tariffs and discussed 
here, would apply uniform percentage tariffs to all imports from nonpartic-
ipating countries. Under this approach, participating countries would levy 
a uniform percentage tariff (perhaps 2%) on all imports from nonpartici-
pants. This mechanism has the advantage of simplicity and transparency, 
although it does not relate the tariff specifically to the carbon content of 
the import.
A major feature of tariff sanctions is that they are incentive-compatible. 
Many sanctions have the disadvantage that they penalize the penalizer. 
For example, if Europe puts sanctions on Russian energy companies, then 
this is likely to raise energy prices in Europe, hurt European consumers, 
and therefore have costs on Europe as well as Russia. The tariff-sanction 
mechanism analyzed here imposes costs on the nonparticipating country 
but benefits participants that levy the penalty tariffs. Moreover, because 
tariffs apply bilaterally, they can support an efficient equilibrium for global 
public goods for a large number of countries.
The Central Role of Carbon Prices
There are many issues in club design. A central question is how to harmo-
nize countries’ policies. What exactly are countries negotiating over? In a 
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Kyoto design, and all the linear descendants through Paris, the negotiations 
are about quantities. This has proved a slippery slope without much to hold 
on to. A more promising approach is harmonizing carbon prices, and the 
proposed Carbon Club follows this route. 
Start with the positive reasons to use carbon prices: The economics of 
climate change is straightforward. Virtually every activity directly or indi-
rectly involves combustion of fossil fuels, emitting carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. If there is a single bottom line from economics, it is that we 
need to correct this market failure by ensuring that everyone, everywhere, 
and for the indefinite future faces a market price of carbon that reflects the 
social costs of their activities. Economic participants—thousands of govern-
ments, millions of firms, billions of people, all taking trillions of decisions 
each year—need to face realistic carbon prices if their decisions about con-
sumption, investment, and innovation are to be appropriate.
The most efficient strategy for slowing or preventing climate change is 
to impose a universal and internationally harmonized carbon tax levied 
on the carbon content of fossil fuels. An alternative would be a hybrid cap-
and-trade system, but this approach has many subtle flaws.
Move next to the negative reasons not to use quantitative targets: 
Quantitative targets in the form of tradable emissions limits have failed in 
the case of the Kyoto Protocol. They have shown excessive price volatil-
ity, lose precious governmental revenues, and have not lived up to their 
promise of equalizing prices in different regions. They are unattractive 
bargaining tools because they can be tailored to favor the strong and dis-
advantage the weak. To the extent that carbon-price targets lead to carbon 
taxes, the administrative aspects of taxes are better understood around the 
world than marketable emissions allowances, and they are less prone to 
corruption.
It will be useful to use an analogy. Assume a country wishes to reduce 
its gasoline consumption. It could do so by issuing ration coupons (either 
to consumers or companies) and then having a market in tradable cou-
pons. This would give a firm idea of the quantity reduction, but the his-
tory of rationing shows that it is highly inefficient and tends to become 
increasingly distorted over time. No country in the modern world takes 
this approach. A simpler approach would be to tax gasoline. This is admin-
istratively simple, raises revenues for governments, can have unfavorable 
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distributional impacts offset through income-tax changes, and is clearly a 
system that can endure decade after decade.
Now go a step further and assume that countries desire to harmonize 
their gasoline policies. Harmonization of gasoline taxes is simple. By con-
trast, the design of a harmonized rationing system would be challenging 
and subject to endless games and lawyerly disputes. The same logic applies 
to negotiating tax treaties or international trade regimes.
Modeling a Climate Club
To understand how a Climate Club would operate, it is necessary to move 
beyond description to analytical and numerical modeling of the incentives 
and behavior of regions with realistic economic and geophysical structures. 
The challenge of analyzing and modeling the science and policy associated 
with global warming is particularly difficult because it spans many disci-
plines and parts of society. An important approach to bringing the different 
fields together has been the development of integrated assessment models 
(IAMs). These pull together in a single model a wide variety of geophysi-
cal, economic, and political relationships so that projections, analyses, and 
decisions can consider simultaneously all important endogenous variables 
at work. IAMs generally do not aspire to have the most detailed and com-
plex representation of each of its components. Rather, they aspire to have 
at a first level of approximation the most important relationships and ones 
that can operate simultaneously and with reasonable accuracy.
In the major study on which this article is based, I describe an integrated-
assessment model (the Coalition-DICE [C-DICE] model) of economics, tar-
iffs, and climate change that examines the effects of different potential 
Climate Clubs. I will not give a detailed report on the results of those simu-
lations but refer interested readers to the original source for an extended 
discussion.
The C-DICE model is designed to find whether countries join a coalition 
of high-abatement countries and to find stable coalitions. It examines 44 
different “regimes,” where a regime is defined as an international target 
carbon price and a penalty tariff rates. The assumed target prices are $12.5, 
$25, $50, and $100 per ton of CO2, and uniform penalty tariffs range from 
0% to 10%. For reference purposes, the US government estimates the global 
social cost of carbon (or the damage imposed by an additional ton of CO2 
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emissions) to be around $35 per ton of CO2. In most models, a carbon tax 
of this magnitude would lead to emissions reduced 15% to 20% relative to 
a business-as-usual path in the near term. Most economic studies would 
recommend that the carbon price rise over time to reduce more sharply and 
even eliminate greenhouse gas emissions over this century.
Some Illustrative Results
I close by highlighting some of the conclusions of the modeling studies 
of a Climate Club. The first major result is to confirm that a regime 
without trade sanctions will dissipate to the low-abatement, NC equilib-
rium. A second surprising result is that, when trade sanctions are imposed, 
the Climate Club structure generates stable coalitions for virtually all sets 
of parameters.
A next set of results concerns the impact of different Climate Club 
parameters on the participation structure. For the lowest target carbon 
prices ($12.5 and $25 per ton of CO2), full participation and efficient abate-
ment are achieved with relatively low tariffs (2% or more). However, as the 
target carbon price rises, it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve full 
participation. For a $50 per ton target carbon price, the Club can attain 
90%+ efficiency with a tariff rate of 5% or more. However, for a target car-
bon price of $100 per ton, it is difficult to induce more than the NC level of 
abatement. Figure 7.1 illustrates these results.
What is the pattern of gains and losses? The benefits of a Climate Club 
are widely distributed among countries. A few regions have losses in some 
regimes. However, the losses are small relative to gains for other regions. 
There are no regimes with aggregate losses.
A paradoxical result is that all regions would prefer a Climate Club 
regime with penalties and modest carbon prices to a regime with no penal-
ties. This is even the case for countries that do not participate. The reason 
is that the gains from strong mitigation measures of participants outweigh 
the losses from the tariffs for nonparticipants—as long as the tariff rate is 
not too high. This powerful result indicates that a regime with sanctions 
should be attractive to most regions.
The analysis shows how an international climate treaty that com-
bines target carbon pricing and trade sanctions can induce substantial 
abatement. The modeling results indicate that modest trade penalties on 
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nonparticipants can induce a coalition that approaches the optimal level of 
abatement as long as the target carbon prices are not too high. The attrac-
tiveness of a Climate Club must be judged relative to the current approaches, 
where international climate treaties are essentially voluntary and have little 
prospect of forging agreements that can effectively slow climate change.
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8 How a Minimum Carbon-Price Commitment Might Help 
to Internalize the Global Warming Externality
Martin L. Weitzman
Introduction
Throughout this chapter, I use the terms “climate change” and “global 
warming” interchangeably. The term “climate change” is currently in 
vogue and is a more apt description overall. But the term “global warm-
ing” is more evocative of this chapter’s main theme. Global warming is a 
global public-goods externality whose resolution requires an unprecedented 
degree of international cooperation and coordination. This international 
climate-change externality has frequently been characterized as the most 
difficult public goods problem that humanity has ever faced. I concentrate 
in this chapter on carbon dioxide emissions, but in principle the discussion 
could be extended to emissions of all relevant greenhouse gases. Through-
out the chapter, I blur the distinction between carbon dioxide and carbon 
because the two are linearly related.1
The core problem confronting the political economy of climate change 
is an inability to overcome the obstacles associated with free-riding on an 
important international public good. The “international” part is signifi-
cant. Even within a nation, it can be difficult to resolve public-goods prob-
lems. But at least there is a national government, with some governance 
structure, able to exert some control over externalities within its borders. A 
national government can (at least in principle) impose targets on national 
public goods. With climate change, there is no overarching international 
governance mechanism capable of coordinating the actions necessary to 
overcome the international problem of free-riding. Instead, instruments of 
control, such as prices and/or quantities, must be negotiated among sover-
eign nations.
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My point of departure throughout all of what follows is the critical cen-
trality of the international free-rider problem as a cause (really the cause) of 
negotiating difficulties on carbon emissions. Negotiators here are playing a 
game in which self-interested strategies are a crucial consideration. It turns 
out that negotiating rules define an important part of the game and can 
thereby change self-interest for better or for worse.
In this chapter, I try to argue that a uniform minimum global tax-like 
price on carbon emissions, whose revenues each country retains, can pro-
vide a focal point for a reciprocal common commitment, whereas quantity 
targets, which do not as readily present such a single focal point, have a 
tendency to rely ultimately on individual commitments. As a consequence, 
negotiating a uniform minimum global carbon tax or price can help to 
solve the externality problem, whereas individual caps essentially incorpo-
rate it. I will try to explain why negotiating a uniform minimum carbon 
price embodies what I call a “countervailing force” against narrow self-
interest by automatically incentivizing all negotiating parties to internalize, 
at least approximately, the global warming externality. The basic challenge, 
as I see it, is to construct a relatively simple and acceptable one-dimensional 
international quid-pro-quo mechanism, which automatically embodies the 
principle of “I will if you will.”2
Some Brief History of Climate Negotiations
In the decade from the actual entering into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 
February 2005 to the Paris COP21 agreement of December 2015, the world 
seemed mired in what has aptly been called global warming gridlock.3
The Kyoto agreement, negotiated in December 1997, began by dividing 
the world into two huge blocs under the so-called “principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility and respected capabilities.” The “Annex 
I” bloc of countries included most of the world’s high-income advanced 
industrial nations. The rest of the world, the “non-Annex I” bloc of coun-
tries, included most of the world’s low-income developing nations. The 
Annex I countries agreed to “legally binding” average emissions reductions 
in 2008–2012 of approximately 5% relative to their baseline emissions of 
1990. The non-Annex I countries were not constrained by “legally binding” 
emissions reductions but otherwise agreed to cooperate.
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In reality, the “legally binding”emissions reductions of the Kyoto Proto-
col were anything but legally binding because there was no provision for 
a mechanism to enforce compliance. There was no provision for a mecha-
nism to enforce compliance because, essentially, at the end of the day, the 
parties did not want to be bound by such a mechanism.
Almost from the beginning, the United States and Australia refused to 
ratify the Kyoto treaty (largely on the grounds that the non-Annex I coun-
tries were unfairly exempt from responsibilities). Subsequently, Canada, 
Japan, and Russia pulled out of their part of the agreement and refused to 
take on future commitments.
I think it is fair to say that the “spirit” of Kyoto was a top-down intended 
adherence to something like the following scenario. The Annex I countries 
agreed to show good faith first by voluntarily lowering their emissions in 
2010 by about 5% relative to their 1990 emissions. Then in a second stage, 
after around 10 years (approximately by 2012 or so), the hope was that the 
non-Annex I countries would be impressed by the good faith effort shown 
over the previous decade by the Annex I countries and would hopefully 
join by pledging something like an emissions reduction target of 5% in 
2020 (relative to 1990 emissions), while the Annex I countries would agree 
to a more stringent emissions quota of about 10%. In reality, no such sec-
ond stage of ratcheted-up commitments ever materialized.
The recently concluded Paris COP21 agreement of December 2015 (by 
contrast with Kyoto) made no formal dichotomy between developed and 
developing countries. In principle, all nations were treated symmetrically. 
The Paris agreement covered countries currently accounting for some 95% 
of world carbon dioxide emissions. Countries agreed to make voluntary 
pledges, now named euphemistically “Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions” (INDCs). The INDCs aspired to be transparent in the sense 
that monitoring, reporting, and verification would be subject to uniform 
standards. COP21 committed countries to report INDC compliance every 
five years or so and to set new (and hopefully more ambitious) INDCs 
for the next five-year period, a policy sometimes labeled “pledge-and-
review.” There was also provision for possible international linkage via the 
euphemistically named “Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes” 
(ITMOs).
All in all, the COP21 agreement seems like an improvement over the 
Kyoto Protocol. It appears to be essentially a gamble that the modest 
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voluntary slowdowns in emissions may buy enough time to develop inex-
pensive future carbon-free technologies. This seems to be a risky bet. In any 
event, it will take maybe a decade or more to sort out the effectiveness of 
the Paris COP21 agreement.
The core weakness of the COP21 Paris Accord is essentially the same 
as the core weakness of the Kyoto Protocol. Neither approach addresses 
the central problem of free-riding on an international public good of great 
importance. There is no penalty for voluntarily setting underambitious 
national targets, and there is no penalty for noncompliance by a coun-
try with its own voluntary self-announced targets. Under COP21, the only 
mechanism for compliance is “blame and shame,” which seems like a weak 
incentive for cutting back on global emissions.
I think the INDC label says it all. The contributions are chosen by each 
country. These COP21 contributions are intended and nationally determined. 
It is hard for me to envision how the labels could more strongly emphasize 
the strictly voluntary nature of the entire exercise. This does not seem to 
me like a formula for overcoming the free-riding problem associated with 
an international public good of great importance.
If the Paris COP21 approach fails to halt “dangerous anthropogenic 
global warming,” which takes the form of a perception of an impending 
climate catastrophe that is felt on a grassroots level, then I think there may 
be more pressure on creating a top-down international mechanism that 
actually works. If climate change becomes sufficiently threatening to an 
“average”citizen of the world, public opinion may support relinquishing 
some national sovereignty in favor of the greater good. This chapter is tar-
geted to such an eventuality.
I will try to explain why negotiating a uniform minimum carbon price 
empowers what I will call a “countervailing force” against narrow self-
interest by automatically incentivizing all negotiating parties to internal-
ize, at least approximately, the global warming externality. Again, the basic 
challenge, as I see it, is to construct a relatively simple and relatively accept-
able one-dimensional international quid-pro-quo mechanism, which auto-
matically embodies the principle of “I will if you will.”
Negotiating Prices versus Quantities
At first, for simplicity of exposition, I assume that a commitment to a 
uniform global price of carbon will be implemented as an internationally 
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harmonized but nationally retained carbon tax. Later I indicate that the 
commitment is actually to an internationally equal minimum price on car-
bon emissions, which could be met in a variety of ways, including, in prin-
ciple, imposing a uniform price floor in a cap-and-trade system. But for 
expositional purposes here, I pretend that the uniform price takes the form 
of an equal self-imposed tax on carbon emissions.
An internationally harmonized but nationally retained carbon tax (or 
price) has already been proposed as a potential solution to the global warm-
ing externality and has been examined on its merits.4 In what follows, I 
briefly summarize some of the possible virtues of an internationally har-
monized but nationally collected carbon tax (or price) that have already 
been noted in the literature. My foil here is an internationally harmonized 
cap-and-trade system (without a uniform price floor). This kind of global-
design comparison is complicated and full of subjective judgments about 
what might or might not work better in practice and why or why not. 
Cap-and-trade systems are perhaps more widely used than taxes through-
out the world to control pollution and, in that sense, are perhaps more 
visible or familiar market-like mechanisms than pollution taxes (although 
fossil-fuel taxes and subsidies are ubiquitous, if somewhat hidden, almost 
everywhere). My purpose here is merely to indicate that the perhaps less-
familiar uniform carbon tax already has some significant arguments in its 
favor—as a prelude to some new arguments for negotiating a uniform price 
on carbon that I will later develop in this chapter.
Both quantity- and price-based controls are inherently uncertain for the 
period during which they apply (in between times of periodic review), but 
the uncertainty takes different forms. With cap-and-trade, total emissions 
are known, but the price or (marginal) cost is uncertain. With a carbon tax, 
the price or (marginal) cost of carbon emissions is known, but total emis-
sions are uncertain. On the basis of economic models of climate change 
that include uncertainty, carbon taxes outperform tradable permits, both 
theoretically and in numerical simulations.5 In the real world, above and 
beyond theory and numerical simulations, I think that energy price volatil-
ity is poorly tolerated by the general public. Swings in carbon prices, espe-
cially in extreme cases, could sour public opinion and discredit for some 
time thereafter (decades, generations) the entire idea of a market-based 
approach to the climate change problem. However, it is difficult for me 
to imagine the broad public getting quite so upset because total emissions 
fluctuate.
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It has been argued, I think convincingly, that a carbon tax is more easily 
administered and transparent than a cap-and-trade system. This consid-
eration is especially important in a comprehensive international context 
that would include all major emitting countries. Under international cap-
and-trade, governments will allocate valuable emissions permits to their 
nation’s firms and residents. In some places, under some circumstances, 
there may be a great temptation for kleptocrats to effectively steal these 
valuable emissions permits and sell them on the international market.
The collected revenues from an internationally harmonized carbon tax 
remain within each country and could be used to offset other taxes or even 
be redistributed internally as lump-sum payments. This, I think, is a desir-
able property. By contrast, the revenues generated from an internationally 
harmonized cap-and-trade system flow as highly visible external transfer 
payments across national borders, which might be less easily tolerated by 
countries required to pay other countries large sums of taxpayer-financed 
money to buy permits.6
This extremely brief discussion of the advantages of an internationally 
harmonized carbon tax (compared with cap-and-trade) is not intended to 
be comprehensive. There are also legitimate arguments in favor of interna-
tionally harmonized tradable permits and against a carbon tax.7
A point in favor of tradable permits, frequently emphasized by its advo-
cates, is the political appeal of giving free allowance permits to carbon-
intensive industry groups (as contrasted with taxing them directly on their 
carbon emissions). As was pointed out, carbon taxes that are internally 
levied and collected by a national government could be used to reduce 
other, more distortionary, taxes—or they could even be distributed directly 
to the citizenry as lump-sum payments. But this redistribution aspect of 
a carbon tax is hidden behind the scenes as it were. Individual firms will 
prefer, and typically strongly prefer, what they perceive as the lesser burden 
to them of freely allocated permits over the greater perceived burden to 
them of pollution taxes. Indeed, studies show that the market value of the 
free allowances is typically significantly greater than the higher compliance 
costs of decarbonization that are incurred.8 Firms and countries in a cap-
and-trade regime will therefore struggle hard for a larger share of the total 
amount of freely distributed emissions allocations. The political appeal of 
freely distributed tradable permits is a double-edged sword. When negoti-
ating emissions caps, a serious income distortion is introduced because a 
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nation is much more concerned with the revenues from its own free quota 
allocations than it is concerned with overall international social optimality. 
Auctioning off the allowances would eliminate this income-effect distor-
tion on the individually desired level of free permit allocations, but then we 
are effectively back in a tax-like system.
Both approaches (an internationally harmonized but domestically 
collected carbon price and freely distributed marketable permits) are sub-
ject to immense—sometimes seemingly overwhelming—criticisms. In both 
cases, innumerable practical details must be attended to and worked out. 
In both cases, an effective international treaty needs to be binding, which 
raises uncomfortable issues of enforcement mechanisms and international 
sanctions. Additionally, there might be mixed hybrid systems, such as cap-
and-trade with a uniform floor on the carbon price. I merely want to estab-
lish a level playing field where the idea of an internationally harmonized 
carbon tax already commands at least as much intellectual respect as an 
internationally harmonized cap-and-trade system (without a uniform price 
floor).
Throughout this chapter, I argue that it is difficult to resolve the global 
warming externality problem by directly assigning individual quantity tar-
gets. A meaningful, comprehensive, quantity-based treaty involves specify-
ing as many different binding emissions quotas (whether in the form of 
tradable permits or not) as there are national entities. Each national entity 
has a self-interested incentive to negotiate for itself a high cap on carbon 
emissions—much higher than would be socially optimal. The resulting 
free-rider problem plagues a quantity-based approach. Even if there were 
a collective commitment to negotiate or vote on a second-stage worldwide 
total emissions cap, which I will later assume for the sake of argument, 
disagreements over the first-stage fractional subdivision formula (for disag-
gregating the negotiated or majority-voted aggregate worldwide quantity 
cap into individual quantity caps) would make it difficult to enact such a 
quantity-based approach.9
The inspiration for this chapter is the perception of a desperate need for 
some radical rethinking of international climate policy. As a possibly use-
ful conceptual guide for what negotiations might accomplish, I sometimes 
ask the reader to temporarily suspend disbelief by considering what might 
happen in a “World Climate Assembly” (WCA) that votes on global carbon 
emissions via the basic principle of one-person-one-vote majority rule. In 
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this conceptualization, nations would vote along a single dimension for 
their desired level of emissions stringency on behalf of their citizen con-
stituents, but the votes are weighted by each nation’s population.
Right now, anything like a WCA seems hypothetical and hopelessly 
futuristic. It presumes a state of mind where the climate-change problem 
has become sufficiently threatening on a grassroots level that world pub-
lic opinion is ready to consider novel governance structures that involve 
relinquishing some national sovereignty in favor of the greater good. What 
might be the justification for a new international organization like the 
WCA? The ultimate justification is that big, new problems may require 
big, new solutions. For a world desperately wanting new solutions to the 
important externality of climate change, perhaps it is at least worth con-
sidering establishing a new organization along the lines of the WCA. After 
all, it is useful to have some concrete fallback decision mechanism behind 
vague “negotiations” because even with the focus on a one-dimensional 
harmonized carbon price (or with the focus on a one-dimensional quan-
tity of total emissions), there are bound to be disagreements whose resolu-
tion is unclear. I merely assume that it is in the interest of enough nations 
to forfeit their rights to pollute in favor of a WCA voting solution of the 
global warming externality. This is truly a heroic assumption at the pres-
ent time because the WCA does not correspond to any currently existing 
international body. Taken less literally, the thought experiment of a hypo-
thetical WCA can still help us to concentrate our thinking and intuition 
on what negotiations should be trying to accomplish. In other words, I am 
hoping that the fiction of a WCA might be useful in indicating what might 
be the outcome of less formal international negotiations.
It could be objected that a “consensus” voting rule, not a majority vot-
ing rule, is employed in negotiations under the UN Framework on Climate 
Change. This “consensus” voting rule has been widely interpreted as requir-
ing near unanimity. With such a restrictive voting rule, significant progress 
on resolving the global warming externality seems virtually impossible. 
Surely, a less restrictive voting-like rule, such as majority rule, would render 
progress more likely and is at least worth considering.
One aspect should perhaps be emphasized above all others at the out-
set. The global warming externality problem cannot be resolved with-
out a binding agreement on some overall formula for dividing emissions 
responsibilities among nations. Voluntary altruism alone will not solve 
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this international public-goods problem. Of necessity, there must be some 
impingement on national sovereignty in the form of an international mech-
anism for determining targets, verifying fulfillment, and punishing non-
compliance. The question then becomes: Which collective-commitment 
frameworks and formulas are more promising than which others?
Theory of Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price
In this chapter, I examine the theoretical properties of a natural one-
dimensional focus on negotiating a single binding price on carbon emis-
sions, the proceeds from which are domestically retained. As previously 
mentioned, for expositional simplicity, I identify this single binding price 
on carbon as if it were an internationally harmonized, nationally col-
lected carbon tax. At a theoretical level of abstraction, I blur the distinction 
between a carbon price and a carbon tax. However, in actuality, the impor-
tant thing is acquiescence by each nation to a common binding minimum 
price on carbon emissions, not the particular mechanism by which this 
common binding minimum price is attained by a particular nation.
A system of uniform national carbon taxes with revenues kept in the 
taxing country is a relatively simple and transparent way to achieve inter-
nationally harmonized carbon prices. But it is not necessary for the con-
clusions of this chapter. Nations or regions could meet the obligation of 
a minimum price on carbon emissions by whatever internal mechanism 
they choose—a tax, a cap-and-trade system, a hybrid system, or what-
ever else results in an observable price of carbon above the internation-
ally agreed minimum. I elaborate further on this issue in my concluding 
remarks.
At a theoretical level, I would suggest that the instruments of negotia-
tion for helping to resolve the global warming externality should ideally 
possess three desirable properties.
1. Induce cost-effectiveness.
2. Be of one dimension based on a “natural” focal point to facilitate find-
ing an agreement with relatively low transactions costs.
3. Embody “countervailing force”against narrow self-interest by automat-
ically incentivizing all negotiating parties to internalize the externality 
via a simple, reciprocal, I will if you will, common-climate commit-
ment formula.
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Using these theoretical properties as criteria, I now compare and contrast 
an idealized binding harmonized tax-like price with an idealized binding 
cap-and-trade system (without a uniform price floor).
On the first desirable property, in principle, both a carbon price and 
tradable permits achieve cost-effectiveness (provided agreement can be had 
in the first place).
The second desirable property (low dimensionality) argues in favor of a 
one-dimensional, harmonized, tax-like carbon price over an n-dimensional, 
harmonized, cap-and-trade system among n nations. Alas, this argument 
is elusively difficult to formulate rigorously or articulate coherently. My 
argument here is necessarily intuitive or behavioral and relies on empiri-
cal counterexamples. In this situation, two important empirical counterex-
amples are the breakdown of the quantity-based Kyoto approach and the 
hugely underambitious “intended nationally determined contributions” 
actually volunteered by nations under the COP21 Paris Accord.
With n different national entities, a quantity-based treaty involves 
assigning n different binding emissions quotas (whether tradable or 
not). Treaty making can be viewed as a coordination game with n differ-
ent players. Such a game can have multiple solutions, often depending 
delicately on the setup, what is being assumed, and, most relevant here, 
the choice of negotiating instrument. In the case of Kyoto, the world 
had in practice arrived at a bad quantity-based solution that essentially 
devolved to regional volunteerism. The ultimate outcome of the COP21 
Paris Accord remains to be seen, but so far the INDCs actually volun-
teered by the parties seem grossly underwhelming, even leaving aside the 
near impossibility of achieving the stated goal of keeping global warming 
below 2°C.
Thomas Schelling10 introduced and popularized the notion of a focal 
point in game theory. Generally speaking, a focal point of an n-party coor-
dination game is some salient feature that reduces the dimensionality of 
the problem and simplifies the negotiations by limiting bargaining by the 
parties to some manageable subset, hopefully of one dimension. The basic 
idea is that by limiting bargaining to a salient focus, there may be more 
hope of reaching a good outcome. In a somewhat circular definition, a focal 
point is anything that provides a focus of convergence. The “naturalness” 
or “salience” of a focal point is an important aspect of Schelling’s argument 
that is difficult to define rigorously and is ultimately intuitive.
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The concept of “transactions cost” is associated with the work of 
Ronald Coase.11 The basic idea is that n parties to a negotiation can be 
prevented from attaining a socially desirable outcome by the costs of 
transacting the agreement among themselves. One could try to argue that, 
other things being equal, transactions costs increase proportionally with 
the number of parties n. Negotiating a one-dimensional price with single-
peaked preferences has the important additional property of allowing a 
majority-rule voting equilibrium, which avoids the Arrow impossibility 
theorem.
In the case of international negotiations on climate change, I believe 
that both Schelling’s concept of a salient focal point and Coase’s concept of 
transactions costs can be used as informal arguments to support negotiating 
a single harmonized carbon price whose proceeds are nationally rebated. 
Put directly, it is easier to negotiate one price than n quantities—especially 
when the one price can be interpreted as “fair” in terms of equality of mar-
ginal effort. I cannot defend this claim rigorously. At the end of the day, this 
is more of a plausible conjecture than a rigorous theorem. Whether justly or 
not, throughout this chapter, I assume that the essential contrast is between 
one binding price assignment versus n binding quantity assignments—and 
I then proceed to examine the consequences.
The third desirable property is that the instrument or instruments 
of negotiation should embody a “countervailing force” against narrow free-
riding self-interest by incorporating incentives that automatically internal-
ize the externality. Such incentives should ideally take the form of a simple, 
reciprocal, common climate commitment based on the quid-pro-quo prin-
ciple of “I will if you will.” I believe this third property is arguably the most 
important property of all. This “countervailing force” property is inher-
ently built into a price-based harmonized system of emissions charges, but 
it is absent from a quantity-based international cap-and-trade system, at 
least as traditionally formulated.
If I am assigned a cap on emissions, then it is in my own narrow free-
riding self-interest to want my cap to be as large as possible (regardless 
of whether my cap will be tradable as a permit). The self-interested part of 
me wants maximal leniency for myself. Other than altruism, there is no 
countervailing force on the other side encouraging me to lower my desired 
emissions cap because of the externality benefits I will be bestowing on 
others.
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Within a nation, the government assigns binding caps. But among sov-
ereign nations, binding caps must be negotiated. I believe this is a crucial 
distinction for the success or failure of a cap-and-trade regime. A quantity-
based international system fails because no one has an incentive to inter-
nalize the externality and everyone has the self-interested incentive to 
free-ride. What remains is essentially an erratic pattern of altruistic indi-
vidual volunteerism that is far from a socially optimal resolution of the 
problem.
An internationally harmonized, domestically collected carbon price is 
different. If the price were imposed on me alone, then I would wish it to be 
as low as possible so as to limit my abatement costs. But when the price is 
uniformly imposed, it embodies a countervailing force that internalizes the 
externality for me. Counterbalancing my desire for the price to be low (to 
limit my abatement costs) is my desire for the price to be high so that other 
nations will restrict their emissions, thereby increasing my benefit from 
worldwide total carbon abatement. A binding uniform minimum price of 
carbon emissions has a built-in self-enforcing mechanism that countervails 
free-riding.12
In previous work, I have tried to model formally the role of this third 
“countervailing force” property of an internationally harmonized but 
nationally collected carbon price.13 I constructed a basic model indicating 
an exact sense in which each agent’s extra cost from a higher international 
minimum emissions price is counterbalanced by that agent’s extra benefit 
from inducing all other agents to simultaneously lower their emissions via 
the higher international minimum price (which might well take the form 
of a uniform price floor on a cap-and-trade system).
With further restrictions, the model showed that population-weighted 
majority rule for an internationally harmonized tax-like carbon price can 
come as close to an optimal price on emissions as the median per capita 
marginal benefit is close to the mean per capita marginal benefit. The key 
insight from this way of looking at things is that in voting on (or more gen-
erally negotiating) a universal minimum carbon price, various nations are, 
to a greater or lesser degree, internalizing the externality. Loosely speaking, 
an “average” nation is fully internalizing the externality because its extra 
cost from a higher emissions price is exactly offset by its extra benefit from 
inducing all other nations to simultaneously lower their emissions via the 
higher price.
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On the price side, a uniform carbon price automatically has the desirable 
property that cost-effectiveness is guaranteed. I think that the formal WCA 
voting result of the model might perhaps be interpreted somewhat less for-
mally as indicating that negotiating an internationally harmonized (but 
nationally collected) carbon price may have an important desirable prop-
erty on the quantity side as well. If the median marginal benefit (per capita) 
equals the mean marginal benefit (per capita), then the socially optimal 
carbon price in the model has the property that, roughly speaking, half of 
the world’s population wants the price to be higher, whereas the other half 
of the world’s population wants the price to be lower. In this situation, the 
desirable quantity-side property is that the total worldwide output of all 
emissions might be “close” to being optimal to the extent that the outcome 
of negotiations mimics the outcome of majority voting. Although the real 
world is a far more complicated and nuanced place than the restrictive 
theoretical model that was constructed, I think this voting result is trying 
to indicate something positive (even if only at an abstract level) about how 
a negotiated uniform carbon price might possess some overall potential to 
counteract via internalization the externality of global warming.
Might a Modified Cap-and-Trade Work as Well?
Previously I listed three desirable features that climate change negotiation 
instruments should ideally possess: (1) cost-effectiveness, (2) a natural one-
dimensional focal point, and (3) a built-in countervailing-force mechanism 
that internalizes the externality by embodying “I will if you will” behavior. I 
then explained that an internationally harmonized but nationally retained 
carbon price possesses all three properties, whereas an n-dimensional, 
quantity-based cap-and-trade system at best (if it can be negotiated in the 
first place) possesses only the first property of cost-effectiveness. With n 
sovereign nations, there will be difficult bargaining over n different caps, 
with no force other than altruism countervailing each nation’s selfish desire 
to be a free-rider and secure for itself a large cap on emissions.
But maybe I am being unfair to tradable permits. Suppose we imagine 
trying to convert the n-dimensional problem of allocating carbon emis-
sions permits into some one-dimensional aggregate-quantity analogue of a 
uniform tax-like price on carbon emissions. We might imagine a thought 
experiment where the cap-and-trade negotiators are sitting around a 
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negotiating table limiting themselves to simple linear formulas for allocat-
ing individual emissions caps as a fraction of total world emissions.14
Suppose the cap-and-trade negotiators must decide the total amount 
of world emissions E, given a suballocation formula for deciding the frac-
tion of emissions permits allotted to each nation. A standard way of concep-
tualizing this allocation problem for each country is in terms of an assigned 
fractional emissions reduction from an assigned baseline level. Here I 
think it is most instructive to view the essence of such an assignment pro-
cess in terms of a simple linear reduced form that allots emissions permits 
Ei(E) = ai + biE to nation i (where ∑ =ai 0, bi > 0, and ∑ =bi 1).
If each nation i would accept as given the assigned distributional coeffi-
cients (ai, bi) and the above suballocation formula Ei(E) = ai + biE, one might 
then imagine negotiating over (or even voting for) the total emissions E. 
Contingent on the distribution of coefficients being accepted as given, this 
system would seemingly possess the desirable property of having a one-
dimensional locus of negotiations (here the level of total worldwide emis-
sions E). There is also countervailing force against negotiating for a higher 
value of worldwide total emissions E. Although each nation i’s automatic 
assignment of a higher individual emissions cap Ei when total emissions E 
are higher helps that nation directly by lowering its emissions costs, this 
domestic effect is counteracted by the benefits that each nation would lose 
from a higher total worldwide emissions level because then everyone else 
would also emit more. It appears that such a cap-and-trade system might 
in principle have desirable focal-point and countervailing-force properties 
if the assigned distribution coefficients were accepted and bargaining were 
restricted to negotiating total emissions.
But now follow the thought experiment further by asking: Where do 
the distributional suballocation coefficients (ai,bi) come from in the first 
place? They are presumably the result of an n-party negotiating process 
where there is no countervailing force to the selfish desire of each country 
to make its own fractional allocation coefficients as high as possible. With 
n different nations, there will be the usual difficult bargaining over n differ-
ent distributional coefficients, with no externality-internalizing incentive 
countervailing each nation’s desire to secure for itself a high fraction of 
emissions.
When a cap-and-trade system is used to control pollution within a 
nation, the government of that nation assigns the caps (or the fractions of 
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emissions).15 In this intranational case, there is a natural symmetry between 
a one-dimensional price p and a one-dimensional total quantity of emis-
sions E. But there is no international government that has the unilateral 
power to assign caps or fractions. These caps or fractions must be negoti-
ated among sovereign nations. This breaks the one-dimensional symmetry 
because now one tax-like price p is contrasted with the asymmetry of n 
vested sovereign interests jockeying for the n initial fractional distributions. 
There is thus a critical distinction between intranational and international 
cap-and-trade systems. In the international case, the initial distribution of 
caps is explicitly distributive, resulting in a war of words about who caused 
the global warming problem and who should bear the burden of remedying 
it, who is rich and who is poor, what is fair and what is unfair, and so on. 
There could also be a war of words about the green-fund transfers required 
to induce participation in a uniform-price treaty, but for reasons elaborated 
in footnotes 5 and 8 regarding the difference between first- and second-
order transfers, I think that an internally retained price treaty takes a lot of 
pressure off the green-fund payments.
But perhaps a formulation of this generality is biased against cap-
and-trade. We might try to imbue the distribution coefficients with 
dimensionality-reducing salient qualities by imagining “naturally sym-
metric” focal allocations of the fractional coefficients. One such seem-
ingly symmetric formula might be that each country is assigned the same 
fractional reduction of emissions from some agreed-on baseline year. The 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997 adopted just a little of the spirit of this idea for 
developed countries alone, with the hope that some variant of it might 
later be extended to developing countries. The high-income industrialized 
countries (Annex I) agreed to “binding” commitments (but without any 
enforcement mechanism) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 by 
an average of 5% relative to 1990 levels (although allowing some individu-
ally negotiated variations around that 5% average). Developing countries 
were exempt from any “binding” commitments. Overall, the Kyoto Proto-
col did not come close to fulfilling its initial aspirations. The United States 
and Australia did not ratify; Canada, Japan, and Russia eventually dropped 
out; and individual compliance was at best spotty.16 Furthermore, and per-
haps most distressingly, non-Annex I countries did not formally agree to 
any actual future “binding” commitments going forward from 2012. The 
Kyoto experience is subject to multiple interpretations. For me, it largely 
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testifies to the great difficulty of negotiating binding international quantity 
caps on the major emitters. In the language employed here, it has been 
overwhelmingly problematic to assign binding quantity-like distributional 
coefficients on a worldwide basis. The Paris COP21 agreement of December 
2015 “solved” this problem only by making all targets completely volun-
tary as “intended nationally determined contributions.” In COP21, there 
was no pressure for nations to cut back emissions by 5% or any other uni-
form amount.
Other seemingly symmetric quantity formulas might also be examined. 
For example, one might entertain the idea of assigning the same world-
wide emissions level per capita. This symmetric formula embodies a cer-
tain concept of worldwide fairness, but a cap-and-trade system based on 
such an initial distribution of caps would involve massive transfers from 
the developed to the developing countries, which would likely prove politi-
cally unacceptable. Besides, even this formula does not address concerns 
regarding historical responsibility for the cumulative stock of emissions, 
which would surely be raised. Alternatively, one might imagine negotiating 
(or even voting on) an identical percentage reduction from some base case 
of emissions. In this situation, I think everyone would first argue about the 
fairness of the baseline emissions that they were initially assigned.
I abstain from further speculation. My point here is that no matter 
what quantity-like initial allocation mechanism I can imagine, an attempt 
to modify an international cap-and-trade system by making it one dimen-
sional seems likely to founder for essentially the same reasons that an 
unmodified international cap-and-trade system founders. In a quantity-
based system with n different sovereign nations, I fear there will be intrac-
table negotiations for n different distributional assignments (ai, bi), with 
no force countervailing each nation’s free-riding desire to secure for itself a 
selfishly lenient emissions fraction of the total emissions E.17
Here is what I think is the essence of the one-price versus n-quantities 
negotiation problem as elaborated in this section. A quantity-type system 
based on a formula like Ei(E) = ai + biE involves two layers of negotiations. 
First, the n parties must agree on the quantity-like distributional coeffi-
cients (ai, bi).Second, the parties must agree on the single worldwide aggre-
gate level of emissions E. By contrast, a price-based system involves only 
one layer of negotiation, focused on agreeing to a single one-dimensional 
uniform price p. The latter is not an easy task, but it would seem generally 
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easier to negotiate one price layer than two quantity layers (whose first 
layer involves assigning n quantity-like distributional coefficients). Admit-
tedly, this argument depends on a particular way of framing the issue, but it 
seems to me that, in international negotiations among n sovereign nations, 
there may be an irreducible asymmetry between one price instrument ver-
sus n quantity instruments.
While acknowledging that it only involves one layer of negotiations (as 
opposed to two on the quantity side), one could ask on the price side what 
might induce n countries to agree to a single harmonized charge for car-
bon emissions. We have been over this ground before. If climate change 
becomes sufficiently threatening on a grassroots level, then public opinion 
may support relinquishing some national sovereignty over carbon emis-
sions in favor of the greater good of binding, enforceable international 
agreements. It all begins with the recognition that any resolution of the 
global warming free-rider problem requires a collective commitment to 
some binding restriction on the sovereign right of nations to freely emit 
as much carbon dioxide as they wish. Why might nations restrict their 
own sovereignty by collectively committing to a common price regime 
for resolving the global warming externality? Perhaps because enough of 
them come to realize (or are made to realize) that the international climate-
change public good is sufficiently important to outweigh national rights 
to pollute the global commons—and that a radical collective problem may 
call for a radical collective solution. Without such a realization and the 
will to act on it, progress on resolving the global warming externality will 
be limited to voluntary altruism, which seems to me not nearly enough to 
overcome the free-rider problem.
Concluding Remarks
At the end of the day, there is no air-tight logic in favor of a negotiated price 
over negotiated quantities, only a series of partial arguments. One argument 
is that the revenues from a tax-like carbon price are nationally collected, 
so that the contentious distributional side is somewhat hidden, and there 
is at least the appearance of fairness as measured by equality of marginal 
effort. A second desirable feature, I have argued, is the natural salience and 
relatively low transaction costs of negotiating one price as against negotiat-
ing n quantities, which, although somewhat imprecise, is in my opinion 
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an important distinction. A third argument is the self-enforcement mecha-
nism that constitutes the main theme of this chapter, namely, the built-in 
countervailing force of an imposed uniform price of carbon, which tends 
to internalize the externality and gives national negotiators an incentive to 
offset their natural impulse to otherwise bargain for a low price.
Of necessity, my argument has been sprinkled with subjective judg-
ments. This, unfortunately, is the nature of the subject. To repeat yet again, 
this time after examining somewhat more carefully the alternatives, I judge 
it difficult to escape the conclusion that, in the context of an international 
treaty that covers all major emitters, it is more politically acceptable and 
it comes closer to a social optimum to negotiate one binding price than n 
binding quantities or quantity-like distributional coefficients.
My argument here is sufficiently abstract that it is open to enormous 
amounts of criticism on many different levels. There are so many poten-
tial complaints that it would be incongruous to list them all and attempt 
to address them one by one. These potential criticisms notwithstanding, I 
believe the argument here is exposing a fundamental countervailing-force 
argument that deserves to be highlighted.
Because the formulation is at such a high level of abstraction, it has 
blurred the distinction between a carbon price and a carbon tax. As previ-
ously noted, the important thing is acquiescence by each nation to a binding 
minimum price on carbon emissions, not the particular internal mechanism 
by which this obligation is met. A system of national carbon taxes with 
revenues kept in the taxing country is a relatively simple and transparent 
way to achieve internationally harmonized carbon prices. But it is not abso-
lutely necessary for the conclusions of this chapter. In principle, nations or 
regions could meet the obligation of a minimum price on carbon emissions 
by whatever internal mechanism they choose—a tax, a cap-and-trade sys-
tem with a tax floor, some other hybrid system, or whatever else results in 
an observable price of carbon above the uniform minimum.18
Of course any nation or region could choose to impose a carbon tax or 
price above the international minimum. The hope is that even a low posi-
tive initial value of a universal minimum carbon tax or price could be useful 
for gaining confidence and building trust in this price-based international 
architecture.
The purpose of this chapter is primarily expository and exploratory. Any 
proposal to resolve the global warming externality will face a seemingly 
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overwhelming array of practical administrative obstacles and will need to 
overcome powerful vested interests. That is the nature of the global warm-
ing externality problem. The theory of this chapter seems to suggest that 
negotiating a uniform minimum price on carbon can have several desirable 
properties, including, especially, helping to internalize the global warming 
externality. To fully defend the relative “practicality” of what I am propos-
ing would probably require a book not a chapter. In any event, this article is 
not primarily about practical considerations of international negotiations. 
I leave that important task mostly to others.19 However, I do want to men-
tion just a few real-world considerations that have been left out of my men-
tal model yet seem especially pertinent.
An example of a relatively small practical issue that I am waving aside 
is just where in the production chain a carbon price should be collected. I 
think the presumption would be that the carbon price should be collected 
by the country in which the carbon dioxide is actually released into the 
atmosphere. One might try to argue that a carbon price should be collected 
downstream as close as possible to the point where the carbon is burned. 
But this would involve an impractically large number of collection points. 
It is much easier to collect the price upstream at various chokepoints where 
the carbon is first introduced into the carbon-burning economy.20
A truly critical issue is that a binding international agreement on a 
uniform minimum carbon tax or price requires some serious compliance 
mechanism. To begin with, the carbon price must be observable. For 
enforcement, perhaps there is no practical alternative to using the inter-
national trading system for applying tariff-based penalties on imports 
from noncomplying nations. Nordhaus (2015) advocates such an approach 
with uniform border tariffs on imports from nonmember countries 
imposed by a “Climate Club” of member nations who agree to impose a 
harmonized carbon price on themselves. Cooper (2010) has argued for an 
expansive interpretation, whereby the internationally agreed charge on 
carbon emissions would be considered a cost of doing business, such that 
failure to pay the charge would be treated as a subsidy that is subject 
to countervailing duties under existing provisions of the World Trade 
Organization.21
An efficient carbon price naturally produces more winners than losers 
(by the metric of the modified Pareto criterion). In the case of the global 
warming externality, which has been characterized as the greatest public 
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goods problem of all time, it seems reasonable to suppose that there might 
be many times more winners than losers from imposing a uniform carbon 
price. Because countries here get to keep their own carbon price-generated 
revenues, welfare-compensating transfers, to the extent that they are made 
at all, should, at least for small changes, be relatively modest second-order, 
deadweight-loss triangles instead of the relatively immodest first-order rect-
angle transfers associated with tradable permits from, say, an initial assign-
ment of caps that are equal per capita.22
I close by noting again that global warming is an extremely serious 
as-yet-unresolved international public goods problem. With the failure 
of a Kyoto-style quantity-based approach, the world has seemingly given 
up on a comprehensive global design, settling instead in the 2015 Paris 
COP21 agreement for completely voluntary and sporadic national, subna-
tional, and regional “contributions.” These partial measures seem far from 
constituting a socially efficient response to the global warming external-
ity. Perhaps, as previously suggested, a quantity-based focus on negotiating 
emissions caps embodies a bad design flaw. The arguments of this chapter 
suggest a way in which negotiating a binding internationally harmonized, 
nationally collected minimum tax or price on carbon emissions might help 
to internalize the global warming externality by empowering an “I will if 
you will”approach.
Notes
1. One ton of carbon equals 3.67 tons of carbon dioxide. My default unit is carbon 
dioxide (CO2).
2. For more about the coherence of this quid-pro-quo mechanism, see chapters 2 
and 4.
3. Global Warming Gridlock is the title of a book by David Victor (2011), who popu-
larized the phrase. For more information on the Kyoto Protocol, see the Wikipedia 
entry for “Kyoto Protocol” and the many other references cited there. For more 
information on the Paris COP21 Accords, see the Wikipedia entry for “Paris Agree-
ment” and the many other references cited there.
4. There is actually a fair-sized literature on a carbon-tax (or carbon-price) approach 
(see e.g., Cooper, 2010; Cramton and Stoft, 2012; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009; 
Nordhaus, 2007, 2013; and the many further references cited in these works).
5. See Hoel and Karp (2002), Pizer (1999), and Weitzman (1974).
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6. Of course, persuading nations to commit to negotiating a uniform price of carbon 
in the first place might well involve some “green-fund” equity transfers. Because the 
imposed “carbon tax” is internally retained within each nation, then at least for 
small changes, the green-fund transfers needed to offset increased costs of compli-
ance for price changes are deadweight-loss, second-order Harberger triangles of the 
relatively modest form (ΔP × ΔQ)/2. The corresponding international transfers in a 
cap-and-trade system (which can be either positive or negative, depending, among 
other things, on initial cap assignments) are first-order immodest rectangles of the 
form P × ΔQ.
7. For a critical review of carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade for carbon emissions, 
see Goulder and Schein (2013) and the many further references they cite.
8. See Goulder et al. (2010) and the further cited references therein.
9. One could try to argue that binding green-fund equity payments are required to 
get n countries to agree in the first place to negotiate a uniform carbon price, also 
representing an n-dimensional problem. However, footnotes 5 and 7 suggest that 
the required green-fund payments may be smaller than the absolute value of the 
(positive or negative) transfers involved in a cap-and-trade regime that starts off, say, 
with equal per capita permit assignments. Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (chapter 
12, this volume) argue additionally that choosing a green-fund equity-payment for-
mula for a uniform price can be reduced to a one-dimensional focal problem.
10. See Schelling (1960). Also see the 2006 special issue of the Journal of Economic 
Psychology devoted to Schelling’s psychological decision theory, especially the intro-
duction by Colman (2006). Three of the seven articles in this issue concerned aspects 
of focal points, testifying to the lasting influence of the concept.
11. Coase (1960) did not invent or even use the term “transactions cost,” but he 
prominently employed the concept. For an application of the transactions cost 
approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions, see Libecap (2013).
12. Later I discuss negotiating one worldwide aggregate emissions cap (contingent on 
a previous-round subdivision formula for n fractional targets, set, for example, by a 
preceding agreement on various target reductions from various baselines). A system 
based on negotiating aggregate emissions (given a subdivision formula) could, in 
principle, embody countervailing force against the global warming externality. But 
again, I will conclude that negotiating the extra layer of n first-round Kyoto-like 
fractional subdivision target reductions will likely founder politically when applied 
on a worldwide scale.
13. See Weitzman (2014).
14. This approach is spelled out in more mathematical detail in Weitzman 
(2014).
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15. Admittedly, this is often done in a way that eases special-interest acceptance, 
such as being allocated for free or almost for free based on something like a uniform 
reduction of previous pollution levels.
16. The one bright spot might be considered the European Union (EU), whose emis-
sions trading system could perhaps be interpreted as evolving toward an EU-wide 
cap (declining annually) with member-state shares increasingly being determined by 
auctioning permits. I am unsure and somewhat skeptical about the extent to which 
this EU model might be extended to the world as a whole. For a generally favorable 
assessment of this possibility, see Ellerman (2010).
17. Bosetti and Frankel (2012) propose a constructive and imaginative allocation 
formula for emissions permits, but it still looks complicated and contentious to me.
18. A minimum carbon price could theoretically be attained in a cap-and-trade 
system by setting it as a floor, which could be enforced by making it a reserve price 
of permits actualized by a hypothetical international agency that buys up excess 
permits whenever the price falls below the floor. (Alas, such a mechanism invites 
its own free-rider problem because each nation has an incentive not to spend its 
own money but for other nations to spend their money to buy up excess permits.) 
Alternatively, a hypothetical worldwide consignment auction for carbon permits 
with a uniform reserve price might work in theory but seems highly impractical in 
practice. Again here, there is a marked distinction between the simplicity of a one-
dimensional price tax and the complexity of negotiating a n-dimensional quantity-
based binding agreement among n different nations.
19. See Bodansky (2010) or Barrett (2005).
20. This set of issues and its distributional consequences (including references to 
other literature) are discussed extensively in Asheim (2012).
21. See also the discussion of the legality of such sanctions under WTO provisions 
in Metcalf and Weisbach (2009).
22. Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (2015) make an analogous argument in the form 
of a numerical example indicating that committing to a price tends to be less risky 
than quantity targets. Thus, according to this reasoning, equity transfers under cap-
and-trade would have to be larger than equity transfers under a uniform price 
because of the increased risk imposed by caps. In a separate argument, they also 
indicate that choosing a particular green-fund equity-payment formula to encour-
age participation in a uniform price regime can be reduced from a seemingly 
n-dimensional to a one-dimensional focal problem.
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9 Climate Policy at an Impasse
Ottmar Edenhofer and Axel Ockenfels*
Global greenhouse gas emissions must decrease if climate change is to 
be slowed. Yet they are increasing and at an ever-faster pace. Despite the 
global economic crisis over the last decade, the growth rate of emissions 
has never been higher (IPCC, 2014b). At the same time, global population 
growth and the economic ambitions of emerging markets are proving to be 
a continually increasing challenge for climate policy. More than 20 years of 
negotiations and numerous summits have done little to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Unfortunately, the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris 
in 2015 is no exception (Cooper et al., chapter 1, this volume), and a major 
breakthrough is hardly in sight.
Climate change policy is at an impasse, and getting out of it will require 
an effective international climate agreement. For this to happen, policy-
makers must first agree on a realistic assessment. In the first part of this 
chapter, we present the climate problem and expose common misconcep-
tions regarding climate policy. In the second part, we propose solutions to 
overcoming the impasse, focusing in particular on Germany’s and Europe’s 
perspective.
Climate Change
Greenhouse gas emissions that have accumulated in the atmosphere are 
driving up the global mean temperature due to the greenhouse effect. The 
fact that this phenomenon is caused by the burning of coal, oil, and gas and 
deforestation (that has been ongoing since the onset of industrialization) is 
* Financial support of the German Research Foundation (DFG) through the Research 
Unit “Design & Behavior” (FOR 1371) is gratefully acknowledged.
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no longer scientifically disputed (IPCC, 2013). This global increase in tem-
perature has negative impacts. However, considerable uncertainties exist 
as to how these impacts are distributed across different regions, as well as 
their frequency and severity. This means that science does not know exactly 
what will happen. Some argue that, deeming certain findings to be too 
unreliable to allow for definitive conclusions, climate policy should abstain 
from recommending any and all courses of action. Yet such an approach 
is imprudent. Climate policy is inherently risk management; although a 
given scenario may be too pessimistic, it could just as well be too optimistic. 
Thus, a more rational approach would be to take precautions to attenuate 
the risk of catastrophic damage (Edenhofer et al., 2015a). In that sense, 
climate policy could be seen as a type of insurance, such as disability, fire, 
or health insurance.
One can distinguish between two classes of uncertainty in the climate 
debate. The first concerns uncertainty about the consequences of climate 
change, the frequency and intensity of which increases gradually. Weather 
events such as droughts, floods, and crop failures belong to this class. The 
second class concerns uncertainty about how or when the climate may 
trigger more abrupt types of damages to the Earth system––damages that, 
once triggered, are irreversible for any length of time and can impact the 
human species (Edenhofer et al., 2015a). The melting of the Antarctic and 
the Greenland ice sheet, the loss of the Amazon rainforest and its trans-
formation from a net carbon sink into a carbon source, and the change in 
the monsoon dynamics in China and India are all examples of events that 
have potentially irreversible physical, social, and economic consequences 
(IPCC, 2014a).
The amount of CO2 stored in the atmosphere is contributing to the 
increase in the global mean temperature and thereby to irreversible cli-
mate change. This can be expressed in terms of fundamental atmospheric 
scarcity.
The Atmosphere and the Fundamental Scarcity Problem
Humankind uses the atmosphere as a dumping ground for greenhouse 
gases. This is understandable because the use of the atmosphere is still free 
of charge. Yet as a storage site, the atmosphere is limited. Because its stor-
age space has thus far been free, it has been overused, resulting in increased 
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climate change. The same overuse phenomenon can be observed in tradi-
tional local commons in the mountains or with protected fisheries.
From this follows a fundamental insight: climate policy must be judged 
above all by whether it succeeds in limiting greenhouse gas emissions, 
thereby protecting the limited space remaining in the atmosphere from 
overuse. The scale of this challenge becomes evident when considering 
how small the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb additional greenhouse gases 
actually is. The world may only emit roughly another 1,000 gigatons of 
CO2 if it is to—with a probability of at least 66%—meet the goal of staying 
below a 2°C global mean temperature increase (IPCC, 2014c). If annual 
emissions stay at their present levels, then the remaining carbon budget 
will be exhausted within the next 20 to 30 years. To use the remaining 
budget in a cost-efficient way, annual greenhouse gas emissions would 
have to be reduced by between 40% and 70% by 2050. Toward the end 
of the century, emissions would have to decrease approximately to zero. 
Eventually, the world will probably have to rely on technologies that are 
able to withdraw more carbon from the atmosphere than they emit (IPCC, 
2014c).
The significance of these figures, beyond indicating the limited carbon 
storage capacity of the atmosphere, reaches another dimension altogether 
when juxtaposing them to the approximately 16,000 gigatons of CO2 that 
the Earth still has in the form of fossil resources and reserves. In other 
words, the supply of carbon is many times greater than the capacity of 
the atmosphere to absorb it. This fact is of critical importance, even if ris-
ing prices for carbon fuels may slow the pace at which these resources are 
extracted from the ground.
The European environmental movement and the public at large appear 
to believe that (1) there is an impending shortage of fossil fuels, and (2) this 
could solve the climate problem and justify or even force the restructuring 
of the energy supply. From a climate change perspective, the opposite is 
true. The supply of fossil fuels is not only large but it has even increased 
in the last two decades. Rising oil and gas prices have made investments in 
the exploration of new oil and gas fields profitable. The currently low price 
of oil is slowing such investments temporarily. However, this will not lead 
to a permanent restriction of further investments in exploration because 
fossil fuel prices are anticipated to increase in the long run. At the same 
time, technological progress in the exploration and production of fossil 
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fuels has been dramatically underestimated. The so-called shale gas revolu-
tion in the United States has contributed to an additional supply of gas and 
a decline in the price of coal. As a result of such developments, the global 
economy is in the midst of the largest coal renaissance since the beginning 
of industrialization.
The Coal Renaissance
The community concerned with climate change sometimes hopes that 
zero-emission technologies will become cheap so quickly that it will no 
longer be worthwhile to continue extracting fossil fuels, especially coal, 
in large quantities. This hope is deceptive. Renewable energies are not 
cost-efficient to the point that the extraction of coal would be no longer 
attractive. It is true that wind power, when generated in locations with 
a strong resource, has already reached the same cost level as electricity 
generated from coal. However, when the fluctuation of wind power is fac-
tored in, additional system costs make wind more expensive. The costs of 
fluctuation increase as larger shares of wind power are integrated in the 
grid (Hirth et al., 2015; Ueckerdt et al., 2013). The same is true for solar 
energy. Thus, although further breakthroughs in renewable energies can 
be expected, they are unlikely to make the use of coal unprofitable in one 
fell swoop.
Instead, the world is witnessing a breathtaking coal renaissance (Steckel 
et al., 2015). Between 2005 and 2013, three times as many coal power 
plants were built worldwide than in any previous decade. Since 2010, five 
Chinese provinces alone built more new coal power facilities than any 
other country. The focus on coal in China has since slowed. However, in 
India and other rapidly emerging countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, 
the construction of new coal power plants is in full force. Even in Europe, 
including Turkey, additional new coal capacities are planned. Africa is also 
investing in this form of energy. Worldwide, about 1,000 gigawatts of coal 
power capacity are currently in the planning stage (Edenhofer, 2015). If 
only one-third of this capacity is built, then an additional 100 gigatons of 
CO2 would be dumped into the atmosphere over the lifespan of these facili-
ties in the next 40 years. The existing infrastructure will already emit more 
than 700 gigatons of CO2 in the coming decades. These figures show how 
incongruous climate policy targets can be with reality: the coal renaissance 
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alone threatens to use up all of the atmosphere’s remaining carbon storage 
capacity (Edenhofer, 2015).
A Reasonable Climate Protection Target
This enormous challenge raises the question of whether the 2°C target is 
a reasonable and achievable goal. The answer is yes. Given the uncertain-
ties about the costs and benefits of avoiding emissions, and the evaluation 
of those uncertainties in terms of distribution and discounting issues, the 
2°C target corresponds to the precautionary principle. Many studies that 
attempt to quantify the various risks arrive at temperature targets between 
2°C and 3°C. There are also analyses that argue—in light of the irrevers-
ible risks—for a limit well below 2°C. Given that climate change may also 
trigger abrupt and catastrophic damage to the Earth’s system, robust and 
meaningful cost–benefit analyses are hardly possible (Weitzman, 2011).
Commitment to the 2°C target appears to be a precautionary and prag-
matic compromise that considers both the normative conflicts and the sci-
entific uncertainties. It calls for the rapid adoption and implementation of 
an effective climate policy, although care must be taken that achieving the 
2°C target does not put an intolerable burden on present and future genera-
tions. This can be done but only if an appropriate climate policy is adopted 
and the necessary technologies are sufficiently available.
According to current knowledge, the 2°C goal can be achieved through 
substantial improvements in energy efficiency, a three- to four-fold 
increase in the share of low-carbon technologies by 2050 (including renew-
able energy and nuclear energy), the use of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS), and the use of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). 
Reforestation and the use of BECCS are important measures for removing 
CO2 from the atmosphere over the long term. Some of these technologies 
are controversial and not without risks (Edenhofer et al., 2015a; IPCC, 
2014b).
With such packages of mitigation options, the cost of remaining below 
the 2°C threshold can be kept in check even without major technological 
breakthroughs in the next few decades. The IPCC has assessed all cost stud-
ies on climate change in recent years and concluded that reaching the 2°C 
target would most likely decelerate economic growth by only 1.5% per year 
from now until 2050.
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An Effective Climate Policy
Thus far, the use of the atmosphere as a dumping ground has been largely 
free of costs, although this causes damages. The overuse of this space could 
be prevented if its use were associated with a fee. There is a broad consen-
sus among economists and beyond that emission fees are the best climate 
policy instrument because they make low CO2-emitting technologies more 
profitable and the burning of fossil fuels less attractive. In this way, emis-
sions can be effectively avoided at little cost. Such a price on carbon could 
be implemented through emissions trading or taxation. It creates scarcity 
where there was none and eliminates inefficiencies as well as the injustice 
of cost-free CO2 emissions. Carbon pricing is all the more pressing as fossil 
fuels are subsidized in many parts of the world today, to the extent that the 
average global carbon price is negative (Edenhofer, 2015). With such prices, 
there is no hope that global temperature rise can be kept within acceptable 
bounds.
Much of the climate debate revolves around indirect and complicated 
instruments. In Germany, renewable energies in the electricity sector are 
generously subsidized with feed-in tariffs. However, this path leads in the 
wrong direction as countless opportunities to advance efficient climate pro-
tection are missed. A carbon price that increases over the long term would 
impact all relevant decisions in an effective, transparent, and fair man-
ner. Every measure in favor of climate protection—from a homeowner’s 
decision to install a new heating system, to investments in renewables, to 
pioneering research in battery technology—is equally encouraged with a 
carbon price and the resulting incentives and market forces. With subsidies, 
by contrast, politics determines the winners and losers. Renewable energy 
subsidies in the German electricity sector do not avoid any CO2 emissions 
beyond what is already accomplished by the EU Emissions Trading System. 
In an emissions trading scheme, a fixed number of allowances for emitting 
one ton of CO2 are traded. For example, if a coal power plant emits one 
ton of CO2 less due to additional power supplied by a wind power plant, 
the overall system is left with an allowance to emit one ton of CO2. This 
allowance is sold at a profit to another user, whereby the total amount 
of emissions remains the same throughout Europe. Because the supply of 
allowances within the market is capped by means of political regulations, 
the demand for allowances dropped because of the additional supply of 
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renewables, which has in part led to a decline in prices in the European 
emissions market.
The price in the emissions trading scheme is also influenced by many 
other factors. After 2008, the main reason for the drastic CO2 price decline 
was primarily the financial crisis: actual emissions have since even been 
below the permitted ceiling. Because the European Commission could not 
decide to take the surplus of permits off the market, traders began assum-
ing that the European emissions market would not necessarily experience 
significant shortages until 2020. Traders were even skeptical of European 
Commission announcements that the upper ceiling would be continuously 
lowered in the long term, with the consequence that future European emis-
sions allowance prices for 2020 have collapsed as well (Edenhofer et al., 
2015b).
One consequence of this price collapse is that the relatively clean but 
expensive gas power plants have been pushed out of the electricity mar-
ket, whereas the relatively cheap but environmentally harmful coal power 
plants have proliferated. This and other undesirable consequences of low 
CO2 prices and indirect climate policies have led to an unmanageable patch-
work of politically motivated attempts at reform and many other costly 
subsidies. Despite all efforts and financial expenditures, the German energy 
transition has not effectively taken place to date. The share of renewable 
energy has risen, but this has not led to a significant decline in greenhouse 
gas emissions.
It is often argued that a carbon price creates undue competitive dis-
advantages when compared with measures implemented in the German 
energy transition. The opposite is true. A carbon price not only reduces 
costs but also generates revenues that could be used to offset politically 
undesired outcomes and burdens. As we shall see, a carbon price will also 
likely be a condition in any agreement that seeks to protect participants 
against free-riders at the international scale. As a result, a carbon price can 
massively reduce the competitive disadvantages arising in Germany from 
subsidizing renewables.
Without a substantial carbon price, effective climate protection is 
unthinkable, and the German energy transition will fall short of its goal. 
To avoid any misunderstandings, renewable energy will surely play an 
important role in climate protection, and research in this area is certainly 
recommendable. The problem arises in the conviction that the large-scale 
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subsidization of renewables is equally justified and effective in mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions as the direct pricing of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The German energy transition is a showcase of this phenomenon.
Paris and the Climate Policy Challenge
It is undisputable that unabated climate change is likely to have dramatic 
consequences for humanity. Governments are striving for a reasonable cli-
mate target, and the economic instruments with which such a target can 
be effectively and efficiently achieved without causing unwarranted burden 
are well understood. What, then, is the problem? The central challenge of 
climate policy is to discipline free-riders throughout the world in their use 
of the atmosphere as a dumping ground (MacKay et al., 2015; Cramton et 
al., chapter 4, this volume; Cramton, Ockenfels, and Tirole, 2017). Why 
should one country spend major sums of money on climate protection if 
it stands to gain only a fraction of the benefits of those efforts? Let the 
others do some work! Canada intends to continue exploiting the tar sands 
in Alberta; many African countries are hoping to become net exporters of 
oil within the next decade; China and India are building new coal power 
plants to keep up with growth, challenged only by local environmental 
protests; and the United States is focusing on shale gas, which may reduce 
domestic emissions but will lead to rising coal exports.
In Europe, greenhouse gas emissions generated from domestic produc-
tion have dropped (IPCC, 2014b). However, emissions generated from 
European consumption have risen due to its net imports of emissions from 
China. China has become the workshop of the world, as well as the largest 
net exporter of CO2 emissions (Jakob and Marschinski, 2012; Jakob et al., 
2014; Peters et al., 2007). Thus, although decreasing greenhouse gas emis-
sions in Europe may ease the European conscience, this plays no significant 
role at the global scale.
International cooperation has not made significant progress thus far 
(Cramton et al., chapter 12, this volume). At present, climate talks are based 
on the principle that each state defines for itself what efforts it wants to 
contribute to climate protection. However, the climate challenge cannot be 
solved with a patchwork of nonaligned commitments.
In Paris, many countries announced their respective climate commit-
ments for the 2030 time horizon. These pledges, despite being delivered 
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with strategic optimism, are sobering. Calculations show that the various 
countries’ pledges, taken together, will continue to lead to rising emissions 
and miss the efficient path to 2°C target by far. Not surprisingly, politi-
cians and climate diplomats sketch more positive pictures of the outcome 
of Paris, but those pictures are almost entirely based on assumptions about 
what happens after 2030. Because there are no pledges for the period after 
2030, many scenarios are conceivable. Although the aim of the Paris cli-
mate conference was to insist that each country also commit to gradually 
increase individual contributions after 2030, it remains completely unclear 
how this may be actually negotiated and implemented. The only serious 
hint about what comes after 2030 that is not based on speculation and 
wishful thinking comes from cooperation research. This research suggests 
that without a shared commitment, cooperation would be rather fragile 
and eventually collapse even if it were to start out with several forceful con-
tributions (Brosig et al., 2003; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 1990, 2009). Anyone 
who has ever participated in climate negotiations and monitored the devel-
opments after Kyoto would realistically agree. New mechanisms are needed 
to solve the cooperation problem.
Toward a Common Price Target
There are two underlying principles that are put forward throughout most 
of this book and explained in more detail in other chapters: (1) pricing 
carbon is the most effective policy to curb emissions, and (2) reciprocity is 
the most effective policy to promote international cooperation. The good 
news is that these two fundamental principles, which are concluded from 
two different research agendas, can be knotted together to fix the broken 
climate negotiations.
The key to understand this is that a shared commitment is needed to 
promote cooperation among countries. Only if countries have a common 
understanding of what can be expected from others and from themselves 
can they be protected against exploitation by free-riders. The common 
commitment binds a country only to the extent that other countries 
also live up to the agreement. This kind of reciprocity creates incentives 
for cooperation and, ultimately, mutual trust (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Bowles and Gintis, 2013; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Kosfeld et al., 2009; 
Kraft-Todd et al., 2015; Ostrom, 1998, 1990).
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As explained thoroughly elsewhere in this book, a quantity commit-
ment, which distributes the global carbon budget across countries, has 
proved infeasible. Although it is relatively easy to agree on a global emis-
sions target, the breakdown of this global goal into national obligations is 
simply impossible. Entitlement to a higher carbon budget essentially rep-
resents money in the form of valuable carbon credits. In such a context, 
during negotiations about the global emissions target, countries try to find 
ways to maximize their respective budgets, which leads to an inflation of 
the overall carbon budget––producing the opposite of the expected out-
come. In practice, at no point in time were participating countries able to 
agree on a distribution of the carbon budget or even a distribution prin-
ciple. The underlying reasons for the failure of quantity commitments have 
nothing to do with uncertainty about the carbon budget: Even if the “opti-
mal” carbon budget would be known with certainty in the future, negotia-
tors would be unable to distribute the budget among all countries because 
of inherent free-riding and fairness issues. That is, what might seem obvi-
ous from a climate science perspective can be a complete failure from the 
perspective of incentive and negotiation design.
A global price target such as an internationally agreed minimum carbon 
price, however, can do the trick. A carbon price could be negotiated such 
that it is consistent with the 2°C objective. It could also be flexibly adapted 
as uncertainties about costs and damages are resolved. At the national level, 
the price target could then be achieved in a flexible way, for example, by 
means of emissions trading schemes or fuel taxes.
An international minimum price target has many advantages, most of 
which are described in various chapters in this book. For instance, because 
the burden created by a price target is proportional to the emissions pro-
duced, it is also proportional to a country’s level of development. Com-
pared with quantity targets, a price target carries fewer financial risks for 
individual countries because business-as-usual emissions and abatement 
costs are both highly uncertain. A price instrument such as a global mini-
mum price for CO2 also allows the efforts of different countries to be mea-
sured and made comparable. In this way, shared commitment allows for a 
system of reciprocal rewards and punishments that are essential for stable 
cooperation: “I will cooperate for as long as the others are also sticking 
to our shared commitment.” All experiences with negotiations concerning 
climate protection (as well as countless other field and laboratory contexts) 
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strongly demonstrate the ubiquitous importance of the principle of reci-
procity for stable cooperation. Only when the international community 
can agree on a shared and comparable benchmark of climate protection 
efforts can cooperation be rewarded and free-riding disciplined.
How the Burden Could Be Distributed
Although a price target reduces the barriers to a joint international com-
mitment, not all countries will want to agree on an ambitious price target. 
Some poorer countries are, for understandable reasons, focused on poverty 
alleviation or rapid growth, whereas other countries stand to lose consid-
erable revenues from the sale of coal, oil, and gas. Thus, we support the 
proposal to implement the Green Climate Fund, which collects money 
with the purpose of realizing an international climate policy, generating 
incentives for ambitious price targets. In this way, the Fund could reward 
cooperation while taking into account differences in costs and willingness 
to pay for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Recent research suggests 
that strategically selected distribution mechanisms of the Green Climate 
Fund could allow the establishment of an ambitious global minimum price 
target on which all countries would voluntarily agree (Cramton and Stoft, 
2012). This global minimum price is associated with transfer payments that 
induce a politically acceptable redistribution of funds from rich to poor 
(Cramton et al., chapter 12, this volume; Kornek and Edenhofer, 2015; 
Roolfs et al., 2015).
A global minimum carbon price that is implemented by national gov-
ernments (e.g., as tax or an emissions trading system) leads to revenues that 
can be used to invest in local infrastructure, lower distortionary taxes (espe-
cially for low-income groups), and reduce government debt. Even with-
out consideration of the climate, it would be better to generate revenue 
for a country through the correction of inefficient scarcity indicators than 
through distortionary taxes on labor income. This would also invalidate 
the frequently made objection that climate protection and poverty reduc-
tion are mutually exclusive. Especially in emerging markets, carbon pricing 
could mobilize means with which to make investments in the provision of 
clean water, sanitation, roads, and mobile networks.
An ambitious carbon price drives a wedge between the revenues gen-
erated by countries supplying fossil fuels and the revenues generated 
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by consumer states. Essentially, profits generated by those who produce 
fossil fuels are funneled to countries with carbon prices (Franks et al., 
2015). Could carbon prices give supplier states an incentive to get coal, oil, 
and gas out of the ground more quickly to circumvent the impending loss 
of revenues from their own resources? This so-called Green Paradox effect 
can be prevented if the rate at which the carbon price increases is slower 
than that of the long-term interest rate in the capital market (Edenhofer 
and Kalkuhl, 2011). Countries with coal, oil, and gas reserves would then 
no longer have an incentive to extract resources more quickly and profit-
ably invest the proceeds in the capital market. In this way, a carbon price 
would ensure that these resources are kept in the ground. A global carbon 
price gives nation-states, but also cities and communities, the leeway to 
design their own flexible climate policy. With a global minimum carbon 
price, additional efforts of a wide range of players would actually lead 
to global emissions reductions. These reductions would not be feasible in 
a global emissions trading scheme, where local efforts would not affect the 
global carbon budget and the corresponding certificate quantity—instead 
leading merely to additional emissions elsewhere. In other words, a mini-
mum carbon price does not induce a shift of emissions. The price remains 
unchanged by additional unilateral efforts.
Although climate policy requires global governance, it needs local 
solutions as well. Technical and social innovations are not made at mega-
conferences. International negotiations should provide a regulatory frame-
work that ensures local efforts and innovations are not meaningless or, 
worse, counterproductive. A commitment to a carbon price will accomplish 
this goal.
The European Emissions Trading Scheme and National Preferences
Should an agreement on a global minimum carbon price be made, to com-
ply with international obligations, common European climate policy would 
need to be reformed to adopt a minimum price within the EU Emissions 
Trading System. However, such a minimum price in the European emis-
sions market would be beneficial even prior to the introduction of a global 
carbon price agreement. First, the price decline in the European emissions 
market would not persist because traders can count on an increasing mini-
mum price for their carbon-free investments. Second, a minimum price 
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would give member states more leeway to implement their own climate 
policies. Countries with a greater willingness to pay for climate protection 
could express their preference for a more ambitious national climate policy 
without it leading to a mere shift of emissions. In Europe, Germany is pur-
suing its own climate change targets and is promoting renewable energy, 
but Sweden also has a national carbon tax, and the United Kingdom pro-
motes nuclear power plants. At present, these unilateral efforts only lead to 
a shift of emissions—a minimum price would ensure that additional emis-
sions are avoided (Edenhofer et al., 2015b).
Targeted transfer payments can facilitate ambitious international climate 
policy (including a minimum carbon price) in both international climate 
negotiations and the European Union. Transfer payments across European 
countries can even facilitate the implementation of a European-wide mini-
mum CO2 price (Edenhofer et al., 2015b). Of course, the goal is to achieve 
a shared commitment beyond European borders. However, as a first step, 
this policy restructuring would get Europe out of its climate policy impasse. 
At the same time, Europe could demonstrate, as a multilateral laboratory, 
how to implement effective global climate protection. On the basis of this 
proposed structure, Europe could operate a smart, reciprocal pricing policy 
that would also help to get an international price target on its feet.
What’s Left to Do?
On the path to an ambitious, effective, and politically feasible global cli-
mate policy, many questions remain unanswered. For example, inter-
national climate negotiations will not be able to persuade all countries to 
back a given outcome. It would be a terrific breakthrough if, for a start, the 
largest emitters could agree on an initially modest carbon price target. This 
would constitute an effective climate policy instrument that would allow 
the community to act, gradually increase the carbon price, and adapt it 
to newly obtained knowledge. For this, it will be necessary for the public 
and governments to stand up against strong interest groups that benefit 
from the failure of international cooperation and the inefficiency of mas-
sive redistribution programs.
The basic principle of effective climate policy is simple, direct, and 
indispensable: those who emit CO2 have to pay. A carbon price generates 
adequate incentives for innovation and effectively reduces greenhouse gas 
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emissions. Luckily, this principle is fully in line with the basic principle 
of effective cooperation: reciprocity. A price target (unlike a quantity tar-
get) is an agreeable common commitment of the international community, 
which in turn is necessary for any reciprocity to evolve, thereby breaking 
the deadlock of failed climate negotiations. The international community 
is now facing perhaps the greatest dilemma of human history. Whether it 
can learn to collaborate and build trust or whether it will lose itself in an 
ineffective patchwork of self-centered actions will depend on whether it 
chooses to utilize or ignore these two fundamental principles of effective 
climate policy and human cooperation.
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10 Effective Institutions against Climate Change
Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole*
We are faced now with the fact that tomorrow is today. Over the bleached bones 
and jumble residues of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words “Too 
late.”
—Martin Luther King, New York, April 4, 1967
Climate Change Is a Global Commons Problem
Before discussing efficient institutions against climate change, let us restate 
the obvious.
We Must Put an End to the Waiting Game
If no strong collective action is undertaken soon, then climate change is 
expected to dramatically deteriorate the well-being of future generations. 
Although the precise consequences of our inaction are still hard to quantify, 
there is no question that a business-as-usual scenario would be catastrophic. 
The 5th Report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2014) estimates that the average tem-
perature would increase by somewhere between 2.5°C and 7.8°C by the end 
of this century, after having already increased by almost 1°C over the last 
century. Our emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) have never been larger 
than today. Limiting the increase in temperature to 2°C is thus an immense 
challenge, with a still increasing world population and, hopefully, more 
* We are grateful to François-Marie Bréon, Dominique Bureau, Bruno Bensasson, 
Frédéric Chevalier, Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, Christian de Perthuis, Steven 
Stoft, and Martin Weitzman for helpful comments. This chapter is an extended ver-
sion of another article, “Negotiating Effective Institutions Against Climate Change,” 
which appeared in Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
pages 5–27, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.cgol. Reproduced by 
permission of the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE).
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countries accessing Western standards of living. It will require radical trans-
formations in the way we use energy, heat and locate our houses, transport 
people, and produce goods and services.
Two “Good” Reasons for Inaction
Most benefits of mitigation are global and distant, whereas costs are local 
and immediate. The geographic and temporal dimensions of the climate 
problem account for the current inaction.
Climate change is a global commons problem. In the long run, most 
countries will benefit from a massive reduction in global emissions of 
GHGs, but individual incentives to do so are negligible. Most of the ben-
efits of a country’s efforts to reduce emissions go to the other countries. In 
Box 10.1
Past and Current Emissions of Anthropogenic CO2
Despite the emergence over the last three decades of solid scientific informa-
tion about the climate impacts of increased CO2 concentration in the atmo-
sphere, the world’s emissions of GHG have never been larger, rising from 30 
GtCO2eq/year in 1970 to 49 GtCO2eq/year in 2010. According to the IPCC, 
about half of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2010 
occurred during the last four decades, due mainly to economic and population 
growth and to the dearth of actions to fight climate change.







































Emissions of CO2 since 1750. 
Source: IPCC (2014).
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a nutshell, a country bears 100% of the cost of a green policy and receives, 
say, 1% of the benefits of the policy if the country has 1% of the popula-
tion and an average exposure to climate-related damages. Besides, most of 
these benefits, however small, do not accrue to current voters but to future 
generations.
Consequently, countries do not internalize the benefits of their mitigation 
strategies, emissions are high, and climate changes dramatically. The free-
rider problem is well known to generate the “tragedy of commons” (Hardin, 
1968), as illustrated by a myriad of case studies in other realms. When herd-
ers share a common parcel of land on which their herds graze, overgrazing 
is a standard outcome because each herder wants to reap the private benefit 
of an additional cow without taking account of the fact that what he gains is 
matched by someone else’s loss. Similarly, hunters and fishers do not inter-
nalize the social cost of their catches; overhunting and overfishing led to the 
extinction of species, from the Dodo of the island of Mauritius to the bears 
of the Pyrenees and the buffalos of the Great Plains. Diamond (2005) shows 
how deforestation on Easter Island led to the collapse of an entire civiliza-
tion. Other illustrations of the tragedy of commons can be found in water 
and air pollutions, traffic congestion, or international security.
Ostrom (1990) showed how small and stable communities are in some 
circumstances able to manage their local common resource to escape this 
tragedy, thanks to built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments 
for overuse. These informal procedures to control the free-rider prob-
lem are obviously not applicable to climate change, whose stakeholders 
include the 7 billion inhabitants currently living on this planet and their 
unborn descendants. Addressing the global externality problem is com-
plex because there is no supranational authority that could implement the 
standard internalization approach suggested by economic theory and often 
employed at the domestic level.1
A country or region that would contemplate a unilateral mitigation strat-
egy would be further discouraged by the presence of the so-called “carbon 
leakages.” Namely, imposing additional costs to high-emission domestic 
industries makes them noncompetitive. This tends to move production to 
less responsible countries, yielding an international redistribution of pro-
duction and wealth with negligible ecological benefit. Similarly, the reduc-
tion in demand for fossil energy originating from the virtuous countries 
tends to reduce their international price, thereby increasing the demand and 
emissions in nonvirtuous countries. This other carbon leakage also reduces 
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the net climate benefit of the effort made by any incomplete club of virtu-
ous countries. Its intertemporal version is called the green paradox. It states 
that a commitment to be green in the future leads oil producers to increase 
their production today to cater to today’s nonvirtuous consumers. Because 
carbon sequestration is not a mature technology, mitigation is a threat to the 
oil rent, and its owners should be expected to react to this threat.
We Must Accept That Climate Mitigation Is Costly in the Short Run
The good news is that an efficient international climate agreement will 
generate an important social surplus to be shared among the world’s citi-
zens. The political economy of climate change, however, is unfavorable: 
The costs of any such agreement are immediate whereas most benefits will 
occur in the distant future, mainly to people who are not born yet and a 
fortiori do not vote. In short, climate mitigation is a long-term investment. 
Many activists and politicians promote climate mitigation policies as an 
opportunity to boost “economic growth.” The fact that no country (with 
the exception of Sweden) comes remotely close to doing its share should 
speak volumes here: Why would countries sacrifice the consumption of 
goods and leisure to be environment-unfriendly? The reality is bleaker, in 
particular for economies in crisis and in the developing world. In reality, 
fighting climate change will imply reducing consumption in the short run 
to finance green investments that will generate a better environment only 
in the distant future. It diverts economic growth from consumption to 
investment, not good news for the well-being of the current poor. Carbon 
pricing, if implemented, will induce households to invest in photovoltaic 
panels on their roof or purchase expensive electric cars, actions that yield 
no obvious increase in their own well-being, to the detriment of spending 
the corresponding income on other goods.
To be certain, countries may perceive some limited “co-benefits” of 
climate-friendly policies. For example, green choices may also reduce emis-
sions of other pollutants (coal plants produce both CO2 and SO2, a regional 
pollutant); in a similar spirit, countries may encourage their residents to 
eat less red meat not so much from a concern about global warming but 
because they want to reduce the occurrence of cardiovascular diseases. Sub-
stituting dirty lignite by gas and oil as the main source of energy had enor-
mous sanitary and environmental benefits in Western countries after World 
War II, for example by eliminating smog from London. Therefore, some 
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Box 10.2
Climate Change and the Oil Rent
One of the most difficult challenges of climate change comes from the exis-
tence of a large fossil fuels rent currently owned by resource-rich countries. 
This rent exists because of the relative scarcity of the reserve of these non-
renewable resources and the expectation of a future exhaustion or at least 
steeply increasing marginal costs of extraction. The problem is that these 
reserves are large, as shown in figure 10.2. The cumulated consumption (dark 
blue) of gas, coal, and oil since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution 
has been quite limited compared with the stock of these resources. Adding 
consumption until the end of this century (light blue) in the business-as-
usual scenario will still leave most of the stock in the ground. The burning 
of the entire stock of fossil resources on this planet within the next two 
centuries or so would certainly devastate our planet by raising GHG concen-
tration way above the acceptable limits. If an efficient and a credible climate 
policy would be implemented one day, this would imply the annihilation of 
the fossil fuels rent. Its strategic and geopolitical consequences shed some 
light on the difficulty to reach an international agreement involving oil-rich 
countries.
Emitted to the Atmosphere
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Past consumption and current reserves of fossil fuels. 
Source: Figure 1.7 in IPCC (2011)—simplified by Working Group 3 Technical 
Support Unit.
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actions are to be expected from countries with an eye on national inter-
est only (not to mention the political benefits of placating domestic and 
international opinion). But these “zero ambition” actions (to use a phrase 
coined by Robert Stavins) will be insufficient to generate what it takes to 
keep global warming manageable.
Overall, fighting climate change yields short-term collective costs, 
thereby creating a political problem for benevolent decision makers who 
support an ambitious international agreement. To sum up, without a col-
lective incentive mechanism, one’s investment in a responsible mode of 
living will hardly benefit one’s well-being. Rather, and assuming away 
leakages, it will benefit distant generations who mostly will live in other 
countries. It is collectively efficient to act but individually optimal to do 
little.
A Uniform Carbon Price Is Necessary
Economic Approach versus Command-and-Control
As we have discussed, the core of the climate externality problem is that 
economic agents do not internalize the damages they impose on other 
economic agents when they emit GHGs. The approach2 that economists 
have long proposed to solve the free-rider problem consists of inducing 
economic agents to internalize the negative externalities they impose when 
they emit CO2 (“polluter pays principle”). This is done by pricing it at a level 
corresponding to the present value of the marginal damage associated with 
the emission and by forcing all emitters to pay this price. Because GHGs 
generate the same marginal damage regardless of the identity of the emitter 
and the nature and location of the activity that generated the emissions, all 
tons of CO2 should be priced equally. By imposing the same price to all eco-
nomic agents around the world, one would ensure that all actions to abate 
emissions that cost less than that price will be implemented. This least-cost 
approach guarantees that the reduction of emissions that is necessary to 
attain the global concentration objective will be made at the minimum 
global cost. In contrast with this economic approach, “command-and-
control” approaches (source-specific emissions limits, standards and tech-
nological requirements,3 uniform reductions, subsidies/taxes that are not 
based on actual pollution, vintage-differentiated regulations, industrial 
policy, etc.) usually create wide discrepancies in the implicit price of carbon 
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put on different emissions. This has been shown empirically to lead to sub-
stantial increases in the cost of environmental policies.
Western countries have made some attempts at reducing GHG emis-
sions, notably through direct subsidization of green technologies: generous 
feed-in electricity tariffs for solar and wind energy, bonus-malus systems 
favoring low-emission cars, subsidies to the biofuel industry, and so on. For 
each green policy, one can estimate its implicit carbon price (i.e., the social 
cost of the policy per ton of CO2 saved). A recent study by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2013) showed 
that these implicit prices vary widely across countries and also across sec-
tors within each country. In the electricity sector, OECD estimates range 
from less than 0 to 800 €. In the road transportation sector, the implicit 
carbon price can be as large as 1,000 €, in particular for biofuels. The high 
heterogeneity of implicit carbon prices in actual policymaking is a clear 
demonstration of the inefficiency of this command-and-control approach. 
Similarly, any global agreement that would not include all world regions in 
the climate coalition would exhibit the same inefficiency by setting a zero 
carbon price in nonparticipating countries.
Although economists are broadly suspicious of command-and-control 
policies for good reasons, they also understand that these policies may 
occasionally be a second-best solution when measurement or informational 
problems make direct pricing complex and/or when consumers discount 
the future too much. This is the classic justification for housing insulation 
standards for instance, but command-and-control is best avoided when 
feasible.
Carbon Pricing and Inequality
Income and wealth inequality at the domestic and international levels is 
often invoked to dismiss uniform carbon pricing. The problems raised by 
inequality around the world are ubiquitous in analyses of climate change, 
as discussed by Posner and Weisbach (2010). On the one hand, if poor 
people emit proportionally more CO2, carbon pricing will worsen inequal-
ity starting today (Cremer et al., 2003). On the other hand, poor people 
may also be more vulnerable to climate change, so reducing emissions 
will reduce inequalities in the future. However, because international and 
national credit markets are imperfect, poor people may face large discount 
rates, making them short-termist and focused on their immediate survival 
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to the detriment of the long-term climate risk. This means that the social 
cost of carbon will be smaller in these countries, even when accounting for 
future damages abroad.
International inequality raises the question of the allocation of the 
climate-mitigation burden. For example, the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility is redistributive because wealthier countries typi-
cally contribute more to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
This issue is certainly important, but its solution should not be found in 
a Kyoto Protocol-like manipulation of the law of a single carbon price. 
The non-Annex 1 parties of the Kyoto Treaty had no binding obligation, 
and their citizens faced no carbon price. This derailed the ratification 
of the protocol by the US Senate. The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) designed in Kyoto was aimed at alleviating the imperfect cover-
age problem; it met with limited success and anyway was not a satisfac-
tory approach due to yet another leakage problem. For example, Annex 1 
countries’ paying to protect a forest in a less developed country increases 
the price of whatever the deforestation would have allowed to sell (beef, 
soy, palm, or wood) and encourages deforestation elsewhere. The CDM 
mechanism also created the perverse incentive to build, or maintain in 
operation longer than planned, polluting plants to later claim CO2 credits 
for their reduction.4
The Kyoto Protocol’s attempted solution to the equity problem was to 
exonerate non-Annex 1 countries from carbon pricing. But using price dis-
tortions to reduce inequalities is always a second-best solution. Policies 
around the world that manipulate agricultural prices to support farmers’ 
incomes end up generating surpluses and highly inefficient productions. 
The same hazard affects climate policies if one lets redistributive consider-
ations influence carbon price signals to economic agents. At the national 
level, one should instead use the income tax system to redistribute income 
in a transparent way when this is possible. At the international level, one 
should organize lump-sum transfers to poor countries. This can be done 
by using the revenues generated by carbon pricing. Given that today we 
emit approximately 50 GtCO2 yearly, a carbon price at $40/tCO2 would 
generate a rent of $2,000 billion per year, or approximately 3% of the 
world GDP.
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Computing the Right Price Signals
Most infrastructure and R&D investments to reduce GHG emissions have 
in common that they are irreversible (sunk) costs and yield a delayed 
reduction of emissions over an extended time span. Energy retrofit pro-
grams for residential building reduce emissions for decades, and hydro-
electric power plans last for centuries. As a consequence, what triggers 
an investment in these sectors is not the current price of CO2 but the 
expectation of high prices in the future. The right price signal is thus 
given by an entire path of carbon prices. Two factors call for a carbon 
price that is increasing with time. First, if the damage function is convex, 
our inability to stabilize the concentration of CO2 within the next 100 
years would imply that the marginal climate damages of each ton of CO2 
will rise in the future. Second, if we impose a cap on GHG concentration 
in the atmosphere that we should never exceed, then the determination 
of the optimal emission path under this maximum quantity constraint is 
equivalent to the problem of the optimal extraction path of a nonrenew-
able resource. From Hotelling’s rule, the carbon price should then increase 
at the risk free rate (Chakravorty et al., 2006). Any climate policy must also 
address the various commitment and credibility problems associated with 
the fixation of the long-term carbon price schedule. This challenge is rein-
forced by the current uncertainties affecting the marginal damage func-
tion, the optimal GHG concentration target, and the speed at which green 
R&D will produce mature low-carbon energy technologies. This question 
is addressed later.
Over the last two decades, governments have commissioned estimates of 
the social cost of carbon (SCC). In France, the Commission Quinet (Quinet, 
2009) used a real discount rate of 4% and recommended a price of carbon 
(/tCO2) at 32 € in 2010, rising to 100 € in 2030 and between 150 € and 350 
€ in 2050. In the United States, the US Interagency Working Group (2013) 
proposed three different discount rates (2.5%, 3%, and 5%) to estimate the 
SCC. Using a 3% real discount rate, their estimation of the SCC is $32 in 
2010, rising to $52 and $71, respectively, in 2030 and 2050.
Two Economic Instruments for Price Coherence
Two prominent strategies for organizing an efficient, uniform pricing of 
CO2 emissions involve a carbon price and a cap-and-trade mechanism, 
respectively.5 Both proposals allow subsidiarity, and neither directly 
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Box 10.3
The Social Cost of Carbon
Although the fifth report of the IPCC (IPCC, 2014) does not contain much 
information about it, there is now a sizable literature on the social cost of 
carbon. To send the right signal to economic agents, the carbon price must 
be equal to the present value of the marginal damages generated by the 
emission of one more ton of CO2. Estimating the SCC is complex because 
most of these damages will materialize only in the distant future and are 
uncertain. The time and risk dimensions raise the problem of the choice of 
the discount rate. If future climate damages were statistically independent of 
world GDP growth, a relatively low real discount rate of 1% should be used 
to discount these damages to the present (Gollier, 2012; Weitzman, 1998, 
2001). However, most standard integrated assessment models such as the 
DICE model are such that climate damages are positively linked to consump-
tion growth (Dietz et al., 2015). For example, Nordhaus (2011) uses the out-
come of Monte-Carlo simulations of the RICE-2011 model with 16 sources of 
uncertainty to conclude that “those states in which the global temperature 
increase is particularly high are also ones in which we are on average richer in 
the future.” Using technical terms from finance theory, this implies that the 
climate consumption-based CAPM beta is positive and the relevant climate 
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Density function for the SCC (in $/tC). 
Source: Nordhaus (2011).
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concerns national taxes or national cap-and-trade. Both rely on an inter-
national agreement that is reasonably encompassing and therefore on an “I 
will if you will” approach discussed in this book. They both require some 
strategy for enforcement; indeed, the implementation of credible and trans-
parent mechanisms to measure emissions is a prerequisite to any efficient 
approach to climate change mitigation or, for that matter, to any policy.
Carbon price Under the first strategy, a minimum average price by coun-
try on all emissions around the world would be agreed on and collected 
by individual countries. All countries would be using the same price for 
GHG emissions.6 The carbon price of a country would be computed as 
the carbon revenue divided by the country’s emissions; the price could 
correspond to a carbon tax7 in the special case of a taxation approach, but 
quite generally it could emerge from a variety of policies (tax, cap-and-
trade, standards, etc.). Indeed, not all emissions in practice are subject to 
a carbon tax or Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) price. As Cooper (chapter 
5, this volume) notes, less than half of the European emissions are subject 
to EU ETS trading.
An international negotiation on a global carbon price has the advantage 
of linking each region’s mitigation effort to the efforts of the other regions. 
As explained in Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (chapter 12, this volume) 
and Weitzman (chapter 8, this volume), each country will internalize in 
its vote for the level of a uniform price the positive impact of a larger equi-
librium price on the global reduction of emissions, thereby raising the 
potential ambition of the international agreement. Under this scheme, a 
supranational supervision of the national carbon-pricing requirement at 
discount rate is closer to the mean return of equity than the risk-free rate 
(Gollier, 2014).
To illustrate the uncertainty affecting the SCC, we reproduce in figure 10.3 
an analysis performed by Nordhaus (2011). He used his RICE integrated assess-
ment model with uncertain parameters related to the discount rate and the 
climate sensitiveness. Figure 10.3 reproduces the density function for the SCC 
of 2015, expressed in dollar per ton of carbon. Notice that 1 ton of carbon 
generates 3.7 tons of CO2, so that the Nordhaus’s mean estimate of the SCC 
at $44/tC corresponds to $12/tCO2, which is considered relatively small com-
pared with other estimates existing in the literature.
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the internationally agreed level is thus necessary, as we discuss later. The 
compensation issue would be dealt with through a green fund.
Cap-and-trade Under the alternative cap-and-trade strategy, the agreement 
would specify a worldwide, predetermined number (the cap) of tradable 
emission permits. The tradability of these permits would ensure that coun-
tries face the same carbon price, emerging from mutually advantageous 
trades on the market for permits; the cross-country price here would not 
result from an agreed-on price of carbon but rather from clearing in this 
market. To address compensation, permits would be initially allocated to 
the different countries or regions, with an eye on getting all countries on 
board (redistribution).
Failed or Unsatisfactory Attempts at Pushing the Economic Approach
The cap-and-trade system was adopted, albeit with a failed design, by the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 extended the 1992 UNFCCC 
that committed participating countries to reduce their GHG emissions. The 
Treaty entered into effect on February 16, 2005. The Annex-B parties com-
mitted to reduce their emissions in 2012 by 5% compared with 1990 and to 
use a cap-and-trade system. Kyoto participants initially covered more than 
65% of global emissions. But the nonratification by the United States and 
the withdrawal of Canada, Russia, and Japan, combined with the boost of 
emerging countries emissions, reduced the coverage to less than 15% in 
2012. The main real attempt to implement a carbon pricing mechanism 
within the Kyoto agreement emerged in Europe, with the EU ETS. In its 
first trading period of 2005–2007 (“phase 1”), the system was established 
with a number of allowances (the so-called Assigned Amount Units [AAUs]) 
based on the estimated needs; its design was flawed in many respects and 
in any case far inferior to that which had been adopted in the United States 
in 1990 to reduce SO2 emissions by half. In the second trading period of 
2008–2012, the number of allowances was reduced by 12% to reduce the 
emissions of the industrial and electricity sectors of the Union. This crack-
down was offset by the possibility given to the capped entities to use Kyoto 
offsets (mostly from the CDM described earlier) for their compliance. In 
addition, the deep economic crisis that hit the region during the period 
reduced the demand for permits. Moreover, large subsidies in the renew-
able energy sector implemented independently in most countries of the 
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Union reduced further the demand for permits. In the absence of any coun-
tervailing reaction on the supply of permits, the carbon price went down 
from a peak of 30 €/tCO2 to around 5€/tCO2 today. This recent price level 
is without a doubt way below the social cost of carbon. Therefore, it has a 
limited impact on emissions. It even let electricity producers substitute gas 
by coal, which emits 100% more carbon (not counting dirty microparticles) 
per kWh. An additional problem came from the fact that the ETS covered 
only a fraction of the emissions of the region. Many specific emitters (e.g., 
the transport and building sectors) faced a zero carbon price. During the 
third trading period (2013–2020), the EU-wide cap on emissions is reduced 
by 1.74% each year, and a progressive shift toward auctioning of allowances 
in substitution of cost-free allocation is implemented.
Over the last three decades, Europeans have sometimes believed that 
their (limited) commitment to reduce their emissions would motivate other 
countries to imitate their proactive behavior. That hope never materialized. 
Canada, for example, facing the prospect of the oil sands dividend, quickly 
realized that their failure to fulfill their commitment would expose them 
to the need to buy permits8 and preferred to withdraw before having to pay 
them. The US Senate imposed a no-free-rider condition as a prerequisite for 
ratification, although the motivation for this otherwise reasonable stance 
may well have been a desire for inaction in view of a somewhat skeptical 
public opinion. Sadly enough, the Kyoto Protocol was a failure. Its archi-
tecture made it doomed to fail. Nonparticipating countries benefited from 
the efforts made by the participating ones, in terms of both reduced cli-
mate damages (free-rider problem) and improved competitiveness of their 
carbon-intensive industries (carbon leakage).
Other cap-and-trade mechanisms have been implemented since Kyoto. 
A mixture of collateral damages (we mentioned the emissions by coal plants 
of SO2, a local pollutant, jointly with that of CO2), the direct self-impact of 
CO2 emissions for large countries like China (which has 20% of the world 
population and is exposed to serious climate change risk), and the desire to 
placate domestic opinion and avoid international pressure all lead to some 
carbon control. Outside the Kyoto Protocol, the United States, Canada, and 
China established some regional cap-and-trade mechanisms. In the United 
States, where per capita GHG emissions are 2.5 times larger than in Europe 
and China, two initiatives are worth mentioning. In the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI), nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic US states 
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created a common cap-and-trade market to limit the emissions of their elec-
tricity sector. Here also, the current carbon price is way too low at around 
$5/tCO2 (up from the price floor level of $2/tCO2 during 2010–2012). From 
2015 to 2020, the CO2 cap will be reduced by 2.5% every year. The sys-
tem will release extra carbon allowances if the carbon price on the market 
exceeds $6/tCO2. A similar system exists in California to cover the electricity 
sector, large industrial plants, and more recently fuel distributors, thereby 
covering more than 85% of the State’s emissions of GHGs.9 In 2014, China 
established seven regional cap-and-trade pilots officially to prepare for the 
implementation of a national ETS. The fragmented cap-and-trade systems 
described earlier cover almost 10% of worldwide emissions, and observed 
price levels are low. This is another illustration of the tragedy of commons. 
Box 10.4
CO2 Price on the EU ETS Market
Figure 10.4 illustrates the failure of the EU ETS to establish a stable and an 
ambitious carbon price in the EU. The instability of the Kyoto coalition is one 
plausible explanation for why the EU did not attempt to push the price of 
permits up on the ETS market after the failure of the Copenhagen Conference 















































Evolution of carbon price on the EU ETS. 
Source: Climate Economics Chair from ICE ECX data.
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These regional or national ETSs could be used in the future under any inter-
national commitment regime, either a universal carbon price or a cap-and-
trade mechanism.
Some countries have implemented a carbon tax. The most ambitious 
country is Sweden, in which a carbon tax of approximately 100 €/tCO2 was 
implemented in 1991. France recently set its own carbon tax at 14.5 €/tCO2. 
Both of these taxes are used for various purposes, such as raising revenue 
or addressing congestion externalities and road safety. They also now can 
be used to comply with an international commitment to cap-and-trade or 
to a carbon price. Outside Europe, some modest carbon taxes exist in Japan 
and Mexico, for example. Except for the Swedish case, these attempts put a 
carbon price that is far too low compared to the SCC.
Pledge-and-Review: The Waiting Game in the Current International 
Negotiation
The Copenhagen conference in December 2009 was expected to deliver 
a new Kyoto Protocol with more participating countries. In reality, the 
conference delivered a completely different project. The central idea of 
a unique carbon price induced by international cap-and-trade was com-
pletely abandoned, and the secretariat of the UNFCCC became a cham-
ber of registration of noncommittal pledges by individual countries. This 
change of vision was upheld at the Cancun Conference in 2010 and more 
recently at the COP 20 in Lima in 2014. The new “pledge-and-review” 
approach was employed at the Paris COP 21 conference in December 2015. 
The so-called “Paris Agreement” will be implemented as soon as more 
than 55 parties to the agreement representing more than 55% of global 
emissions will have ratified the agreement. Voluntary climate actions (or 
“intended nationally determined contributions”) will be registered with-
out any coordination in the method and in the metric of measurement of 
the ambition of these actions. Although they are crucial to the credibility 
of the system, the reporting on and verification of the pledges were not 
formally decided.10
The pledge-and-review strategy has four main deficiencies and defi-
nitely is an inadequate response to climate change. First, if implemented, 
the agreement yields an inefficient allocation of efforts by inducing some 
economic agents to implement high-cost mitigation actions while others 
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will emit GHGs that would be much cheaper to eliminate.11 Because the 
marginal costs of emission reduction are likely to be highly heterogeneous 
within and across countries, it will be almost impossible to measure the 
ambition of each country’s pledge. In fact, individual countries have a 
strong incentive to “green wash” their actions by making them complex to 
measure and price.
Second, the pledge-and-review promises, even if they were credible, are 
voluntary, so free-riding is bound to prevail. These pledges are expected 
to deliver much less effort than would be collectively desirable. Following 
Buhr et al. (2014), “pledge-and-review means that climate change is dealt 
with the lowest possible level of decision making.” As Stiglitz (chapter 6, 
this volume) notes, “in no other area has voluntary action succeeded as a 
solution to the problem of undersupply of a public good.” In a sense, the 
pledge-and-review process is similar to an income tax system, in which each 
household would be allowed to freely determine its fiscal contribution.
Third, even if the pledges were large enough to put the global emis-
sion trajectory back on track, the absence of commitment to the pledges 
would limit their long-term credibility. This fragility makes it tempting for 
countries to deviate from their pledges. The absence of credibility of long-
term pledges will reduce the innovators’ incentive to perform green R&D 
and implement mature technologies, yielding reductions of emissions for 
a long period of time.
Fourth, the pledge-and-review regime can be analyzed as a waiting 
game, in which the global negotiation on formal commitments is post-
poned. Under the Paris Agreement (articles 4 and 14), the parties will meet 
every five years starting in 2023 to renegotiate their pledges, hopefully in 
a more ambitious manner. Beccherle and Tirole (2011) show that the free-
riding in this waiting game is magnified by the incentive to achieve a bet-
ter deal at the bargaining table in the future. Building on both theory and 
past experiences, countries will realize that staying carbon-intensive will 
put them in a strong position to demand compensation to join an agree-
ment later: the carbon-intensity of their economy making them less eager 
to join an agreement, the international community will award them higher 
transfers (either monetary or in terms of free pollution allowances) so as to 
bring them on board. Moreover, when the damage function is convex, a 
country committing to a high emission level before this negotiation raises 
the marginal damages of all other countries and therefore induces them 
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to reduce their emissions more heavily. All in all, these strategic consider-
ations increase the cost of delay beyond what would be obtained in the tra-
ditional free-riding model with no expectation about a future negotiation.
Indeed, there has been concern that the current pledges are at a “zero 
ambition” level, or perhaps even below that level, where “zero ambition” 
refers to the level that the country would choose simply because of co-
damages (local pollutants) and the direct impact of GHG on the country, 
that is, in the absence of any international agreement.
To conclude this section on a more positive note, the pledge-and-review 
process might be useful in the second half of this year, provided that (1) 
ambitions turned out to be strong enough (a big “if” at this stage), and (2) 
one were to call the countries’ bluff and transform or modify their pledges 
into real commitments. Suppose indeed that the various pledges are in 
line with a reasonable trajectory for GHG emissions (asserting this requires 
being able to aggregate/compare the various pledges, as some concern mit-
igation and others adaptation, and current pledges have rather different 
time horizons). One could then transform the predicted global trajectory 
of emissions into an equivalent number of permits; in a second stage, one 
could allocate permits under the requirement so that countries receive the 
same welfare as they would if their pledge were implemented. Countries 
that are sincere about their pledge could only gain from having all coun-
tries commit.
Negotiating a Price/Quantity and Negotiating Transfers
Let us now turn to the more satisfactory approach of picking an economic 
instrument together with measurement and enforcement strategies.
The One-Dimensional Negotiation: Uniform Carbon Price or a Global 
Emission Target
We can imagine two negotiation processes “I will if you will” with only one 
decision variable. Negotiators could try to agree on either a universal car-
bon price or a global emission target. For the sake of the argument, suppose 
first that all countries were similar in terms of their exposure to climate 
change, degree of development, endowment in natural resources, tastes, 
and so on. The free-rider problem inherent to the international negotia-
tion on climate change could then be resolved by negotiating a uniform 
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carbon price.12 Under this negotiation framework, a “world climate assem-
bly” would vote for a uniform carbon price whose implementation would 
be left to its individual members. The claimed virtue of this framework 
is to align the constituents’ private interests. Let us illustrate this claim 
with an example inspired from Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (chapter 12, 
this volume). Suppose that the world is composed of 100 countries with 
the same characteristics (population, economic prosperity, growth expecta-
tions, industrial structure, etc.). Each ton of CO2 in the atmosphere gener-
ates $1 of damage in each country. The business-as-usual scenario yields 
a uniform emission of 10 tCO2 per capita. Suppose also that 80% of each 
country’s emission can be eliminated at a unit abatement cost of $50/tCO2. 
The abatement cost of the remaining 20% is $200/tCO2. In this context, 
it is desirable that each country abates its emissions by 80% because the 
global damages of $100/tCO2 exceed the cheaper marginal abatement cost 
of $50/tCO2. But the tragedy of commons would prevail in the absence of a 
binding international agreement because the marginal abatement cost is 50 
times larger than the local marginal damages. Suppose that the 100 coun-
tries accept to join an international coalition in which they cooperate to 
enforce the domestic imposition of an internationally harmonized carbon 
price that is voted by a majority rule. Participants are required to impose 
the common price as long as all signatories do too. The domestic revenues 
of the scheme are recycled internally. In this framework, all countries will 
be in favor of a carbon price of, say, $100/tCO2, which will induce them to 
abate their emissions by 80%. This dominant strategy yields the first-best 
solution and makes all countries better off.
As Cramton and Stoft (2012) point out, an equivalent negotiation pro-
cess exists that is based on quantities. Suppose that all countries in the 
coalition accept to negotiate a uniform emission per capita that is voted 
on by a majority rule. The same subsidiarity rule applies for which green 
policy should be implemented to attain the national target, and countries 
are allowed to trade their emissions with others. In this alternative frame-
work, all countries will understand the benefit of imposing an ambitious 
target for themselves as long as the other countries do the same. It is an 
optimal for each country to vote for an 80% reduction of emissions. In this 
example, the two negotiation mechanisms yield the same efficient solution 
and have the same simple structure of a one-dimensional negotiation, on 
either a uniform price or a uniform per capita quantity.
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Alas, the real world does not look at all like this description. Indeed, 
countries differ markedly by their exposure to climate change, abatement 
costs, economic dependence to fossil fuels, willingness to invest in the 
future, emissions per capita, and so on. These sources of heterogeneity of 
costs and benefits make the negotiation dramatically more complex.
Consider, for example, the case in which only 10 of the 100 countries are 
responsible for all emissions. The other countries emit nothing. Under the 
uniform price mechanism as under the quantity mechanism, conditional 
on all countries ratifying the treaty, the median voter will be in favor of a 
$200/tCO2 and a zero-emission target for all countries, respectively. This 
example illustrates two difficulties with the two simple negotiation mecha-
nism examined in this section. First, in line with Weitzman’s (chapter 8, 
this volume) result, there is too much abatement at equilibrium, so these 
mechanisms do not guarantee a first-best solution.13 Second, the 10 high-
emission countries are likely to quit the coalition because they bear all the 
cost of mitigation and receive a tiny fraction of the benefits. In economics 
parlance, their participation constraint is binding. This is why the econo-
mists supporting a price negotiation recognize that, due to the heterogene-
ity among countries, the system is feasible only if some mechanism for side 
transfers (such as a green fund or an allocation of permits) is designed so as 
to bring the reluctant countries on board. We concur. Observe that the sizes 
of the transfers from the 90 green countries to the 10 others that would 
induce the latter to participate are exactly the same for the two negotiation 
mechanisms.
Unfortunately, but unavoidably, the green fund (under a carbon price) 
or the unequal allocation of permits (under cap-and-trade) destroys the 
simplicity of a single-dimensional negotiation. The green fund must set 
the net (positive or negative) transfer to the fund for each country and 
therefore involves dimensionality n + 1 (the number of countries, n, plus 
1, the carbon price). In the cap-and-trade mechanism, an unconstrained 
allocation of permits yields the same dimensionality (n allowances, plus 
the carbon price). This sharp increase in dimensionality can be avoided 
by adopting a common formula as the Kyoto negotiators attempted to do. 
Cramton and Stoft (2012) propose doing this and argue that, by making 
this the first stage of a two-stage negotiation, countries would find it easier 
to agree (more on this below).
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Summing up, whether the international architecture adopts a uniform 
carbon price or a cap-and-trade mechanism, cross-country transfers will thus 
be needed so as to bring reluctant countries on board. As we just discussed, 
under the carbon pricing approach, the proposed transfer mechanism is to 
use a fraction of the collected revenue to help developing countries adopt 
low-carbon technologies and adapt to climate change. This is illustrated by 
the green fund, which was created at the COP-15 of Copenhagen in 2009. 
Under a cap-and-trade protocol, transfers operate through the distribution 
of free permits.
Either way, the design of compensation poses a complex problem: each 
country will want to pay the smallest possible contribution to the green 
fund or receive the maximum number of permits.14 This negotiation is 
complex and of course a major impediment to reaching an agreement on 
a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade. However, it must be realized that most 
international negotiations involve give-and-take, and there have been suc-
cessful negotiations in the past. A case in point is the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendment in 1990. This arrangement was not imposed by a centralized 
authority but rather was the outcome of a protracted negotiation, in which 
the Mid-west states, high emitters of SO2 and NOx, delayed jumping on 
board until they received sufficient compensation (in the form of free per-
mits in that case).15
Simplifying the Compensation n-Dimensional Negotiation (Green Fund or 
Allocation of Permits)
Transparency considerations A green fund may be too transparent to be 
politically acceptable. The transparency argument requires further thought, 
but experience here suggests a serious concern. The Green Climate Fund 
established at COP-16 aims at a flow transfer of $100 billion per year by 
2020, and four years later had received promises of less than $10 billion in 
stock.16 As is known from other realms (such as humanitarian relief after a 
natural disaster or health programs in developing countries), parliaments 
are known to be reluctant to appropriate vast amounts of money to causes 
that benefit foreigners. Even successful programs such as the Vaccine Alli-
ance GAVI—which involves a much smaller amount of money—took off 
only when the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation brought a substantial finan-
cial commitment. Politicians often pledge money at international meet-
ings, only to downsize or renege on their pledge. Substantial free-riding is 
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expected to continue, jeopardizing the build-up of the green fund. In Arti-
cle 9 of the Paris Agreement, the developed world promised nothing more 
than to “continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance,” and this 
mobilization will “represent a progression beyond previous efforts,” what-
ever that means. Strikingly, the promise is a collective one, which therefore 
commits no one.
We believe that the transparency issue is one of the reasons that many 
pollution-control programs around the world adopted cap-and-trade and 
handled the compensation issue through the politically less involved dis-
tribution of tradable permits (often in a grandfathered way). The large 
transfers to the Midwest implied by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment 
never really made the headlines. To be certain, the transfers made under 
national cap-and-trade programs are different in their economic and 
political nature from international payments for international permits; 
however, in the EU ETS, billions of euros could have been potentially 
transferred to Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries (“Hot 
Air”) through the allocation of permits in order to convince them to sign 
the Kyoto Protocol.17
The strength of the opaqueness argument in favor of the allocation of 
permits remains to be tested, and no one has the answer as to whether it 
would work for climate change. On the one hand, transfers associated with 
an allocation of free permits are not that hard to compute, and one would 
imagine that politicians (privately or publicly) opposed to an ambitious 
climate change agreement would quickly publicize the numbers (if unfa-
vorable to the country) so as to turn their domestic public opinion against 
the agreement. In fact, the public uproar over the sale of Hot-Air AAUs was 
such that the UN was forced to restrict their sale. On the other hand, some 
of the cap-and-trade transfers failed to make the headlines in the past. The 
jury is still out on this question.
Finally, it should be noted that countries routinely transfer a sizeable 
fraction of their GDP to foreign investors in reimbursement of their sover-
eign debt. It would be useful to have estimates of likely shortfalls/surpluses 
of permits (which of course depend on the initial distribution) so as to have 
a better assessment of the sums involved.
Reducing the dimensionality of the compensation negotiation Rich and poor 
countries have always had opposite views on the compensation issue. 
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Developing countries correctly emphasize ethics and their desire to 
develop, whereas in the past rich countries were allowed to develop with-
out being hindered by environmental concerns; they demand equal rights 
per capita or a variant of it. Rich countries invoke Realpolitik and explain 
that they will not get on board unless permits are grandfathered (as they 
were in many other instances), or they will contribute only modestly to 
the green fund. The developing countries’ being morally right does not 
mean they should overstress the equity concern for their own sake; induc-
ing the rich countries to refuse to get on board will make poor coun-
tries much worse off. The politics of negotiations are not always aligned 
with the ethical view, unfortunately; in the driver’s seat lay the countries 
with a high-projected GDP (they will be the high polluters), those with a 
high abatement cost, and finally those that will suffer the least—or even 
slightly gain from—global warming. These countries have low incentives 
to get on board. The Paris Agreement is particularly weak on this by stat-
ing, “developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitiga-
tion efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide 
emission reduction […] in the light of differential national circumstances” 
(article 4).
The green fund allocation or the formula for the allocation of free per-
mits in the cap-and-trade approach must be acceptable by all.18 The expec-
tations must also be convergent, and unrealistic demands are to be avoided. 
Rich countries must be much less selfish and accept to bear a large share 
of the burden (in reality and not through cheap pledges as they sometimes 
do). Conversely, a common per capita emission is a complete nonstarter 
for the developed world. This would involve massive wealth transfers to 
the less-developed world. As Cramton et al. (2013, chapter 12 in this vol-
ume) stress furthermore, the basis for the determination of such transfers is 
unclear; developed countries will argue that although they are responsible 
for anthropogenic global warming so far, they also have developed numer-
ous technologies (medical, agricultural, communications, etc.) that are ben-
efiting the less-developed countries. Such an acrimonious debate is unlikely 
to foster a decent solution to climate change. Moreover, the inconsistent 
expectations that we observe today are, needless to say, dangerous. As in 
the case of an impending war, we hope that the various sides will become 
more reasonable and come to terms with the huge collective gains from 
reaching an ambitious agreement.
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Freestyle negotiations among n countries are exceedingly complex. They 
are likely to lead to a deadlock, whether the countries negotiate about who 
will be a contributor or a recipient (and by how much) of the green fund or 
the allocation of free permits among countries under cap-and-trade. There 
is a complex trade-off between a simple rule, which prevents individual 
countries from demanding a special treatment, and a more complex rule, 
which better accounts for individual willingness to get on board but also 
make the negotiation captive of specific demands.
To illustrate this, consider the following (simple) rule, which reflects 
the trade-off described earlier between ethics and Realpolitik in the case of 
a common carbon price approach. The transfer scheme in this approach 
is based on a green fund. Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (chapter 12, this 
volume), Weitzman (chapter 8, this volume), and De Perthuis and Jouvet 
(2015) propose to finance the green fund on the basis of a one-dimensional 
bonus-malus system where countries whose per capita emissions lie above 
a predetermined threshold would transfer funds to countries whose emis-
sion is below the threshold. More specifically, let pi and P  denote country 
i’s and the world’s populations, and let xi and X xin i= ∑ =1  denote the current 
emissions of country i and the world. The contribution Ci  to the green fund 
by country i would then be determined as follows:
C g x p
X
P
i i i= −

 ,  (1)
where g  is a generosity parameter (i.e., how many dollars are transferred per 
ton of excess emission). Note that the sum of these contributions is equal 
to 0, as it should.
In a cap-and-trade approach, the transfer is implicit in the allocation of 
free permits. For conciseness, we state it in terms of intertemporal (total) 
pollutions. Let qi denote country i’s number of free permits and Q qin i= ∑ =1
denote the total number of permits (as discussed earlier, Q  would be com-
puted so as to contain the temperature increase to 2°C). With grandfather-
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Table 10.1
National Emissions per Capita in 2011.
Country tCO2/cap
Uganda 0.11











Source: World Bank. 
Box 10.5
Per Capita Emissions
One of the most challenging aspects of the international negotiation on cli-
mate change is the extremely heterogeneous per capita emissions of CO2, 
from around 0.1 tCO2 in the poorest countries to 17 tCO2 in the United States 
(table 10.1). The principle of common but differentiated responsibility has 
many possible interpretations in this unequal world, which has had disruptive 
effects on the negotiation process since 1992. Because emissions per capita 
and GDP per capita are strongly positively correlated, the international nego-
tiation on climate change cannot be disconnected from the problems of eco-
nomic development and worldwide inequalities.
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So, the ethical approach prevails if ĝ  is close to 0, and the Realpolitik 
concerns are reflected by a large ĝ  value.
There are many potential criticisms to and improvements on such for-
mulae. For instance, the formulae need not hold in each year but only 
overall. Under cap-and-trade, developing countries’ endowment might be 
backloaded so as to avoid a situation in which initially they are in expecta-
tion big net suppliers of permits in the market for allowances.
But the point we want to make here is that such rules may be a bit 
too simple. Realpolitik suggests accounting at least somewhat for the expo-
sure to climate change, even if this may be rather unfair. Countries such as 
Canada and Russia may not get on board under formula (1) or (2), whereas 
other high-income, high-pollution countries would, provided that the gen-
erosity coefficient g is not too high or the grandfathering coefficient ĝ  not 
too low.
Price versus Quantity
Given that the pledge-and-review approach was still favored by policy-
makers at the COP 21, it may be premature to enter the intricacies of 
“prices versus quantities” (to use Weitzman’s 1974 terminology) or “car-
bon price versus cap-and-trade” (by cap-and-trade we mean the setting of 
a global volume of emissions, not of individual countries’ targets, which 
would be highly inefficient). We feel that either approach clearly domi-
nates the current alternative. Besides, the question is far from being settled 
among economists. However, because post-COP 21 negotiations need to 
be engaged quickly, it is important to discuss these second-stage issues 
right away.
The choice of instruments has two dimensions: the purely economic 
question of which system best accommodates scientific and demand 
uncertainty, a complex question that was treated at a theoretical level in 
Weitzman’s article but on which limited empirical evidence is available19; 
and a political economy dimension, on which we now focus.20
On the political economy front, of which we developed one dimension 
(the transparency of transfers) earlier, we would like to make two points. 
First, like for any other public policy, international commitments must be 
feasible; that is, its implementation must not be prevented by the lack of 
information.
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Second, and perhaps more controversially,21 one may want to leave 
scope for national policies, although we know that these policies may then 
deviate from least-cost abatement. Imagine, for instance, that some coun-
tries with limited tax-collection-and-redistribution capabilities would want 
to opt for a low carbon price on cement to make housing affordable to the 
poorest; then they would want to deviate from the single-price rule; to be 
certain, governments may be weak and grant excessively low carbon prices 
to some lobbies, but this is by and large a matter of domestic politics (unless 
the practice is so widespread that it becomes unlikely that the country will 
abide by its overall commitment, whatever the agreement is). The rationale 
for subsidiarity is twofold. First, it gives leeway for governments to con-
vince their domestic opinion (or themselves). Second, other countries care 
only about how much CO2 is emitted by the country, not how the number 
came about.
The Enforceability Problem
Enforcement under a carbon-price commitment 
Price implementation. Carbon-pricing proposals allow a large array of regula-
tory mechanisms that get carbon-pricing credit. To fulfill their price com-
mitment, countries could levy a carbon tax or set a cap-and-trade system 
and value carbon permits at their market price. Some countries’ carbon 
price will also reflect their green standards (with an implicit carbon value) 
or count their public investments that have an impact on emissions. Under 
the principle of subsidiarity, we believe that all these actions should indeed 
be accounted for to determine the national carbon price, which is the ratio 
of the carbon revenue over the carbon emission.22 The net effect is to gener-
ate efforts to curb national emissions.
Because most of the climate benefits of this policy accrue abroad, coun-
tries currently have no incentive to impose strict carbon usage constraints 
on their citizens, firms, and administrations; and by and large, except for 
Sweden, they do not. This will also be the case under any international 
agreement. Thus, even if enforcement were costless, authorities would 
still turn a blind eye on certain polluters or underestimate their pollution, 
thereby economizing on the cost of green policies. This form of moral 
hazard is particularly hard to avoid in countries that are on the spend-
ing side of the compensation scheme (say the green fund), but it also 
applies to countries on the receiving side, which could be threatened by a 
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withholding of transfers in case of noncompliance. To envision the diffi-
culties faced by the monitoring of compliance, one can refer to the current 
debate on poor tax collection in Greece.23 To sum up, the imposition of 
a common carbon price faces the standard free-rider problem, with local 
costs and global benefits. Its management requires a strong international 
monitoring system.
Undoing. Second, another form of moral hazard consists of undoing the car-
bon tax through compensating transfers; presumably the countries would 
do this in an opaque way so as not to attract the attention of the inter-
national community.
Monitoring local externalities associated with fossil fuels. Burning fossil fuels 
generates various local externalities, such as the emission of nanoparticles 
(cardiovascular diseases, asthma, etc.), and, in the case of gasoline, road 
congestion and the deterioration of road infrastructure. This justifies spe-
cific Pigovian taxes whose level depends on the density of population, the 
value of life, the burning technology, or the average atmospheric condi-
tions, for example. Countries also take advantage of the relative inelastic-
ity of demand to raise revenue. Proponents of the carbon-price approach 
propose a “zero baseline” in defining the carbon price. That is, they define 
the carbon price to include all taxes and subsidies on each fossil fuel on 
each market, implicitly ignoring all other externalities or more generally 
other motivations for taxing fossil fuels. One problem with this pragmatic 
strategy is that these other Pigovian prices differ much around the world. 
Take again gasoline taxation: the distribution of the price of the liter 
of gasoline at the pump around the world has huge variance: 2 cents 
in Venezuela, 97 cents in the United States, and 209 cents in Belgium.24 
Under the previously mentioned definition, imposing the same “carbon 
price” at the world level forces all countries to price local externalities and 
embody revenue concerns equally, a contradiction with the basic idea of 
subsidiarity. Monitoring this by the international community is a serious 
challenge.
Nonprice policies. Third, the carbon-price approach requires finding conver-
sion rates for various policies that impact climate change but are not sub-
ject to an explicit price, such as road and housing construction standards, 
no-till farming, or afforestation and reforestation. These conversion rates 
may need to be country-specific: a construction standard will impact GHG 
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emissions differently depending on the country’s climate; similarly, affor-
estation may increase rather than decrease emissions in high-latitude areas, 
in which trees may cover (high-albedo) snow.
Enforcement under a cap-and-trade mechanism Enforcing an international 
quantity mechanism is relatively straightforward when countries, rather 
than economic agents, are liable for their national emissions. The anthro-
pogenic emissions of CO2 by a nation can be derived from a simple carbon 
accounting by adding extraction and imports and by subtracting exports 
and the variation of stocks. Carbon sinks from forests and the agricultural 
sector can already be observable by satellite. Experimental projects from the 
National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) and the European Space 
Agency (ESA) to measure the global emission of CO2 at the country level are 
promising in the long run.25 We believe that monitoring the country’s CO2 
emissions is easier than monitoring emissions at the point source. Like for 
existing cap-and-trade mechanisms, agents (here countries) with a shortage 
of permits at the end of the year would have to buy extra permits, whereas 
those with a surplus would sell or bank them.
There is one concern about permit trading among nations: some coun-
tries (one has in mind China and the United States here) may well enjoy 
market power due to their share of world emissions. This is a potentially 
serious issue, which requires oversight and offers some similarity to the 
control of market power in production or financial rights over transmission 
on a power grid.26 In particular, one would want countries to be as close as 
possible to zero net supply so as to reduce their incentive to affect the world 
price for permits by restraining the demand or supply.
Price Volatility Under a Carbon Price and Under Cap-and-Trade
Attention should be paid to the question of how to accommodate uncer-
tainty. A cap-and-trade approach would compute and issue a worldwide 
number of permits consistent with the 2°C target. However, there is scien-
tific uncertainty about the link from emissions to global warming. There is 
also uncertainty about the abatement technology, consumer demand, and 
so forth. So the number of permits will probably have to be adjusted over 
time. The market price of permits will be volatile (although presumably less 
so than under the flawed and unstable attempts at pricing CO2 so far).27
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The same concern holds for a carbon price. Due to the same sources of 
uncertainty, there is no guarantee that the price will initially be set at the 
“right level,” consistent with the overall global warming target. Thus, the 
tax will need to be adjusted over time as well.
More generally still, any proposal must confront the volatility question 
because price volatility is likely to be unpopular. One possibility, which 
a priori does not require public intervention, is to transfer risk through 
hedging instruments to those who can bear that risk more easily. Another 
complementary approach is to intervene in markets to stabilize prices. 
For example, in 2014, the European Commission proposed a “Market Sta-
bility Reserve,” in which the auction volumes will be adjusted in phase 
4 of the EU ETS starting in 2021, so as to create a soft target corridor 
for banking of EU Allowance units (EUAs). The mechanism will reduce 
the amount of EUAs that are auctioned if an upper threshold of EUAs in 
circulation is exceeded and releases them if the EUAs in circulation fall 
short of a lower threshold. This scheme is meant to be automatic, but its 
efficiency can be questioned.28 In particular, one can wonder how it can 
be made responsive to news in a way that guarantees that the 2°C target is 
reached. This brings us to the question of the trade-off between flexibility 
and commitment.
The Potential Time Inconsistency of Carbon-Price and Cap-and-Trade 
Policies
Whether one opts for a carbon price or for cap-and-trade, one should be 
concerned by the possibility that, conditional on the accruing news about 
the climate change process, technology, or demand, the ex-post adjustment 
be too lax (too low a carbon price, too high a number of tradable permits). 
To understand why, note that the carbon-price or tradable rights path is 
designed so as to incentivize long-term investments: in carbon-light hous-
ing, transportation infrastructures or power plants, and in green R&D. Ex-
post price incentives have served their purpose and now impose undue 
sacrifices; put differently, optimal environmental policies are not time-
consistent. Furthermore, the possibility of administration turnover or news 
about other aspects (say, public deficit or indebtedness, economic opportu-
nities) may transform climate policy into an adjustment variable, adding to 
the overall time inconsistency.
194 Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole
This time inconsistency is studied in Laffont and Tirole (1996a, 1996b), 
who look at the optimal mechanism designed by a centralized authority 
(the world’s nations here) when news will accrue that may vindicate a 
change of course of action. The optimal mechanism must trade off commit-
ment and adaptation. It can, for example, be implemented through a gen-
eralized cap-and-trade mechanism. This mechanism consists of providing 
authorities with flexibility, provided that the latter commit to compensate 
permit owners (in cash or Treasury securities). More precisely, authorities 
must issue a menu of permits with different redeeming values that limit the 
authority’s ability to expropriate their owners by flooding the market with 
pollution permits. For example, if news led the authority to lower the price 
of permits (or the carbon tax) from $50 to $40, some $50 and $45 strike 
price put options on the Treasuries (with agreed-on country keys) would 
become in the money; at $35, some other options (with a $40 strike price) 
would also be in the money, and so forth. This approach creates flexibil-
ity but constrains it by forcing the authority to partly compensate permit 
owners. It obviously requires a governance mechanism, whose existence is 
inescapable in any international agreement.
Cap-and-trade mechanisms can obviously accommodate various auto-
matic mechanisms that react to news accrual. We have not studied when 
the Market Stability Reserve mentioned earlier or a variant thereof can 
approximate the optimal adjustment mechanism described in Laffont–
Tirole,29 and we think that economists have not paid enough attention to 
this aspect, whether they favor carbon pricing or cap-and-trade.
Enforcing a Stable International Agreement: The Carrot-and-Stick 
Approach to Promote International Cooperation
An efficient international agreement should create a grand coalition in 
which all countries and regions will be induced to set the same carbon 
price in their jurisdiction. Under the principle of subsidiarity, each country 
or region would be free to determine its own carbon policy, for instance, 
through a tax, a cap-and-trade, or a hybrid. The free-rider problem raises 
the question of the stability of this grand coalition.30 An analogy is sover-
eign borrowing. Sanctions for defaulting are limited (fortunately, gunboat 
diplomacy has waned), which raises concerns about countries’ commit-
ment to repay creditors. The same applies to climate change. Even if a good 
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agreement is reached, it must still be enforced with limited means. The La 
La Land of international climate negotiations most often ignores this cen-
tral question.
Naming and shaming is an approach and should be used; but as we 
have seen with the Kyoto “commitments,” it has limited effects. Countries 
always find a multitude of excuses (choice of other actions such as R&D, 
recession, insufficient effort by others, commitment made by a previous 
government, etc.) to not abide by their pledge.
There is no bullet-proof solution to the enforcement problem, but 
we think that at a minimum two instruments should be employed. First, 
countries care about gains from trade; the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
should view noncompliance with an international agreement as a form of 
dumping, leading to sanctions. Needless to say, the nature of these sanc-
tions should not be decided by individual countries because the latter would 
then gladly take this opportunity to implement protectionist policies.
In the same spirit, one could penalize nonparticipants through punitive 
border taxes. This policy would incentivize reluctant countries to jump on 
board and be conducive to the formation of a stable world climate coalition. 
Nordhaus (2015) examines the formation of stable climate coalitions when 
coalitions are able to impose internally a uniform carbon price together 
with uniform trade sanctions against nonparticipants. For a carbon price 
around $25 per ton of CO2, a worldwide climate coalition is stable if a uni-
form tax of 2% is imposed by the coalition for any good or service imported 
from a nonparticipating country.
Second, noncompliance with a climate agreement should be treated 
as committing future administrations and treated as sovereign debt. This 
policy would involve the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well. For 
example, in the case of a cap-and-trade approach, a shortfall of permits at 
the end of the year would add to the public debt; the conversion rate would 
be the current market price.
Of course, we are aware of the potential collateral damages associated 
with such linkages with other successful international institutions. But the 
real question is that of the alternative. Proponents of nonbinding agree-
ments hope that the countries’ good will suffice to control GHG emissions. 
If they are correct, then the incentives provided through institutional 
linkages will also suffice a fortiori, without any collateral damage on these 
institutions.
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Putting the Negotiation Back on Track
Despite the mounting evidence about global warming, the international 
mobilization has been most disappointing. The Kyoto Protocol failed to 
build an international coalition supporting a carbon price in line with its 
social cost, and it illustrates the intrinsic instability of any international 
agreement that does not seriously address the free-rider problem.31 An 
international agreement must satisfy three properties: economic efficiency, 
incentive compatibility, and fairness. Efficiency can be attained only if 
all countries face the same carbon price. Incentive compatibility can be 
attained by penalizing free-riders. Fairness, a concept whose definition dif-
fers across stakeholders in the absence of a veil of ignorance, can potentially 
be reached through lump-sum transfers.
The noncommittal Paris agreement was hailed as a diplomatic success. 
However, it was reached because it opted for the least common denomi-
nator, accommodating demands even of some oil-rich countries that are 
opposed to any carbon pricing. We feel further that the pledge-and-review 
strategy is doomed to fail. It does not address the fundamental free-rider 
problem of climate change. The pledge-and-review process is another illus-
tration of the waiting game played by key countries, which are postpon-
ing their real commitment to reduce emissions. Countries made sure that 
their pledge is hard to compare with other pledges and is nonverifiable 
and nonenforceable. The predicted outcome of this waiting game in terms 
of emissions of GHGs is potentially worse than the business-as-usual, 
zero-ambition outcome. We should tackle the climate challenge more 
seriously.
The Paris agreement did not deliver anything close to a credible, fair, and 
efficient solution. So what’s next? All contributors to this book consider 
the efficiency objective of a universal carbon price the top priority for the 
post-Paris negotiation process. We should get the fundamentals right and 
face the thorny issue of equity. The latter issue is daunting, but any negotia-
tion will have to confront it, and discussing many other topics simultane-
ously does not facilitate the task. Because national interests are paramount, 
sooner or later the international community will be confronted with the 
failure of the voluntary approach used in the Paris negotiations. An alterna-
tive roadmap can be described as follows:
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• Agree on a single-carbon-price principle and the need to in the measure-
ment infrastructure so to allow for an independent monitoring of coun-
tries’ overall pollution.
• Agree on a governance and enforcement mechanism (we have proposed 
that nonparticipating countries be imposed penalties through punitive 
border taxes administered by the WTO and that participating countries 
recognize a “climate debt” accounting for the uncovered emissions of the 
nonabiding countries and administered by the IMF).
If the choice for a single-price policy is carbon pricing:
• Find a price that is agreeable to the international community and limits 
global warming to the 2°C objective.
• Put in place the monitoring environment, as well as the general prin-
ciples for conversion of nonprice policies into the price realm, and define 
criteria that limit undoing.
If the choice for a single-price policy is cap-and-trade (the option we 
favor because we believe it is easier to monitor):
• Fix a trajectory of emissions that scientists deem consistent with the 2°C 
objective, and agree on the principle of this worldwide cap trajectory.
• Agree that permits will be allocated to participating countries in line with 
the aggregate cap.
• Agree on a trading mechanism in which countries will have to match 
pollution and permits at the end of the year to avoid creating unfulfilled 
climatic debt.
Under the current circumstances, the implementation of any of these 
two approaches would constitute a formidable achievement. If none of 
these solutions works, then let us hope that green innovations will emerge 
that will make renewable energy cheaper to produce than current fossil 
energy sources. Otherwise the immensely risky adaptation strategy will be 
the only alternative remaining solution for future generations.
Notes
1. See, for example, Bosetti et al. (2013). According to Nordhaus (2015), the equilib-
rium average carbon price that would prevail in a simple global noncooperative 
game is equal to a fraction h of the first-best price, where h is the Herfindahl index 
of country sizes (the Herfindahl index h is the sum of the squares of each country’s 
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share in global output; for example, if there are 10 identical countries, h equals 
10%). He concludes that the equilibrium average carbon price in the absence of a 
coordination mechanism to solve the free-rider problem will be in the order of 
one-tenth of the efficient level.
2. A liability system would not solve the problem. Because of the diffuse and inter-
temporal nature of the pollution, it is impossible to link current individual emis-
sions to future individual damages. Therefore, a liability system cannot fix the 
problem. Besides, even if such a link could be established, one would need an inter-
national agreement to prevent free-riding.
3. Let us emphasize that we are not necessarily opposed to standards. For example, 
one could use an economic instrument to encourage insulation by embodying the 
carbon price into the price of heating fuel and gas housing. However, insulation 
standards may overcome an informational problem (consumers may be poorly 
informed about the energy efficiency of their dwelling) and, for owners, do not 
require a complex computation of intertemporal savings on a carbon price. Our 
point is that standards are often enacted without a clear analysis of whether the 
goals could have been achieved more efficiently and a computation of the implicit 
carbon price involved in their design.
4. The best example is the hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC-23), which has a warming 
effect 11,000 times greater than CO2, so that destroying one ton of HFC-23 earns 
11,000 more CDM certificates than destroying one ton of CO2. From 2005 to June 
2012, 46% of all certificates from the CDM were issued for the destruction of 
HFC-23. Projects for destroying HFC-23 were so profitable it is believed that coolant 
manufacturers may have built new factories to produce the coolant gas. As a conse-
quence, the EU banned the use of HFC-23 certificates in the EU ETS from May 1, 
2013.
5. Many other variants use an economic instrument. For example, countries could 
agree on a universal carbon tax (as opposed to a carbon price), leaving no scope for 
subsidiarity. To do so, a possible strategy would be to set up an international carbon 
tax collection entity. This, however, is not discussed in existing proposals probably 
because it could be perceived as too large an infringement on sovereignty or because 
there are returns to scope in tax collection. Thus, the implementation of the carbon 
tax would likely be left to individual countries, and the proceeds from the carbon 
tax would go to the country. We will here focus on the two commonly advocated 
strategies.
6. This is naturally the same absolute level of a carbon price; adding a common 
carbon price onto the one already in place in each country would not only be inef-
ficient (carbon prices would differ across the world) but also unfair to a country such 
as Sweden, which has been virtuous prior to the agreement and whose extra contri-
bution relative to other countries would thereby be made perennial.
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7. Since Weitzman’s (1974) seminal paper, a sizable literature has compared the rel-
ative merits of the tax-and-cap approaches, focusing on the economic aspects and 
often leaving enforcement and political economy aspects aside (the two systems 
have different implications along these dimensions, as we will discuss later). When 
the various parameters of the climate change equation (climate science, abatement 
technologies, demand) are known, a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system are 
equivalent because, for a given price target, it is always possible to determine the 
supply of permits that will support this equilibrium price and conversely. Not so 
under uncertainty.
8. Under some estimation, it would have cost Canada $14 billion to buy enough 
carbon credits to make its target.
9. Since early 2014, this market is linked to a similar one established by the 
Province of Québec. The current price of permits in California is $12/tCO2 at the 
minimum legal price. This fragmented scheme illustrates the strange economics of 
climate change in the United States, where the minimum carbon price in California 
is larger than the maximum carbon price in RGGI.
10. Article 13 of the Paris Agreement is particularly problematic from this view-
point, stating that the transparency framework should recognize “the special 
circumstances of the least-developed countries […] and be implemented in a facilita-
tive, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner.”
11. Notice that Article 6 of the Paris agreement allows for the use of transferable 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) through voluntary “Inter-
nationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes” (IMTOs). This is reminiscent of the 
inefficient Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) contained in the Kyoto Protocol. 
But some experts see in this Article 6 a hidden intention in favor of an international 
market for INDCs. This could be feasible only if INDCs were legally binding. Market 
solutions cannot work in the absence of transparent and legally enforceable prop-
erty rights.
12. See Cramton and Stoft (2012), Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (chapter 12, this 
volume), Weitzman (2013, chapter 8, this volume), and the other chapters in this 
book. Cramton et al. (2013, chapter 12, this volume) suggest defining a country’s 
carbon price as its carbon revenue divided by its carbon emissions. Others recom-
mend a uniform carbon tax. Still others advocate a global cap and trade system 
leading to a uniform carbon price. At this stage, there is no need to distinguish 
among the various approaches.
13. Weitzman (chapter 8, this volume) derives an analytical solution for this major-
ity voting scheme on the carbon price when the damage function and the marginal 
abatement cost function are linear. In that case, the equilibrium price is efficient 
if and only if the mean and median of the distribution of the country-specific mar-
ginal damages are the same.
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14. In either case, there is also an issue regarding whether the governments will not 
steal or make use of the transfers for their own well-being: they may cash in the 
green fund receipts (or for that matter the carbon tax) or sell permits in the inter-
national market to the same effect. This difficulty is inherent to the respect of sover-
eignty and is not specific to climate policies.
15. See Ellerman et al. (2000) for an extensive analysis of these negotiations.
16. However, Cramton and Stoft (2012) claim that a far smaller amount would be 
needed to support a carbon price of $30/ton and that donor countries would receive 
much more for their money than with the current green fund.
17. This a priori gave Eastern European countries the choice between making 
money by selling permits and not exerting any abatement effort; other countries 
became reluctant to buy the permits, and the second option became the leading 
one.
18. Cramton, Ockenfels, and Stoft (chapter 12, this volume) make a similar point 
for the cap-and-trade initial negotiating approach attempted by Kyoto negotiators, 
who tried to agree on a uniform reduction of x% relative to 1990 emissions; no such 
x could be found.
19. Besides, the Weitzman framework does not allow for more complex but reason-
able mechanisms, such as dynamic adjustment mechanisms to cope with uncer-
tainty. For instance, the European Commission has recently proposed to create a 
market stability reserve starting in 2021. The reserve would cope with the current 
surplus of emission allowances and improve the system’s resilience to shocks by 
adjusting the supply of allowances to be auctioned. It would operate according to 
predefined rules that would leave no discretion to the Commission or member 
states.
An economic debate also exists regarding whether price or quantity schemes best 
insulate countries against uncertainty about climate risk or technology. In theory, 
hedging instruments should provide an efficient allocation of risk worldwide, but 
little is known about to the extent to which markets would actually deliver this.
20. We will not expand on another political economy dimension here. Another 
issue with a carbon tax is the legal process. This obstacle is certainly not insurmount-
able but requires specific attention. First, taxes are usually set every year. What is 
needed for climate change control is a long-term commitment (think about the SO2 
tradable permits in the United States, which are issued 30 years ahead). Second, 
taxes are generally the prerogative of parliaments. For example, in Europe, setting 
up the ETS cap-and-trade scheme required only a majority vote, whereas tax harmo-
nization is subject to the unanimity rule, and therefore a carbon tax would have 
been almost impossible to achieve. So an exception needs to be made to prevent 
individual parliaments from undoing the international agreement.
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21. Cramton et al. (2013; and chapter 12, this book) also argue in favor of subsidiar-
ity, although on slightly different grounds.
22. We have not studied and therefore will not discuss the question of aggregation 
of the various efforts along different dimensions. The choice of weights and their 
relationship to technological progress has been discussed in the literature on price 
indices (e.g., Diewert 1993); relevant here is also the embryonic literature on price 
caps (here floor) (Armstrong and Vickers, 2000; Laffont and Tirole, 1999). The opti-
mal response of a country, even in the absence of political economy/favoritism 
considerations, will not satisfy the law of one price, both within the country (the 
country-optimal tax depends on good-specific cost and local pollution characteris-
tics) and across countries. However, we do not have an educated guess as to whether 
these deviations from price coherence impose sizable costs; in comparison with the 
distortions attached with current pledge-and-review approach, this is without doubt 
a second-order issue.
23. All symposium authors agree that enforcement should work in two steps: (1) 
monitor, and (2) impose trade sanctions if necessary. Of course, this is not straight-
forward. In the last few years, and despite the existence of a program and the pres-
ence of the Troika in the country, Greece made little progress in curbing tax evasion. 
It is difficult for foreigners to impose a tax when the government is reluctant to 
strengthen it. Although in both cases (sovereign debt and climate agreements), the 
foreigners have a strong vested interest in domestic tax collection, one could argue 
that the problem is even more complex in the climate context and that there is no 
reason to believe that the international community would be much more successful 
in obtaining compliance of the carbon tax agreement. Indeed, some compliance-
prone factors are not even present in the case of climate change: there is no troika in 
each country threatening to cut the flow of lending; countries are not under a pro-
gram (and therefore carefully monitored); they also derive some benefits from com-
pliance (prospect of no longer being under a program, of not facing international 
sanctions in case of default), whereas for most countries almost 100% of the benefits 
of good behavior are enjoyed by foreigners.
24. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EP.PMP.SGAS.CD/countries/1.
25. For example, the NASA Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) is already orbit-
ing the planet. The ESA CarbonSat project is also promising.
26. See Green and Newbery (1992) and Joskow andTirole (2000).
27. Even in a well-designed, long-term-oriented system, such as the acid rain pro-
gram in the United States, SO2 prices have been volatile. They were stable in the first 
10 years but then exhibited substantial volatility from 2005 through 2009, for 
instance.
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28. The precise implementation of this mechanism has been criticized for being 
asymmetric and failing to have the desired dampening effect (Trotignon et al., 
2015).
29. For instance, suppose that scientists demonstrate that the climate is deteriorat-
ing faster than had been thought. Then permits must be withdrawn. The Market 
Stability Reserve mechanism reacts to an intertemporal use of permits (“is permit 
use more frontloaded or backloaded than expected?”) rather than to the overall 
target. So it is likely to miss some desirable adjustments.
30. In an asymmetric information framework, Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2016) 
describe the optimal mechanism that prevents the free-riding problem with local 
co-benefits when participation is voluntary.
31. Incidentally, we are not convinced that the Onusian framework is optimal 
either, as bargaining among 195 nations is incredibly complex. A coalition of the 
current and future high emitters (say the G20) might prove more effective, both to 
negotiate and then put pressure on other countries, including through the WTO.
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11 From the Paris Agreement to the Carbon Convergence
Éloi Laurent*
Introduction: Reducing Climate Inconsistency
The 32-page Paris agreement (and the related decisions) adopted on Decem-
ber 12, 2015, by COP 21 is the result of an undeniable diplomatic success. 
The French presidency and countries that, like Canada, acted positively 
during these difficult negotiations played their cards properly under the 
circumstances.
But from a scientific point of view, Paris is short of what would be needed 
to really protect humankind against climate change and its worrying con-
sequences. This is the foreseeable paradoxical outcome of the Paris Confer-
ence: an unprecedented universal climate agreement that is unable to solve 
our climate crisis.
The basic reason why diplomacy cannot deliver scientific require-
ments is that the negotiating parties do not feel that there is, under the 
current rules, a fair, level playing field. Creating a negotiating framework 
which may lead to an effective climate agreement requires the institution 
of a world carbon price. This is what I intend to demonstrate in this chap-
ter, based on the Dion-Laurent proposition (see Dion and Laurent, 2015).
Ideally, COP 21 would have extended to the emerging markets, starting 
with China and India, the binding commitments agreed in Kyoto 18 years 
earlier by the developed countries. What took place was exactly the oppo-
site: every country is now effectively out of Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
released from any legal constraints on the nature of their commitments 
in the fight against climate change, which now amount to voluntary 
* Éloi Laurent is a senior economist at OFCE/Sciences Po (Paris) and a Visiting 
Professor at Stanford University.
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contributions (“Intended Nationally Determined Contribution,” or INDC) 
that countries determine on their own and without reference to a com-
mon goal.
The Paris agreement gives rise to a new global variable, which we can 
accurately track over the coming years: the factor of climate inconsistency, 
which compares objectives and means. At the end of COP 21, this ratio was 
in the range of 1.35 to 2 (the climate objective chosen, specified in Article 
2, lies between 1.5°C and 2°C, whereas the sum of national voluntary con-
tributions pledged to reach this would lead to warming of 2.7°C to 3°C). In 
a more positive version, the factor of climate lucidity lies between 50% and 
74%. The question facing us now is thus: How do we deal with this climate 
inconsistency by bringing the means deployed into line with the ambi-
tions declared (bringing the climate inconsistency factor to 1 or the climate 
lucidity factor to 100%)?
The need to put a price on carbon (and thus give it social value), 
which had been gaining momentum prior to COP 21, as was highlighted 
from the opening of the summit under the aegis of Angela Merkel and 
François Hollande, still appeared in the penultimate version of the Paris 
agreement. It disappeared from the final version (under the combined 
pressure of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela). Yet there is no doubt that by 
internalizing the price of carbon, we will put the economy at the service 
of the climate transition. But it seems at this point that the world’s gov-
ernments have decided to outsource this internalization function to the 
private sector. It is necessary to quickly take this in hand, both internally 
and globally.
Climate inconsistency can indeed be reduced in large part by introduc-
ing into climate negotiations the goal to develop a robust global carbon-
pricing system. The new system would rely on a few simple principles:
• The common climate objective is now officially to limit global warming 
between 1.5°C and 2°C above preindustrial levels; a global carbon price 
must therefore aim to meet that objective;
• Whatever one’s opinion on the debate regarding the best way to levy 
a carbon price—tax or emissions trading—various countries have already 
picked their own path, and trying to get them to fit the same mold would 
be unrealistic1;
• Several countries have pledged to meet quantitative reduction targets 
(pledge-and-review strategy); rather than asking these countries to abandon 
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those targets in favor of a global carbon price, it would be better to show 
them that negotiating such a price would be a powerful means to meet—or 
even exceed—their targets;
• Because the internationally agreed principle of “Common but Differenti-
ated Responsibilities” would make it difficult to set a single price imme-
diately, it would be more realistic to consider a price convergence-based 
process stretching over a number of years, as proposed by such international 
bodies as the International Energy Agency; and
• Given that the developed countries have pledged to provide $100 bil-
lion yearly to help the most vulnerable countries deal with climate change, 
global carbon-price negotiations cannot be used to cancel that commit-
ment: on the contrary, they are a good means to meet—or even surpass—
the commitment.
Before reviewing those points in more detail, let’s see by the numbers 
why the current climate negotiation system is fundamentally flawed.
The Unflattering Carbon Footprint of Climate Negotiations Thus Far
It is a well-known fact today—at least in academic circles and a significant 
segment of the international community—that greenhouse gas emissions 
(responsible for the climate changes observed in the second half of the 
20th century and predicted to continue until the end of the 21st century) 
have increased during the last 25 years. The average annual increase went 
from 1% between 1990 and 1999 to 3.3% between 2000 and 2009. After 
a slight decrease during the great recession, greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions began rising again at an annual rate of 2.5%.2 True, the latest news is 
surprisingly good: in a March 2015 communiqué, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) announced that emissions had decreased in 2014, and for 
the same year, data released by BP in June 2015 showed a slight increase 
of 0.5%. On March 16 2016, the IEA announced that for 2015 as well (a 
second year in a row), global emissions had stabilized (energy-related CO2 
emissions amounted to 32.14 gigatons in 2015 compared with 32.13 in 
2014 and 32.87 in 2013).
But that decrease, largely due to China’s economic slowdown and reduc-
tion in coal consumption, should not be used to distract from the obvi-
ous observation that since 1997 and the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
world’s countries have been doing the opposite of what climate science 
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recommends, causing global emissions to rise by more than 60% since 
1990. As highlighted in the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), the disconnect between the intensifying cli-
mate crisis and stagnating international negotiations has never been wider.
With so much scientific evidence warning us against the catastrophic 
impact of climate change on human welfare, how can this discrepancy be 
explained if not by the inefficiency and inefficacy of the current climate 
negotiation framework?
The thinking today is that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which guided these 
negotiations following the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(decided at the 1992 Rio Summit), has been a resounding failure. However, 
that is not the case: in fact, protocol-bound Annex 1 countries3 did live up 
to their commitments—albeit only by resorting to a sleight of hand that led 
us to understand why we must now change the system.
In Kyoto, the most economically developed countries made a first—and 
supposedly binding—GHG emission reduction commitment, whereas the 
less developed countries were exempted from such commitments due to 
their lower development levels and lower GHG emissions. In 1990—the 
baseline year for calculating emissions—the first-group nations (former 
Soviet Union members and OECD countries) were deemed responsible for 
60% of the total GHG emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol, these countries 
committed to reduce their emissions by approximately 5% by 2012, com-
pared with 1990 levels. What is not always known today is that this objec-
tive was met. Even better, the latest available data show that the reduction 
almost reached 10% (even 15% according to some estimates): thus, Annex 
1 countries did twice as well as expected but almost entirely because of 
the collapse of the USSR, which biased outcomes.4 Although these dubious 
reductions were taking place, a much more significant increase was rearing 
its head in the rest of the world. Between the early 1990s and early 2010s, 
the emission ratio of Annex 1 countries versus exempted countries reversed 
itself, with the Annex 1 share of emissions going from 60% of global emis-
sions to less than 40% (see table 11.1).
Therefore, the economic vision that informed the Kyoto Protocol is now 
totally obsolete. The problem that ails the current climate action frame-
work, defined in 1997, is fourfold:
• An efficiency problem: the targets set in 1997 and instruments deployed 
since then (which are called “flexibility mechanisms” in the Protocol and 
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include markets in pollution rights) are unable to stem the global GHG 
emission dynamics;
• A transparency problem: the quantitative, volume-based emission targets 
approach suffers from result-skewing biases. The baseline date that was 
chosen (generally 1990) is problematic for former USSR countries, some 
of which have since joined the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the 
Kyoto Protocol keeps account of production-based emissions (emissions 
generated within a given territory) but not consumption-based emissions 
(emissions from a country’s production that are included, as incorporated 
carbon, in products consumed by other countries); thus, the paradox of a 
text of which the letter has been complied with while the problem that text 
was supposed to solve was made worse by “carbon leaks”5;
• An inclusiveness problem: henceforth, a binding international climate 
agreement must without fail include all major GHG emitters, including—
and especially—emerging economies (starting with China, which is respon-
sible for almost one-third of global emissions, and India, which could well 
see its still modest emissions increase significantly as the country develops 
its production and consumption of coal); and
• An incentive problem: volume-based emission reductions are seen by 
developing countries as a “carbon constraint,” an unfair impediment to 
Table 11.1
2013 CO2 Emissions
Emissions Per Capita Total* % of Total
Annex 1 7.5 13.05
United States 16.4 5.23 14.5
EU-28 6.8 3.48 9.6
Russia 12.7 1.81 5.0
Japan 9.8 1.25 3.4
Canada 14.3 0.50 1.4
China 7.2 9.98 27.6
India 1.9 2.41 6.7
South Korea 12.5 0.62 1.7
Iran 7.9 0.61 1.7
Saudi Arabia 18.0 0.52 1.4
* Emissions in GtCO2, from fossil energy consumption and cement production.
Source: Global Carbon Project.
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their economic development; and during economic crises, quantitative 
targets may become difficult to accept by developed countries.
Any reform proposal that aims to outgrow the current negotiation sys-
tem must therefore offer solutions to the four problems. However, as was 
expected, the Paris agreement operates within the Kyoto framework, the 
shortcomings of which all countries participating in the negotiations know 
well but are fearful to challenge given the fragility of the global climate 
consensus.
The Paris Agreement: Missing the Wrong Targets Softly?
A Legally Weak Agreement
The key factor in achieving an appearance of success at COP 21 was to 
manage expectations beforehand. That has been the major failure of the 
2009 Copenhagen Conference, where negotiators promised a global, legally 
binding agreement but could not deliver it in the end, causing a huge disap-
pointment. This is why Paris negotiators adopted a flexible position on the 
legal form of the final text. Contrary to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris text is 
an “agreement” instead of a “treaty,” meaning that its legal power will be 
even weaker. As is well known in diplomatic circles, having an international 
text labeled as an “agreement” is rarely a good sign.
This can indeed be seen as a victory for the US negotiators, who have 
insisted that a legally binding text—which would require the Republican-
controlled Senate’s approval—had no chance of being adopted. Although 
the Obama administration had convinced other parties that it could act 
on the basis of executive force (the rationale behind the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) final ruling on cutting emissions from coal-fired 
plants released in early August 2015), it was hard not to consider climate 
policy in the United States as conditional, the conditionality being that the 
legal challenges of the states are overturned by the US Supreme Court. The 
US Supreme Court decision on February 9, 2016, to freeze EPA rules cut-
ting carbon emissions from power plants until the Washington, DC, circuit 
court of appeals hears challenges from 29 mainly Republican-led states and 
dozens of corporations and industry groups has confirmed this fear. The 
US political polarization, not unrelated to the damaging effect of income 
inequality, is thus a drag on global climate policy. There are strong reasons 
to believe that the Trump administration will only exacerbate this political 
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polarization and move away from a lucid climate policy domestically and 
globally.
The Stubborn Ambition-Science Gap
At the 2011 Durban Conference (COP 17), the parties acknowledged the 
gap between their commitments and achieving the 2°C objective. In the 
preamble of their joint statement, they expressed “grave concern” and 
promised to “raise the level of ambition” to bridge this gap. At the Lima 
Conference (COP 20) in December 2014, the parties reiterated6 the same 
“grave concern” about “the significant gap between the aggregate effect of 
Parties’ mitigation pledges” and the goal of holding the increase in global 
average temperature below the 2°C limit. But the ambition-science gap has 
so far survived all virtuous proclamations.
Climate negotiations have revolved crucially around volumes of car-
bon emitted: under the Kyoto Protocol, a country’s climate performance is 
assessed in terms of emission reduction targets compared with their 1990 
levels, and climate commitments are being framed in terms of emission 
reductions up to 2030 or 2050.
There are two reasons that this volume-based approach can be insuf-
ficient: it does not specify the instruments that are supposed to be used 
to match the volume targets, and it does not take into account carbon 
flows, which are emissions resulting not only from national production 
but also from national consumption. The gap between the two can be quite 
large: the EU has reduced its GHG emissions by close to 20% in terms of 
production since 1990 but by only 5% when consumption emissions are 
considered. A country such as France sees its climate performance since 
1990 completely turned upside down when consumption emissions are 
considered instead of production emissions.
But even if one withholds judgment on the potential efficiency of the 
volume approach, it appears to fall short on its own ambitions: Climate 
Action Tracker experts, assessing the announcements and commitments to 
track their compatibility with the 2°C threshold, conclude that existing and 
announced measures lead to an increase above 3°C and possibly as high as 
3.7°C in global temperatures, much higher, as previously noted, than the 
objectives of the Paris agreement. The latest IEA assessment indicates that 
given the INDCs submitted, the path would be “consistent with an aver-
age temperature increase of around 2.6°C by 2100 and 3.5°C after 2200”7 
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(the scenario assumes that countries will fulfill their climate commitments, 
which is doubtful).
The Perils of Commitments without Instruments
The agreement reached by the EU Member States in the fall of 2014 is a 
good illustration of the limitations of any strategy based on emission reduc-
tion targets alone, with no efficient and effective carbon-pricing system. 
Indeed, the European “climate-energy package” can be considered a base-
less pyramid: the GHG emission reduction target of 40% by 2030 is only 
supported by nonbinding energy efficiency and renewable energy targets, 
which are not underpinned by a true carbon-pricing reform.
At the basis of the European agreement lies a dysfunctional, derelict 
carbon-pricing system. The end result is commitments without instru-
ments and “ambitious” emission reduction targets suspended over a sea 
of ambiguity. The same can be said of most current national commitments 
that are lacking adequate instruments.
National emission reduction targets must absolutely be accompanied by 
adequate and coordinated implementation tools, including a trial global 
carbon price. In other words, negotiators should aim for a “commitments 
+ instruments” strategy up to 2020 rather than a “commitments-only” 
agreement.
The Need for Climate Justice
In Copenhagen (COP 15) and Cancún (COP 16), the developed countries 
committed to a contribution of $100 billion per year beginning in 2020 to 
help developing nations fight—and adapt to—climate change. A fund—the 
“Green Climate Fund”—has been createdto provide developing countries 
with the substantial financial and technological assistance they require.
Developing countries take this commitment seriously. They have made 
it known that no agreement will be possible in Paris without the conclu-
sion of a clear plan for the delivery, through the Green Climate Fund, of the 
committed $100 billion per year by 2020.
Unfortunately, despite years of ongoing discussion over this agreed-on 
$100 billion target, nobody knows how much each developed country is 
supposed to contribute, and the Paris agreement has done little to clarify 
this question. What we do know, however, is that raising such a sum will 
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require private-sector contributions. This will not happen in the absence of 
a fully functional, robust, and comprehensive carbon-pricing system.
Focusing negotiations on a world carbon price in addition to quantita-
tive reductions of emissions can alleviate all four problems. First, it can 
strengthen the Paris agreement by providing economic incentives so that 
countries take charge of their climate commitments rather than engage in 
carbon freeriding. Second, it can serve as a tool for adjusting climate com-
mitments and hence gradually increase the level of ambition of nation-states 
so that the gap between commitments and science-based requirements can 
be progressively closed; note that such a tool can also enhance the effi-
ciency of the agreement by controlling carbon flows. Third, it can provide 
a credible instrumental basis for climate commitments. Fourth, it can pro-
vide the source of the $100 billion pledged by developed countries to fight 
climate change globally.
Building the Carbon Convergence
Governments and businesses are unlikely to realize their climate-change 
goals if they have no definite assurance that their competitors will play by 
the same rules. To address this stalemate, we need an international agree-
ment that gives them that assurance, one that changes the rules of the game 
so they apply to every player. We need to create a system whereby every 
decision maker, public or private, is responsible for taking into account the 
true cost of global warming and is secure in the knowledge that the com-
petitors are doing the same.
This explains why more and more experts—including every author of 
the Symposium on International Climate Negotiations8—agree that putting 
a price on carbon is essential to the success of any serious, comprehensive 
climate plan. The International Monetary Fund now recommends it,9 as 
does the OECD.10 The World Bank11 convinced 73 countries, 22 subnational 
jurisdictions, and more than 1,000 companies and investors to declare their 
support for a price on carbon. The Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate12 has also pointed out that a carbon price may be beneficial 
for the economy.
There are opportunities to explore linkages between carbon pricing and 
the new international climate change agreement13 to be reached in Paris. 
But the main challenge facing us is how to evolve from a hodge-podge of 
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local or national carbon prices to a global, harmonized carbon-pricing sys-
tem. The IPCC recommends14 a solution: adopting a “single global carbon 
price.” The price should be high enough to create the necessary incentives 
to limit global warming to about 2°C. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA)15 recommends that the price of one ton of CO2 be gradually raised by 
2040 to $140 for developed countries and $125 for China, Russia, Brazil, 
and South Africa (in US 2013 dollars). According to the IEA,16 this goal can 
be reached without harming economic development.
It is impossible to reach a global carbon price of $125 or $140 per ton 
of CO2 without first having negotiated an international agreement that 
ensures all economic agents that their competitors will play by the same 
climate rules. Indeed, carbon pricing will not reach the desired level as long 
as individual countries fear that carbon price setting within their respective 
jurisdictions will scare away businesses and investors will send them off to 
countries where carbon dioxide emissions are cheaper or free of charge. The 
idea is to refocus these international efforts on negotiating a global, harmo-
nized carbon-price signal.
All countries would pledge to introduce, in their respective jurisdictions, 
a gradually evolving carbon price based on a scientifically validated inter-
national standard, in order for the world to keep global warming as close 
as possible to 2°C over preindustrial levels. Countries may levy this price 
through carbon taxes or emission quotas. Governments would be free to 
invest, as they see fit, any revenues accruing from carbon emission lev-
ies and the corresponding—and necessary—gradual elimination of fossil 
energy subsidies.
In keeping with the principle of “Common But Differentiated Respon-
sibility,” developed countries would be required to set aside part of their 
carbon pricing revenues to help developing countries introduce policies to 
lower their emissions, adapt to climate change impacts, and create carbon 
sinks (e.g., through reforestation). This requirement would help fund the 
yet unsourced $100 billion annual injection into the Green Climate Fund 
that was promised to developing countries for 2020 to help them deal with 
climate change. That amount could even be increased. The Dion-Laurent 
plan proposes that the contributions of individual developed countries be 
set according to the proportion of total developed country emissions that 
their respective GHG emissions represent. The lower a country’s emission 
level, the lower its share of the financial effort. This would serve as a further 
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incentive for emission reductions. Other formulas are also conceivable, 
such as making the contributions proportional to emissions in excess of 
the global average per capita rate, but the argument will likely be made 
that the most advanced economies—those that have the best technological 
capacities—should be the ones helping the others.
This international carbon-pricing agreement would allow countries to 
levy border taxes on products from countries that have not established a 
carbon-price signal in accordance with the international standard. That 
would be a solution of last resort, to be applied after the usual warnings 
have been issued. In this manner, it will be in each country’s interest to 
comply with the international agreement, levy a carbon price on its own 
emissions, and use the resulting revenue as it sees fit.
Conclusion: From Climate Science to Climate Justice
Climate negotiations are not only a technical discussion based on scientific 
data but also a political dialogue ultimately based on ethical criteria.
The fight against climate change must not only be presented as an oppor-
tunity for economic development but also as a lever to reduce inequalities 
in human development between countries and within countries. The case 
of China shows how the constraint of reducing CO2 emissions can be a 
way to limit coal consumption and limit damage on the health of Chinese, 
unevenly distributed within the Chinese population. The same applies to 
the limitation of car traffic in France, which represents both a health gain 
and reduction of CO2 emissions. This double climate-health dividend must 
be at the heart of state contributions to the reduction of global CO2 emis-
sions. Climate justice highlights the equality potential of the fight against 
climate change at the national and international levels. This is why we 
need to follow up on the Paris agreement with two sets of criteria: climate 
science and climate justice must be combined in a single plan. That is 
precisely why the Dion-Laurent proposition brings together the logic of 
science-based efficiency and ethics-based justice:
1. Science-based efficiency: a carbon budget set to the 2°C limit leads to 
the establishment of a differentiated trajectory of gradually converging 
global pricing of carbon, each country freely determining the mix of 
instruments used to raise its price; and
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2. Ethics-based justice: the proposed carbon-price system addresses 
inequalities between countries (through modulations and compensa-
tions) and within countries (accelerating adaptation of financing).
An international carbon-price agreement would provide the world with 
an excellent instrument for sustainable development. After decades of 
international stalemate, carbon emitters would have to acknowledge the 
obvious social and environmental costs of pollution. Consumers and man-
ufacturers would have an incentive to choose lower carbon-content goods 
and services and invest in new energy-saving and emission-reducing tech-
nologies. Governments and legislators would have the tools to achieve the 
scientific climate targets they have endorsed.
This plan is necessary—more so than ever—to protect humankind from 
the threat of a 3°C—or more—global warming. Current initiatives are not 
without merit, but they are insufficient. Our world leaders must champion 
what a comprehensive and effective climate/energy policy needs: a world-
wide, harmonized carbon price.
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12 An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes 
Cooperation
Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, and Steven Stoft*
How a Common Commitment Promotes International Agreement
For 20 years, climate negotiators have been stymied by the most challeng-
ing tragedy of the commons ever encountered. The central problem is well 
understood. All countries can use the atmospheric commons for free, but 
only a small fraction of the benefits of investing in CO2 reductions accrue 
to the country that incurs the cost of such an investment. As a result, 
self-interested countries rationally invest too little in CO2 abatement and 
instead attempt to free-ride on the hoped-for investments of others. Indeed, 
“climate change is a public good (bad) par excellence” (Arrow, 2007).
The Kyoto process started with a natural approach to breaking the free-
rider deadlock: agree on a common commitment. A common commitment 
helps realign self-interest with the common good by assuring all parties 
that they will only be required to contribute to the common good if all 
are required to follow the same commitment rule. This “I will if you will” 
feature is critical for solving problems of the commons.1
A common commitment needs to be enforced like any other commit-
ment. Yet the fairness that comes with protection from exploitation offered 
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by a reciprocal common commitment removes one reason to defect. Also, 
because defecting will weaken the common commitment and hence jeop-
ardize the contributions of others, a well-structured common commitment 
automatically embodies some enforcement.2 Moreover, as we show later, 
a price commitment reduces risks compared with quantity commitments 
and thus reduces the needed size of the enforcement penalty.
In a nutshell, a common commitment facilitates the collective reci-
procity that is the only known way of overcoming free-riding—the cen-
tral problem of climate negotiations (Weitzman, chapter 8, this volume). 
Moreover, it is likely a necessary precursor to the implementation of 
effective enforcement. Yet Kyoto failed to find such a commitment. This 
failure was no accident. The quantity commitments needed for inter-
national cap-and-trade preclude a common commitment. This chapter 
suggests this is the foundation underlying the proposals for an inter-
national price commitment by Cooper (2004, chapter 5, this volume), 
Nordhaus (2013), Stiglitz (chapter 6, this volume), Weitzman (chapter 8, 
this volume), and ourselves.
Why Kyoto Failed
Initially, many countries supported a common commitment by all to reduce 
their emissions by an equal, agreed percentage below their 1990 emission 
levels. Such a general percentage-reduction rule—as opposed to individu-
ally pledged percentages—would constitute a common commitment. But 
many disagreed, and at least 10 other formulas were developed and con-
sidered. After many failed attempts, the resolve to forge a common com-
mitment was broken and replaced with a resignation to accept individual 
commitments. Indeed, even before concluding the negotiations, Chairman 
Estrada allowed parties “to negotiate their own targets” and finally “invited 
Annex I Parties to submit their revised, final, numbers to the podium” with-
out any restrictions (Depledge, 2000, p. 214).
The European Union (EU) offered a 15% emission cut with a common 
commitment but accepted only 8% when that failed.3 Russia accepted 0%, 
Australia and Iceland accepted 8% and 10% increases, respectively, and 
the United States accepted a 7% cut, which was not serious. Of course the 
developing countries accepted nothing and with the EU masked cuts that 
ranged from 30% to an increase of 40%. The 95 to 0 rejection by the US 
Senate was explicitly linked to the fear of free-riding, although there were 
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other motives as well. The lack of an acceptable common commitment 
meant there was little check on free-riding, but if any common commit-
ment had been forced on the parties, the outcome would have been worse, 
which is why none was agreed to. The Kyoto negotiations were right to 
focus on the search for a common commitment, but what they proved, 
after more than a year of searching, was that no common quantity com-
mitment can be found. The result was a weak and fragile international cap 
and the mistaken conclusion that a common commitment is impossible. 
The mistake was accepting the international-cap-and-trade straight jacket 
as inevitable.
Interestingly, the Kyoto Protocol also failed to achieve its second goal: 
equalized prices. International permits were implemented in the form of 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). The Soviet Bloc’s AAUs are referred to as 
“hot air” in the popular press, and, in fact, some AAU trades that took 
place simply enriched those in Eastern Europe who faced no burden from 
the Kyoto Protocol. Because trading was seen as inappropriately redistribu-
tional and evasive of climate commitments, AAU trading became so con-
troversial that Japan had to publicly deny purchasing AAUs from countries 
previously in the Soviet Bloc.4 Now the UN has restricted AAU trading.5 As 
a result, and because of political uncertainties (Edenhofer et al., 2014) and 
various regulatory interventions (Marcantonini and Ellerman, 2014), quan-
tity commitments did not lead to anything like the hoped-for equalization 
of carbon prices.
Stiglitz (2006b, chapter 6, this volume) has explained why there is no 
reason to believe anyone will ever come up with a quantity-based emissions 
rule. The history of the Kyoto negotiations strongly confirms that requir-
ing quantity targets will block any hope of a broad common commitment 
even without including the developing countries. The US government has 
now come to the same conclusion.6 Without a common commitment, any 
agreement, if one could be reached, would again be weak and fragile. It 
would not produce anything like a uniform price on carbon. Kyoto was a 
useful experiment, but the world learned the wrong lesson.
Kyoto’s Legacy for International Climate Negotiations
In response to Kyoto’s dramatic failure and then Copenhagen’s, the idea 
of striving for a common global commitment was abandoned on the way 
to Paris. Rather, it was hoped that individually selected quantity targets 
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will cover the bulk of global emissions with sufficient stringency. Indeed, 
the plan for Paris was to let every country simply pledge to do whatever it 
wants. There will be reviews without consequences for hundreds of incom-
parable proposals (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 10, this volume). If countries 
fall short of their pledges, then there still will be no consequences.
This pledge-and-review approach is unlikely to work (Cooper et al., 
chapter 1, this volume). As the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates, individu-
ally adopted targets do not change self-interest, at least not by enough to 
notice. The reason is that such agreements are not of the “I will if you 
will” type (MacKay et al., chapter 2, this volume; Cramton et al., chapter 4, 
this volume). In fact, under the Kyoto Protocol, several countries, includ-
ing the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and Russian, have said 
“We won’t” while the others continue to say “We will.” So the Protocol is 
an “I will even if you won’t” agreement. This is an agreement of nations 
acting altruistically—a coalition of the politically willing. But as explained 
by Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume), among others, there is no 
reason to suppose that altruism can solve the tragedy of the commons. 
Conditional cooperation in the vein of “I will if you will,” in contrast, pro-
vides a strong source of cooperation, as explained by Weitzman (chapter 8, 
this volume). Indeed, conditional cooperation is the most robust pattern 
of cooperation seen in laboratory, field, and theoretical studies of free-rider 
situations and is—unlike unilateral altruism—consistently found to stabi-
lize higher cooperation levels. Numerous studies show that conditionally 
cooperative strategies can promote cooperation levels well beyond what 
is theoretically sustainable among selfish players. One reason is that con-
ditional cooperation—unlike unilateral altruism—is considered fair (see 
Hauser et al., 2014; Kraft-Todd et al., 2015; MacKay et al., 2015, and refer-
ences therein).
This is why we advocate that negotiations again focus on a common 
commitment. Although a common quantity commitment proved infea-
sible, we argue that a common price commitment can substantially miti-
gate many of the problems associated with quantity commitments (see also 
Stiglitz, chapter 6, this volume; Weitzman, chapter 8, this volume). One 
reason is that there is near-unanimous agreement that each country should 
commit to the same price, which thus constitutes what Schelling (1960) 
calls a focal point. Such a common commitment makes possible the type 
of agreement that changes self-interests for the better: “I will commit to the 
common price if you will.”
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The difference between the two commitments—price and quantity—has 
been overlooked in part because the two can be economically equivalent 
in a world without uncertainty. A global cap induces a carbon price, and 
taxing carbon at that price would limit emissions to that cap. But for reach-
ing agreements, the two targets are substantially different. Before exploring 
that in more depth, it is useful to review why international commitments 
do not automatically induce specific national policies.
International Commitments Are Not National Policies
Economists sometimes imagine that caps or taxes could be implemented 
by an international tax-collection agency or international cap-and-trade 
market covering a large majority of each country’s carbon emissions. Such 
plans assume a dose of top-down regulation that is presently infeasible.
However, a different pair of alternatives requires no such top-down 
apparatus and would allow countries tremendous flexibility. Under these 
alternatives, countries simply commit to a set of quantity commitments 
(regarding carbon permits) or a price. Either type of commitment could be 
met by national or regional cap-and-trade markets, fossil-fuel taxes, or any 
mixture of these along with bonus-malus systems applied to, for example, 
auto emissions estimated at the time of sale. An example of a mixture is the 
EU’s reliance on a weak cap-and-trade market and a strong tax on carbon 
in the form of an oil tax. Another possibility is cap-and-trade with a floor 
price. This flexibility should minimize the acrimonious debate over caps 
and taxes to the extent possible because all countries could adopt linked 
cap-and-trade markets under either a global price commitment or a set of 
global quantity commitments. Countries also comply with either commit-
ment by using fossil-fuel taxes.
Defining a Global Price Commitment
A country that commits to the global price only needs to meet the commit-
ment on average. The average carbon price is simply the country’s carbon 
revenues divided by its emissions. The revenue can, of course, come from 
selling permits under cap-and-trade, fossil fuel taxes, or calculations on 
other pricing-compatible regulation.
There should be some restrictions on how unevenly a country prices its 
carbon. For example, exports should face a price rather close to the global 
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price. (The same is true under an international cap.) But we will not get into 
such details.
Also, our definition leaves a question of how to count preexisting taxes. 
There are at least two views on this. For accounting simplicity, all carbon 
charges would be counted toward compliance. We prefer this approach 
for pragmatic reasons. Another view is that this would be true after some 
base year, say 2015, and the fossil-fuel tax rate in that base year (exclud-
ing any taxes imposed for climate reasons) would be subtracted from all 
future carbon-price measurements. Both approaches are quite simple, and 
from an implementation point of view, the only difference is that the sec-
ond approach requires a one-time accounting of fossil-fuel tax revenues 
at the start. There is no need to untangle taxes by purpose after the initial 
accounting, and even that may be unnecessary. So there is no possibility 
of gaming the commitment by saying a nonclimate tax is for the climate. 
Going forward, all taxes count.
Of course, it is inefficient to credit a new tax to pay for highways as if 
it were a carbon tax for the climate (Gollier and Tirole, chapter 10, this 
volume). But this is simply the minor inefficiency of not having a perfectly 
uniform tax, which seems even more out of reach with an international 
cap-and-trade scheme, as we will explain later.
Price versus Quantity Commitments: A Comparison
This chapter argues for correcting the flaw that derailed the Kyoto process 
and for returning to Kyoto’s sound fundamental principle: agree on a com-
mon commitment that leads to (fairly) uniform carbon pricing. It proposes 
to do so in the most straightforward way—by using a global price commit-
ment. Similar views have been expressed by Cooper (2004, 2008), Nordhaus 
(2013), Weitzman (2014), and Cramton and Stoft (2012a, 2012b), as well as 
throughout most of this book.
Although a single price commitment would be effective and is within 
reach, as we discuss throughout this chapter, it appears impossible to agree 
on n national quantity commitments. Stiglitz (chapter 6, this volume) 
has made the case that there is no way to achieve a compromise between 
rich and poor countries regarding quantity commitments, and Weitzman 
(chapter 8, this volume) argues that quantities cannot be successfully nego-
tiated. We add that history confirms this. The hope of finding a common 
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quantity commitment was high at the start of the Kyoto treaty but has 
declined steadily ever since to the point where no one any longer men-
tions the possibility. Neither is there any discussion of how individual 
quantity commitments might be negotiated, even in this book, which 
raises this as the central topic for discussion. This explains why we will not 
attempt to refute any arguments that quantity commitments, common or 
individual, could be successfully negotiated. Rather, we will focus on com-
paring the two negotiation processes in terms of reciprocity and common 
commitments.
Importantly, cap-and-trade advocates and tax proponents nearly always 
agree that a uniform global price is the desired outcome. So unlike quan-
tity, for which there is little if any agreement on the appropriate common 
commitment rule, there is nearly universal agreement that a common price 
commitment should be a uniform price commitment (or more precisely 
a uniform price floor). That is, a uniform price is a natural focal point. 
This facilitates negotiations about the price commitment (Schelling, 1960; 
Weitzman, chapter 8, this volume).
There is an apparent but not actual symmetry between the global cap 
of Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) and the global price of our 
approach. Gollier and Tirole suggest a cap corresponding to 2°C, which 
is likely a focal point. Also, as they point out, negotiating a cap avoids 
the free-rider problem, much like negotiating a price. However, there is an 
important difference. Although a global price is a common commitment, 
a global quantity is only a common aspiration. Individual countries can 
implement the global price, and their commitment to the price is in prin-
ciple enforceable. But no country can implement the global cap. An aspira-
tion cannot be enforced.
The practical benefit of a price commitment is that it takes us most of 
the way to the set of final commitments. It resolves who will do how much 
for the climate, and of course it can also strive to reach the 2°C goal or any 
other focal climate goal. It leaves only the question of equity transfers to 
be resolved. This is still a crucial and difficult question (and we will get 
to it below), but focusing on price helps to disentangle it from the larger 
question of climate efforts.
Another advantage is that price is an inherently fairer measure of effort 
intensity than is a Kyoto-style quantity measure. The United States has 
tried to persuade India to commit to a cap in the vicinity of its emissions 
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level, which would have been lower than the per capita emission of the 
United States in 1880. Not surprisingly, India rejected this idea. Accepting a 
carbon price would not limit India to any lower emission rate or “intensity 
rate” than the United States, and it would even allow India to emit as much 
or even more per capita than the United States. A price treats India more 
equitably and is at least as efficient as a cap that induces the same carbon 
emissions.
Monitoring and Corruption
For the two global commitments (as opposed to national policies), two 
main questions will determine which is best. The first concerns reaching 
an agreement (discussed earlier), and the second concerns whether compli-
ance can be verified. Here we discuss verification.
Local monitoring and corruption. Under a commitment to either price or 
quantity, it is possible for emitters to bribe the carbon-tax collector or the 
carbon-permit collector (Tirole, 2012; Victor, 2001). Such corruption will 
impose inefficiency on the country but will not disrupt the enforcement of 
the international commitment, which only requires information of a more 
aggregate nature. If a power plant dodges its carbon charge, national carbon 
revenues are reduced. So the country must charge other emitters more to 
meet its average-price commitment, but the national commitment is still 
verifiable.
National monitoring and corruption. Emissions should be measured by moni-
toring the inflow of fossil fuel from extraction and net imports. Even so, 
with more than 500 coal mines in India and more than 18,000 in China, 
emissions monitoring could be poorly enforced or deliberately distorted. 
Similarly, under a price commitment, national carbon-pricing revenues 
could be falsely reported. Although this could be a serious problem in a 
number of countries, there are several ways to mitigate such problems. 
There could be monitoring by the International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, International Energy Agency, or World Trade Organization, all of 
which do some similar monitoring already. Countries receiving green funds 
could be required to open their national accounting books to receive such 
funds.
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Finally, most real carbon pricing will be reflected in visible prices at gas 
stations, in home heating bills, and in retail electricity prices. These prices 
could be easily monitored. So verification is possible under either com-
mitment, but in a few countries, it may require a significant effort. Both 
commitments would include a requirement to allow verification, and any 
country that did not cooperate would be considered to be out of compli-
ance and would be sanctioned as if it had not met its price or quantity 
commitment.
International monitoring and corruption. On a global level, the corruption 
problem is asymmetric. Suppose a local official, on behalf of a kleptocratic 
ruler, allows a company to underreport emission so that it needs fewer car-
bon permits. The kleptocrat then sells supposedly surplus international car-
bon permits to a perfectly honest country. As Nordhaus (2008) explained, 
both the government and private company benefit because this shifts 
money from honest to corrupt countries. It also crowds out the honest 
country’s abatements.
Conclusion on monitoring. Proponents of international cap-and-trade claim 
a carbon price cannot be monitored. Yet they claim that cap-and-trade will 
solve the export-import problem that results from international carbon-
price differentials. But as we saw earlier, equality of nationally traded per-
mit prices says nothing about the price of carbon emissions from exporters 
or anyone else. So the export-import problem can only be solved by moni-
toring the carbon prices paid by exporters. In other words, a crucial claim of 
cap-and-trade proponents relies on the assumption that carbon prices can 
be monitored accurately under the worst of conditions—at the local level, 
in industries where (unlike at gas stations) the price can be camouflaged, 
and where there is perhaps the strongest incentive for corruption.
Overall, looking at the various arguments in favor and against each com-
mitment type with respect to monitoring and corruption, we tend to agree 
with Nordhaus (2008), who concludes, “Quantity-type systems are much 
more susceptible to corruption than price-type regimes,” and with Cooper 
(2008), who concludes that a global cap-and-trade system “will unavoid-
ably foster rampant corruption.”
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Will Carbon Emission Actually Be Priced?
The point of international cap-and-trade is usually viewed as imposing 
on “all CO2 emitters the cost of their damage to the climate.”7 The result of 
this would be an economically efficient reduction in emissions. This effi-
ciency is a central goal of the policy partly because cost reduction is a great 
help in making a strong policy sustainable. Environmentalists, however, 
generally have quite a different goal for cap-and-trade. Their view is that 
the price doesn’t matter but that the cap is a good old-fashioned command-
and-control mechanism.
So the question is, will international cap-and-trade induce a uniform 
and an efficient carbon price as economists would like, or will it produce 
an inefficient mix of national command-and-control policies? Let us look 
at the Kyoto Protocol, which priced international permits and allowed 
any national policy. Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) note that 
within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries, there were direct subsidies to green technologies, which resulted 
in implicit carbon prices that range from “less than 0” to “as large as 1,000 
€.” It is likely that most of this range was spanned within countries that 
were under the Kyoto Protocol. Gollier and Tirole conclude that such poli-
cies demonstrate “the inefficiency of this command-and-control approach.”
In other words, in the only test case, the outcome was, by and large, not 
what economists hoped for but rather the inefficient command-and-con-
trol policies. Two conclusions seem evident. International cap-and-trade 
need not induce much if anything in the way of actual carbon pricing, 
and it may leave the current command-and-control approaches untouched. 
In other words, international cap-and-trade may not achieve the central 
objective of its proponents but rather the opposite.
Committing to a Price Is Less Risky
Quantity targets are favored because they supposedly remove the risk of 
emission and climate uncertainty and shift that risk to nations in the form 
of price and cost uncertainty. Although their success at limiting climate 
risk has been dismal, in part due to the uncertainty of the resulting quan-
tity agreements and disagreements, quantity targets do impose risks on the 
countries that adopt them.
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More specifically, accepting a quantity commitment entails risk because 
future business-as-usual (BAU) emissions and abatement costs are both 
highly uncertain. Suppose that a country expects BAU emissions of 100 Mt 
and considers two commitments: (1) a quantity reduction to 90 Mt, and 
(2) a price of $20/t. Assume these are equivalent (they both cause the same 
price and same emission quantity). Furthermore, assume that the global 
carbon price will be $20/t.
Now suppose that the country’s BAU emissions turn out to be 110 Mt 
(10 Mt higher than expected). Under the quantity commitment, the $20/t 
global price will reduce emissions 10% to 99 Mt. But the country will only 
have been issued 90 Mt of permits, so it will need to buy 9 Mt of permits 
on the world market for a cost of $180 M. Under a price commitment, the 
country simply sets its carbon price to $20/t as if nothing had changed.
Although the price-commitment policy specifies that countries keep all 
of the carbon revenues from pricing carbon, there is still a social cost. To 
find that cost, note that the more that is abated, the greater the cost per 
ton is abated, with the per-unit cost starting at $0/ton and reaching a maxi-
mum of $P/ton. So the standard estimate of the cost of abatement, A, under 
carbon price, P, is A × P/2, or in this case, 11 Mt × ($20/Mt)/2, which equals 
$110 M. This cost occurs under either policy because the global price of $20 
causes 11 Mt of abatement in both cases.
Hence, the total cost under the quantity commitment is $180 M + $110 
M = $290 M. That’s 2.6 times as much as the $110 M cost under the price 
commitment. But some cost was expected to occur under the expected 
BAU emission of 100 Mt. That expected cost was 10M × $20/2, or $100 
M. So the unexpected cost under the quantity policy is $290 M − $100 
M = $190 M, whereas the unexpected cost under the price commitment is 
$110 M − $100 M = $10 M. The financial risk from a possible 10% shock 
to BAU emissions in this example is 19 times greater than under a price 
commitment.8
This example does not exaggerate the risks of quantity commitments. 
In 2000, the US Department of Energy’s International Energy Outlook pre-
dicted China’s 2010 emissions would be 1.5 Gt, but in the event, emis-
sions were more than 7 Gt—nearly a 400% error rather than the 10% error 
assumed in the previous example. Quantity targets generally have been set 
10 to 15 years in advance. Moreover, quantity errors can have high political 
sensitivity. If China had committed to a cap in 2000 equal to its expected 
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BAU emissions (not reduced by any cooperative climate efforts), it would 
have been purchasing more than 5 billion tons of permits annually by 2010 
from perhaps the United States and the European Union. This would have 
likely caused a dramatic permit shortage and high carbon prices, but even 
at $20/ton, this comes to $100 billion per year in highly visible transfers to 
foreign countries. If China had made anything like the quantity commit-
ments desired of it by cap-and-trade advocates at that time, quantity risks 
would have likely destroyed that international quantity commitment and 
any associated cap-and-trade treaty. China was right to reject such quantity 
commitments.
Enforcement
Measurement delays. A major advantage of monitoring and enforcement 
of a price commitment is that it is an annual rather than a once-in-15- 
year event, such as the Kyoto Protocol or China’s recent commitment to 
cap emissions in 2030. This creates free-riding incentives and diffuses 
responsibilities among successive governments within countries and makes 
it difficult to repair noncompliance. Annual price commitments have the 
advantage that cheating can be quickly detected and quickly corrected 
because full compliance can be achieved simply by increasing the carbon 
charge. Indeed, frequent monitoring is known to be one of the most critical 
aspects of self-enforcing cooperation (Ostrom, 1990).
Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) propose a fix for this prob-
lem: “Countries will have to match pollution and permits at the end of 
the year to avoid creating unfulfilled climatic debt.” Unfortunately, this 
proposal blocks banking and borrowing of permits, the standard method of 
mitigating the volatility of permit prices. Such price volatility is likely to be 
unpopular with investors and the public.9
Successful enforcement is one key to successful cooperation (Nordhaus, 
2015 and chapter 7, this volume). We have argued before that cooperation 
based on a common commitment is relatively easy to enforce because the 
common commitment enables a reciprocal relationship, which is known 
to promote cooperation. Here we argue that a common price commitment 
facilitates enforcement compared with a quantity commitment. One rea-
son is that a price commitment is continuously monitored and thus more 
easily. Another reason is that it reduces risks. Risks can produce strong 
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incentives to leave or avoid a quantity commitment. Without such strong 
negative incentives, the needed size of the enforcement penalty is reduced. 
Finally, price commitments reduce the required size of equity transfers (as 
we describe later), which also reduces the needed size of the enforcement 
penalty.
Various complementary mechanisms can further ease the enforcement 
of price commitments (e.g., efficient performance, which we borrow from 
modern electricity markets, where deviations from plans are settled at the 
market price for carbon revenues). In other words, a country that exceeds 
its commitment can sell its excess performance to a country that falls short. 
This guarantees that plans are met in aggregate and yet gives countries the 
flexibility to easily and efficiently react in an uncertain environment. Effi-
cient resolution of deviations from plans greatly reduces risks, facilitates 
performance, and encourages participation.
The Waiting Game
Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume) explain that negotiations 
which are currently ineffective but are likely to eventually result in indi-
vidual pledges contribute to what they call the “waiting game.” The result 
of this game is that present behavior, while waiting for an agreement on 
individual commitments, can be even worse than the outcome of the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium of the public goods game—worse than with-
out any thought of cooperation.
The problem does not arise if a common commitment is expected to be 
the eventual outcome. Yet if individual climate commitments are expected, 
then it pays countries to jockey now for position in the final round of com-
mitments. For example, if it is expected that commitments will be made 
relative to 2020 emissions or some future BAU emissions, then it pays to 
not take easy actions to reduce emissions before 2020.
But if the eventual commitment will be a common price, then having 
higher emissions in 2020 will simply mean more emissions will be taxed 
at the global price. This confers no advantage on the recalcitrant country. 
That is, deciding now to agree on a common price ends the waiting game 
now, although there is still a wait for the actual agreement.
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The Role of the Green Fund and Equity Transfers
Equity Transfers Are Less Expensive With Price Commitments
Agreeing on price as the indicator of global action opens the door to a com-
mon commitment. However, poorer countries, such as India, will feel that 
they should receive significant help with it. Fortunately, this is relatively 
inexpensive. Because India’s carbon-pricing revenues would stay in India, 
pricing India’s two billion tons of emissions at $20 per ton will have a net 
cost to India of only about $2 billion if emissions were reduced 10%—far 
less than the planned $100 billion per year Green Climate Fund. This is 
not to suggest that India should be given an exception to the common 
commitment. Rather, the common commitment should include a Green 
Fund formula for providing assistance from richer, high-emission countries 
to poorer, low-emission countries. In this way, the common pricing com-
mitment would respect the UN’s principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities.”
Equity transfers need not be as high with price commitments because 
risk is lower. As seen in the previous example of price and quantity risk, if 
a country expects a $100 million cost of abatement, but there is a risk that 
its BAU emissions will be unexpectedly high by 10%, then this would add 
$190 million in the case of a quantity commitment and only $10 million 
in the case of a price commitment. If the country demands that this risk be 
covered by equity transfers, then these will need to be $180 million larger 
in the case of a quantity commitment. Politically, it seems difficult for a 
poor country to risk having its equity transfer obliterated by a miscalcula-
tion of future BAU emissions.
Choosing a Green Fund Formula
By committing to a uniform global price, we have confined the differentiated-
responsibilities problem to the Green Fund formula. This makes possible 
a natural and less-divisive principle for national differentiation. The new 
design principle is to choose the Green Fund formula that maximizes global 
emissions abatement.
This suggests a two-step design: select the Green Fund formula and then 
choose the common price. This is similar to many political processes in 
which it is common to specify the payment and benefit structure before 
deciding how much to spend on a program, say a school system. When 
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voters are pleased with the payment-benefit structure, they will be gener-
ous in voting for a strong program. If they are displeased, then they will 
be less generous. This arrangement gives those designing the payment-
benefit structure, in this case, the Green Fund structure, a strong incentive 
to design the structure to please all of those whose support is needed. It 
also allows the funders to have peace of mind when the funders delegate 
authority to those negotiating the structure—first because they know that 
they can reject or minimize the proposed structure if it is not to their lik-
ing, and second because they know the negotiator/designers will be well 
aware of this.
Compare this to the cap-and-trade alternative, which is also a two-step 
approach. First, the global cap Q is selected and then the permit allocations 
{Ai} are negotiated. But, as noted earlier, Q is an aspiration and not a com-
mitment, so all of the work of solving the climate-effort and equity-transfer 
problems is bundled into the single step of negotiating {Ai}. In contrast, 
the two-step approach of pricing breaks the problem in two—choosing cli-
mate effort (P) and negotiating equity transfers {Gi}—this simplifies both 
negotiations. Then it links the two halves so that the availability of the 
step-two price decision provides good incentives for, and confidence in, the 
Green Fund design process, and the Green Fund design is properly focused 
on making the price negotiation successful. This is why the “{Gi} then P” 
negotiation process can outperform the “Q then {Ai}” process.
We now describe, for the sake of concreteness, a possible pair of negoti-
ating procedures, beginning with the step-two price negotiation. To set the 
price, countries pledge their highest acceptable global price target, taking 
the step-one Green Fund formula into account. Then the highest price 
target acceptable to, say, 70% of the countries (population-weighted) deter-
mines the global price commitment.10 Only countries that have pledged 
at least that price would sign the global-pricing agreement and partici-
pate in the green fund.11 (This “club” could then implement enforcement 
that could induce additional members to join; see Stiglitz, chapter 6, this 
volume.)
Before describing step one, the Green Fund negotiation, we note 
that, as pointed out by Gollier and Tirole (chapter 10, this volume), it is 
an n-dimensional negotiation and hence difficult. As with the climate-
effort negotiations, a common formula is needed, but here we are not 
lucky enough to have something as simple and well-agreed-on as a 
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uniform price. Nonetheless, it pays to look for an equity formula that is 
focal and has a single parameter that can differentiate responsibilities to 
the extent required. Of course, in reality, no simple formula will be suffi-
cient. However, this example will serve to illustrate the value of looking for 
a common-commitment formula, even if the actual one needs to weight 
multiple relevant variables.
The formula that we propose as simplest and most focal for Green Fund 
transfers is to make transfers proportional to a country’s excess emissions. 
These are defined as emissions that are in excess of what the country would 
emit if it had world-average per capita emissions. Countries pay into the 
green fund in proportion to their excess emissions and receive payments 
from the green fund in proportion to their negative excess emissions.
There seems little doubt that this formula would work if accepted 
because perfection is not required. But it would likely not achieve as high 
a price as a more detailed and thoughtfully designed formula. The formula 
should be judged by how high a price results from its use in the stage-two 
voting process.
The excess-emissions formula must also include a generosity parame-
ter, G, that determines its strength—how many dollars per ton of excess 
emissions will be transferred. If the Green Fund formula is too generous, 
rich countries will hold down the global price to reduce Green Fund pay-
ments. If the formula is too miserly, then poor countries will hold down 
the carbon price to reduce the burden of carbon pricing. Only a compro-
mise on generosity will lead to the highest agreed global carbon price and 
maximize abatement ambition. Hence, the objective of maximizing ambi-
tion leads naturally to a reasonably fair compromise on differentiation of 
responsibilities.
To ensure that the generosity of the Green Fund formula is set objec-
tively to maximize climate ambition, it will be best to rely on countries 
that have the least stake in Green Fund payments. Such countries will base 
their recommendations on climate rather than Green Fund considerations. 
Within such a group, the median (not the average) opinion should deter-
mine the outcome. This prevents any one country from having too much 
influence (Cramton and Stoft, 2012a, 2012b).
When proposing individual commitments, the United States (2013) 
argues that it is “hard to imagine that Parties would be willing to have 
other Parties dictate their contributions.” But the prior illustrative agree-
ment shows the U.S. argument is irrelevant. Under such an agreement, no 
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country will ever be asked to commit to a price higher than it nominates 
voluntarily with full knowledge of the generosity of the green fund. Noth-
ing is “dictated” by other parties. Despite the completely voluntary nature 
of this treaty, the resulting agreement captures the “I will if you will” effect 
of a common commitment that modifies self-interest within the agreeing 
group. Hence, each country’s self-interest in naming a high price will be 
increased dramatically relative to the individual commitments the United 
States is proposing.
Why Opaqueness Is Not an Argument for Quantity Commitments
Some observers argue that a green fund is too transparent to be politically 
acceptable and that a supposed lack of transparency is a major advantage 
of cap-and-trade. However, the cap-and-trade programs often referred to are 
domestic and are opaque for a different reason. Their transfers are not in 
the form of traceable money. Companies get paid mainly by raising com-
modity prices by an amount that is hard to measure and that most people 
cannot comprehend. In contrast, international purchases of AAUs—the 
real standard of comparison—have been extremely controversial, as we 
described in our introduction. Indeed, we find it difficult to believe that 
large cross-border money transfers through perfectly transparent markets 
would not catch the public’s attention. It seems even more likely that the 
transfer will become obvious at an earlier stage. To give India a large trans-
fer, India must receive a cap that is far above its BAU emissions level. This 
part of the transfer will be highly visible, and past comments have shown 
that environmentalists will find this highly objectionable. It will also make 
it impossible to explain to the US public why the United States is giving a 
multibillion dollar climate transfer to a country that is required to do less 
than nothing.
That said, even if the supposed opaqueness of permit transfers is some-
thing worth taking advantage of, this might be possible under a price com-
mitment without incurring the political risk premiums associated with 
quantity commitments. For example, instead of the US government paying 
India $100 million, it could allow US businesses to purchase offsets from 
the Indian government at the global price of carbon, and India could be 
issued a package of say 5 million one-ton permits. Although these would 
be just as visible as permits under cap-and-trade, they would not cause the 
financial risks of cap-and-trade.
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Conclusions
Despite much rhetoric, there is almost no hope that the Paris pledge-and-
review approach, if based on individual pledges, can solve the climate 
dilemma. Rather, to address the dilemma, we agree with all experts in this 
book that a common commitment is necessary. In this chapter, we reiter-
ate Weitzman’s plea that price and quantity commitments be compared 
on a level playing field. This seems eminently reasonable because quantity 
commitments have had the field to themselves for more than 20 years and 
failed repeatedly. Quantity commitments have been favored partly because 
of the misperception that caps provide stronger incentives and more cer-
tainty than a price, together with an incorrect analogy between an easily 
enforced domestic cap and unenforced international caps. Yet for reasons 
that we and other contributors to this book explain, a price commitment is 
likely a much more promising basis for a common commitment; it is a fair 
focal point, reduces risks, is easier to enforce, and is consistent with climate 
policies already in place. Indeed, one beauty of a carbon-price commitment 
is that it will not interfere with the current, dispersed cap-and-trade experi-
ments, thereby leaving the door open to a future rehabilitation of caps and 
keeping alive the fundamental idea of using price.
Promoting cooperation in international climate negotiations is the crux 
of the climate problem. We hope that our chapter, along with the other 
contributions in this book, will provide guidance to those shaping inter-
national climate policy after Paris. After more than 20 years of failure, surely 
it is worth attempting a fresh approach, one that is guided by insights from 
the science of cooperation.
Notes
1. We will return to this later. For the moment, observe that democracies habitually 
solve national public-goods problems by voting on a common commitment. Usu-
ally this is a commitment to pay a uniform tax with revenues used for public goods, 
such as parks, highways, education, defense, or cleaning up toxic waste. Voting for a 
tax is an organized approach to saying, “I will adhere to the common commitment 
if you will.”
2. In other words, a treaty based on a common commitment is a partially self-
enforcing treaty.
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3. Kyoto Chairman Estrada personally suggested the target of “8% below 1990 
emissions” for many countries, and many countries adopted his suggestion when 
submitting their final pledges.
4. “Japan is defending itself against criticism that it’s exploiting a surplus of Kyoto 
assigned credits and using ‘hot air’ to meet emission targets.” Bloomberg, July 23, 
2009. The importance of high-profile political ramifications caused by unpredictable 
public transfers between rival countries was anticipated by Cooper (2004): “What US 
Senator, once s/he understands the full implications of a trading regime, can vote 
for a procedure which could result in the unconditional transfer of billions of dol-
lars, even tens of billions, to the government of communist China, or to Castro’s 
Cuba, or even to Putin’s Russia?”
5. See carbonmarketwatch.org/doha-on-aaus-the-future-of-the-phantom-menace.
6. In its March 11, 2013, submission, the United States stated, “It is hard to imagine 
agreement on any formula or criteria for imposition of contributions, as this would 
get into the most controversial issues.”
7. From https://sites.google.com/a/chaireeconomieduclimat.org/tse-cec-joint-initiative/ 
some-economic-perspectives, accessed July 14, 2015.
8. Based on our example, Weitzman (2015) has recently shown in a rigorous and 
general model that under uncertainty, internationally tradable permits expose a 
country to unambiguously greater risk than the imposition of a uniform carbon 
price whose tax proceeds are domestically retained.
9. In that respect, the first trading period in the context of the EU ETS provides 
a good lesson of undesired price effects when banking and borrowing are not 
allowed.
10. The higher the coverage of global emissions, the lower the price that will be 
agreed to by all the countries that must be included to achieve that coverage.
11. Countries may also agree on a price path. In any case, this initial agreement 
would be updated periodically with the intention of increasing its coverage and 
strength, and of reflecting the improving estimates of costs and benefits of climate 
change.
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